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Abstract 
This thesis investigates our sensitivity to social signals from the face, both in health 
and disease, and explores some of the methodologies employed to measure them. 
The first set of experiments used forced choice and free naIll1ng paradigms to 
investigate the interpretation of a set of facial expressions by Western and Japanese 
participants. Performance in the forced choice task exceeded that measured in the free 
naming task for both cultures, but the Japanese participants were found to be 
particularly poor at labelling expressions of fear and disgust. The difficulties 
experienced with translation and interpretation in these tasks led to the development of 
a psychophysical paradigm which was used to measure the signalling strength of 
facial expressions without the need for participants to interpret what they saw. 
Psychophysical tasks were also used to measure sensitivity to eye gaze direction. A 
'live' and screen-based task produced comparable thresholds and revealed that our 
sensitivity to these ocular signals was at least as good as Snellen acuity. 
Manipulations of the facial surround in the screen-based task revealed that the 
detection of gaze direction was facilitated by the presence of the facial surround and as 
such it can be assumed that gaze discriminations are likely to be made in conjunction 
with other face processing analyses. 
The tasks developed in these chapters were used to test two patients with bilateral 
amygdala damage. Patients with this brain injury have been reported to experience 
difficulties in the interpretation of facial and auditory signals of fear. In this thesis, 
their performance was found to depend on the task used to measure it. However, 
neither patient was found to be impaired in their ability to label fearful expressions 
compared to control participants. Instead, patient SE demonstrated a consistently poor 
performance in his ability to interpret expressions of disgust. 
Vll 
Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter 3, have also been reported in Perception, 1995, 
Vol. 24, Supplement, pp. 14. The Face as a long distance transmitter. Jenkins, J., 
Craven, B. & Bruce, V. 
Experiments 1,2,3 and 4 of Chapter 3 were also reported in the Technical Report of 
the Institute of Electronics Information and Communication Engineers. HIP 96-39 
(1997-03). Methods for detecting social signals from the face. Jenkins, J., Craven, 
B., Bruce, V., & Akamatsu, S. 
Experiments 2 and 5 of Chapter 3, and a selection of the patient studies from Chapter 
6 were reported at the Experimental Psychology Society, Bristol meeting, 1996, and 
at the Applied Vision Association, Annual Meeting, April, 1996. Sensitivity to 
Expressive Signals from the Human Face: Psychophysical and Neuropsychological 
Investigations. Jenkins, J., Bruce, V., Calder, A., & Craven, B. 
V111 
"Consider the meaning of a face. A face can be a symbol, signifying matter which 
would require volumes for its exposition in successive detail. A vast sum, for the 
person on whom it acts as a symbol, of feelings and thoughts, of remembered 
sensations, impressions, judgements, experiences - all rendered synthetically and 
simultaneously, at a single glance" 
Aldous Huxley from "Eyeless in Gaza" 1936. 
Facial Expressions and Eye Gaze 
Overview 
How sensitive are we to the socially relevant signals with which we are confronted 
in our non-verbal communications with other people, and how can we measure 
these sensitivities? In our day-to-day interactions with people we witness a huge 
range of dynamic facial displays varying in meaning and intensity which can 
change in a fraction of a second. In addition we monitor eye contact to infer the 
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attention and also intentions of others. These demands would seem to pose huge 
processing loads, and yet for most of us, we perform these tasks effortlessly and 
accurately. Until very recently, most of the research on facial expression 
recognition and gaze detection has been the concern of social psychologists who 
have extensively studied their role in social interactions. This thesis examines our 
ability to detect social signals from a range of viewing conditions, using a range of 
methodological approaches. 
Some of the problems of using the traditional forced choice paradigms of 
expression research are demonstrated in Chapter 2, with suggestions for improved 
methodology examined in Chapter 3. Similar approaches are applied in 
investigations into our sensitivities to eye gaze direction and the significance of the 
entire face in these tasks is explored in Chapter 4. Neuropsychological patients have 
given us great insights into the understanding of many normal brain operations. 
Some of the conditions that result in difficulties with facial expression processing 
are described in Chapter 5. Recently there has been considerable interest in the 
amygdala, a brain structure which has been implicated in the appraisal of danger 
and the emotion of fear. Chapter 6 describes how a range of tasks developed and 
described in the early chapters of this thesis have been used in the assessment of 
two such brain injured patients. This chapter reviews some of the literature which 
considers our faces as transmitters of socially relevant information, from 
recognition of familiar faces to expression and gaze sensitivity. 
Face Value 
A cursory glance at another individual is sufficient for us to make a wealth of 
decisions and judgements about that individual. Human faces provide a surface 
which covers a relatively small area of our bodies and yet it is involved in an 
amazing variety of functions. The majority of our sensory apparatus is housed in 
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this small part of our bodies: eyes, ears, nose and mouth which allow us to see, 
hear, smell and taste. In addition the face provides the entry points for air and food 
and the lips, teeth, tongue and jaw are used for eating, but also in the generation of 
speech. In addition to the sensory and biological functions of our facial features, our 
faces are surfaces which provide an abundance of socially relevant information. 
From them we are able to identify familiar people, make judgements about gender, 
age, mood, health, tiredness and attractiveness. Intentionally or not, we also make 
certain judgements about the character of a person, their intelligence or personality 
for example, simply from our perceptions of their physical characteristics. We also 
use our faces to control social interactions by monitoring gaze cues and expressive 
signals. The amount of visible sclera in the eye gives us cues about where another 
individual is attending, and we use the amount of eye contact experienced to 
generate ideas about the levels of interest we are generating with other people. 
Someone else's gazing behaviour can tell us a considerable amount about a person; 
too much and it is considered to be inappropriate and causes unease, too little and 
the person is described as inattentive or rude. Our eyes are also gainfully employed 
to express emotion which is again achieved by moderating the amount of visible 
sclera by raising or lowering the eyelids and brows. The position of a person's 
tongue and their lip movements increase our understanding of their speech. The 
hearing impaired can supplement their impoverished auditory information by lip-
reading and in fact all of us benefit from the ability to see the lips during speech 
especially in a noisy environment. MacLeod and Summerfield (1987) suggested 
that the ability to see a person's mouth during speech has the equivalent advantage 
of a 15dB increase in volume, and conveniently enough, sounds which are difficult 
to distinguish by ear are easily distinguished by eye and vice versa. 
The small area occupied by the facial features and the constraints upon them 
regarding their position means that variations between individuals are very subtle 
and yet, with the possible exception of identical twins, no two faces are the same. 
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Despite the small size of the individual facial features and the limited range over 
which they can move, we can see how they combine to make us efficient sensory 
and biological organisms with a highly developed non-verbal communication 
system. The saliency of the human face is demonstrated explicitly by the human 
neonate. Within the first few minutes of birth, human infants have been shown to 
follow a schematic pattern of a face with their gaze and head further than a pattern 
which contains an equivalent amount of visual information but does not conform to 
a face i.e. scrambled features or an inverted image (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis & 
Morton, 1991). Bushnell, Sai and Mullin (1989) demonstrated that infants appeared 
to learn the face of their mother within a matter of days whereas the ability to 
distinguish between other faces takes several months. Neonates have also been 
shown to imitate facial expressions (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), and to recognise 
expressions when only a few days old (Field, Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 
1982). Walker-Andrews (1986) found that infants aged 7 months seemed sensitive 
to the pairing of facial expressions with the correct affective auditory sounds. 
The power of the face is realised most dramatically when its dynamic ability to 
portray emotion is absent or lost. Mobius syndrome is a congenital condition which 
is manifested by a complete facial paralysis (Giannini, Tamulonis, Matthew, 
Giannini, Loiselle, & Spirtos, 1984). These patients often lead very isolated lives 
and have difficulty in experiencing emotion as a direct result of their lack of 
expression. Patients who experience facial paralysis, perhaps as the result of a 
stroke, are unable to make appropriate responses to the people around them. Cole 
(1997) reported one such patient who, lacking the appropriate facial language, 
doctors had deemed demented despite the fact that she was intellectually 
unimpaired. The lack of a face had the effect of invalidating her as a person. Cole 
also reported the experiences of a man who lost his sight in adulthood and whose 
memory for the faces he once knew, including his own, had faded. The impact that 
this loss had on the individual was not just confined to the loss of his vision, but 
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also involved a sense of loss of who he was. Our faces seem to be inextricably 
linked with much deeper perceptions of ourselves, and serve much more 
complicated roles than their obvious biological and sensory functions. 
At first thought, the face may seem a fairly unsophisticated subject for study and in 
this modern age of rational thought and cognitive deduction quite how useful are 
our faces and the signals they portray? One of the best examples of the importance 
of our ability to express and feel emotion is seen in the story of Phineas Gage. Gage 
was a construction foreman of the nineteenth century. An accident while using 
explosives resulted in an iron rod over three and a half feet in length and one and a 
quarter inches in diameter entering his left cheek, piercing the base of his skull, 
crossing the front of his brain and exiting through the top of his head. Miraculously 
Gage survived and after only a few months convalescence was considered to be 
cured. Despite a remarkable physical recovery, Gage's personality was severely 
altered and remained so for the rest of his life (Damasio, 1994). Brain injury like the 
one experienced by Gage which reduces or removes an individual's ability to feel 
emotion can result in the individual making decisions which are positively 
disadvantageous to their well-being. This can occur despite normal intelligence, 
memory and rational problem solving. However, many decisions are made by 
considerations of possible outcomes, for which a person must be able to attribute an 
emotional feeling to potential consequences. Cognitive reason and information 
alone is not sufficient to make a decision, we all need input from our emotions and 
the ability to express these emotions to function as normal human beings. The face 
is one of the most important sources of information about emotion. Considered like 
this, our faces and their bewildering range of functions can be considered one of our 
most valuable assets. 
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Memory for Faces and their Owners 
We are able to recognise the face of someone whom we may have only met on one 
occasion several years ago, and despite the changes of ageing, weight or hairstyle 
we are still aware that this person is known to us and we experience the sensation of 
'recognition'. In addition, there appears to be no limit to the number of faces we can 
store and hence recognise. The loss of the ability to recognise familiar faces -
prosopagnosia, which can occur as a result of a brain injury, can have a profound 
effect on the life of the patient. Of course the face is not the only means by which 
we can recognise familiar individuals and many prosopagnosic patients develop 
idiosyncratic strategies to overcome their disability. Recognition can be achieved 
from voices, hairstyles or even a person's clothing or gait. However, the face is the 
most distinctive and available means by which we identify people. In order for us to 
recognise a familiar person we must be able to access previously stored knowledge 
of every individual we meet and retrieve information about the semantic knowledge 
we may have of the person, i.e. their occupation, nationality or interests. So, the 
study of faces offers us the potential to investigate the way in which the brain 
integrates incoming sensory information about a person including making 
judgements such as gender, age and expression with stored memories of that 
person. The ability to access these stored memories is very important as it ensures 
that we behave in a manner appropriate for that person. 
Models of Face Recognition 
The study of face recognition has interested psychologists for several decades now 
providing insight into cognitive and perceptual mechanisms in the brain. More 
recently, psychologists have joined with computer scientists and engineers to 
further their understanding of how this process is achieved. These findings have 
implications in a forensic setting, e.g. eye witness testimony, and also for security 
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purposes. For example, Hancock, Burton and Bruce (1996) have used the technique 
of Principle Components Analysis for machine based recognition and shown that 
such image-based statistics can provide an insight into actual human face 
processing. 
(i) The Bruce & Young Model of Face Recognition 
During the late eighties, considerable advances were being made in the 
understanding of the stages involved in the process of face recognition and several 
functional models describing these stages were published (e.g. Bruce & Young, 
1986). All of the models were broadly similar although the Bruce and Young 
(1986) model has received the most attention over the years. 
The model was designed by combining empirical data obtained from normal 
subjects in the laboratory, information from everyday errors and data obtained from 
neuropsychological patients. The model reflects different aspects of face 
processing; person recognition, expression analysis and facial speech analysis 
which are shown as occurring in parallel routes (Figure 1.1). Important though this 
model is, however, it omitted to account for gaze perception as an element of face 
processmg. 
The face recognition route has received the most attention over the years. The 
Bruce and Young (1986) model describes the distinct sequential stages which are 
involved in the process of identifying a person by their face. The first stage involves 
'face recognition units' (FRUs) which are responsible for perceptual classification. 
The FRU becomes activated when any view of the appropriate face is seen. The 
product of structural encoding must match a previously stored structural code for 
that particular face in order for recognition to be achieved. Once the FRU is 
activated, the appropriate 'person identity node' (PIN) becomes activated. The PIN 
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provides semantic information about each known face; nationality, profession, 
interests, context of previous encounters etc . 
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Figure 1.1. Bruce and Young's (1986) functional model offace recognition. 
Unlike FRUs, PINs are activated by any input modality, the face, voice, or even a 
written or heard name. The final stage in this process, if the face is known, is the 
retrieval of the individual's name which according to Bruce and Young (1986) can 
occur only via the PINs. This model also supposes that the cognitive system plays a 
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role in deciding if the match is close enough for recognition, or if the seen face 
simply resembles one from stored units. According to Bruce and Young (1986) 
there are major differences in the processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces. 
Recognition of familiar faces as described, primarily depends on structural 
encoding, face recognition units, person identity nodes, and name generation. 
Unfamiliar faces seen for the first time are not represented in the FRUIPIN system, 
but, in common with familiar face processing, the processing of unfamiliar faces 
involves structural encoding, expression analysis, facial speech analysis, and 
directed visual processing. 
(ii) The Interactive Activation and Competition (lAC) model 
In more recent years, the microstructure of the components of the Bruce and Young 
(1986) model concerned with recognition has been explored by the development of 
an interactive activation and competition (lAC) network (Burton, Bruce & 
Johnston, 1990). Models like lAC can be used as a framework for developing 
predictions which can subsequently be tested within the field of face recognition 
(e.g. Burton, Young, Bruce, Johnston, & Ellis, 1991). 
The lAC model has a connectionist architecture of active units connected by 
modifiable links. The model consists of a number of units organised into pools. This 
model assumes three pools of information: The FRU's are view independent units 
which are activated by the presence of any familiar face; PIN's are domain and 
modality free gateways into semantic information, and are where familiarity 
decisions are made (rather than as Bruce and Young (1986) proposed, at the 
FRU's). A face is recognised as familiar when activation in the appropriate PIN 
reaches a threshold level of activation. Recognition is achieved in this way 
irrespective of input modality, i.e. face, voice, name or other information. The third 
pool contains semantic information units which, according to Burton and Bruce 
(1992), contain names and other information about an individual (e.g. occupation; 
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interests). So unlike the Bruce and Young (1986) model, this model has no separate 
store for names. Burton et al (1990) demonstrated that this model was capable of 
accounting for a range of findings from empirical studies regarding recognition 
which included face familiarity decision tasks, semantic and identity priming tasks. 
This thesis concerns the processing of signals other than identity. The next section 
explores the relationship between facial identity and other face processing 
mechanisms which are discussed in greater detail later. 
Parallel Processing of Facial Signals 
Bruce and Young (1986) proposed that the three primary aspects of face processing: 
identification, expression analysis, and lip-reading proceed independently within 
the human information processing system. Convincing evidence to support the idea 
of separate pathways has been presented from neurophysiological research and 
research with neuropsychological patients. There are numerous reports of double 
dissociations in neuropsychological patients who lose their ability to perform one 
aspect of face processing while others remain intact (Young, 1992; Young, 
Newcombe, de Haan, Small, & Hay, 1993; Malone, Morris, Kay, & Levin, 1982; 
Campbell, Landis & Regard 1986). Observations of dissociable impairments which 
affect different aspects of face processing are consistent with the idea that the brain 
processes different types of social signals independently from one another. 
(i) Identity and Expression 
The idea of separate pathways for the processing of identity and expression is 
intuitively appealing. We need to recognise individuals regardless of their 




Neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies have provided particularly 
strong evidence for the separate processing of these facial signals. Tranel, Damasio 
and Damasio (1988), described three patients who were impaired in their ability to 
recognise identity from the face but whose ability to recognise facial expressions 
was intact. Kurucz and Feldmar (1979) described a group of elderly patients with 
chronic organic brain syndrome, some of whom were found to be severely impaired 
in their ability to recognise facial affect although their ability to recognise famous 
faces was preserved. Young et al (1993) conducted an extensive study with a group 
of ex-servicemen who had all sustained unilateral brain injuries which affected the 
posterior areas of the left or right cerebral hemisphere. The nature of the 
impairment was confirmed by measuring the performance of each participant on 
two different tasks for each of the postulated impairments. A selective impairment 
was diagnosed if performance on both tests was found to be significantly impaired. 
Amongst the group, they found evidence from their accuracy data for selective 
impairments in the ability to recognize familiar faces, to match unfamiliar faces and 
to process facial expressions. However, when response latencies were examined the 
position became less clear. Nonetheless, the selective deficit for expression was still 
evident. Thus there is clear evidence of a double dissociation between identity and 
expressIOn. 
Evidence from normal participants has been reported by Young, Mc Weeny, Hay 
and Ellis (1986) who used a speeded matching task on normals and found that 
matching faces on identity was faster for familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces, 
but that expression matching was unaffected by the familiarity of the face. 
Physiological evidence is consistent with this double dissociation. Hasselmo, Rolls, 
and Baylis (1989) reported populations of cells within the temporal lobe cortex 
which responded preferentially to identity or to expression. The cells which were 
found to be sensitive to expression were found within the superior temporal sulcus 
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which Perrett, Smith, Potter, Mistlin, Head, Milner, and Jeeves (1985) have also 
shown to house cells which are sensitive to the direction of gaze. 
Perceptual experiments have shown that judgements about facial expressions are 
made with the same accuracy to familiar as to unfamiliar faces, further support for 
the independent routes account (Bruce, 1986; Young, McWeeney, Hay, & Ellis, 
1986). In contrast to identity recognition which we remain remarkably good at 
despite changes in age or hairstyle for example, facial expressions and gaze 
information needs to be monitored constantly to gage the intentions, emotions and 
desires of others from moment to moment. Recent research into facial expression 
analysis would also suggest that we may have specific neural substrates for each of 
our expressions, (Young, Aggleton, Hellawell, Johnson, Broks, & Hanley, 1995) 
and that perhaps the mechanism responsible for facial expression analysis in the 
Bruce and Young (1986) model should be divided into separate systems devoted to 
the analysis of the different emotional categories. 
Finally, further evidence in support of separate pathways for identity and expression 
is illustrated in the idea of Universal facial expressions (Ekman, 1992). Ekman, for 
example, supports the idea that basic emotions are recognised by all people 
regardless of culture and yet we know that recognising identity from different race 
faces is difficult (Valentine, 1991). 
(ii) Identity and Gaze 
Campbell, Heywood, Cowey, Regard and Landis (1990) reported gaze direction 
sensitivities in two patients, KD and AB, who were both impaired in their ability to 
recognise familiar individuals, label facial expressions and in judging age and 
gender from the face. In a forced choice gaze task, KD was only found to be 
impaired at discriminating small gaze deviations, however, AB performed at chance 
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level for most of the discriminations and relied more heavily on the orientation of 
the head rather than the eye orientation to make her decisions. This research, and 
evidence for the independence of identity and gaze processing from 
neurophysiological studies are described in more detail later in this chapter and also 
in Chapter 4. 
(iii) Identity and Unfamiliar Face Matching 
Two patients were described by Malone, Morris, Kay, and Levin (1982) who 
showed different patterns of recovery after brain injury. One of the patients was 
initially diagnosed as prosopagnosic, however his ability to recognise familiar faces 
was regained after a period of time. However, he was still found to be impaired on 
tests which required matching unfamiliar individuals as 'same' or 'different'. The 
second patient showed the opposite pattern of recovery with his ability to match 
unfamiliar faces intact, he was unable to recognise once familiar faces. When 
matching unfamiliar faces, a detailed analysis of individual features is required in 
addition to more general facial attributes such as the sex and approximate age of the 
person. The finding that this patient was able to perform such a detailed analysis 
and yet was unable to recognise familiar individuals, and the presence of a patient 
with the opposite trend provides compelling evidence for a separate routes account 
of face processing. 
However, Young et al (1993a) investigated this further using two tasks of familiar 
face recognition and unfamiliar face matching. From the results of this 
investigation, Young et al (1993a) could not conclude that these tasks were 
completely separate. Young et al (1993a) noted increased response latencies which 
could have been the result of the implementation of an alternative strategy which 
the participant had learnt in order to compensate for their disability. However, some 
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of the patients could have been trading speed for accuracy, a long response latency 
could simply reflect cautiousness on behalf of the participant. 
(iv) Expression and Lip-reading 
Interestingly, and perhaps less obviously than the separate processing of identity 
and expression, is the discovery of a dissociation between expression analysis and 
lip reading (Campbell, Landis, & Regard 1986; Campbell, Brooks, de Haan, & 
Roberts 1996). The ability to interpret the configuration of the lips is needed for 
both expression recognition and lip-reading and yet there is evidence that the two 
processes are distinct. Campbell et al (1986) described two patients, one who was 
unable to recognise identity or expressions from the face but the ability to lip-read 
remained intact and the patient exhibited a normal McGurk effect (i.e. experienced 
blends between conflicting visual and auditory cues to a phoneme (McGurk & 
MacDonald, 1976)). In contrast the other patient was found to be normal on all face 
processing tasks with the exception of lip-reading and consequently failed to show 
the McGurk effect. 
So, there is evidence for initial independence for these processes, but, recent 
research suggests that this may not be quite so simple. Schweinberger and Soukup 
(in prep) designed a series of experiments using the Gamer paradigm to investigate 
selective attention to identity, expression and speech reading and have suggested 
that although identity is perceived independently of expressions and facial speech 
analysis it may exert an influence on their perception. They suggest that despite the 
universal nature of many of our facial expressions, at an individual level small 
idiosyncratic facial movements which are specific to their owner could influence 
recognition. Schweinberger and Soukup suggest that the analysis of facial 
expressions could be optimised or modified if the system was able to take identity 
into consideration. Similarly, they argue that speech reading may not be totally 
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independent of identity. Schweinberger and Soukup note that speakers show 
systematic interindividual variation in articulating particular phonemes and these 
idiosyncrasies are evident both in auditory and facial speech. As a consequence, 
they therefore suggest that the speech reading system could improve its 
performance if identity was also a factor. Certainly, it would be feasible to imagine 
that knowing that a particular individual has a distinctive accent which would 
influence the shape of their lips when enunciating certain vowel sounds would help 
in the processing of speech-reading information. Walker, Bruce and O'Malley 
(1995) using a McGurk type paradigm also demonstrated that speech reading was 
affected by whether or not the stimulus face was known to the observer. 
It would appear then that the different aspects of face processing are at least initially 
independent though the signals may come together at a later stage of processing. 
Here we are concerned with the earliest stages in the perception of social signals 
from unfamiliar faces so the identification route need not concern us further. In the 
remaining section of this chapter, a more detailed review of previous findings in the 
areas of Expression and Gaze processing are described, which forms the focus of 
this thesis. 
Emotional Expressions 
Physiology from Physiognomy 
Our facial expressions are very powerful signals which allow us outwardly to 
display internal emotions. Some facial expressions have been shown to correspond 
to specific patterns of autonomic nervous system activity. As such the ability to 
detect and interpret the facial expressions of others carries importance as it provides 
information about a person's internal physiology and from an external display of 
this, we can make assumptions about a person's probable behaviour. 
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However, distinctive patterns of autonomic response for every one of our emotions 
have not been found. This could be explained if we consider what possible 
advantage there is behind the manifestation of such a response. It could be, as 
Ekman (1992) suggests, that these different patterns of autonomic nervous system 
(ANS) activity evolved to prepare the organism for specific motor actions which 
would be produced as a response to specific emotions e.g. fear, anger, or disgust 
which would be relevant to the animal's survival. It seems less likely that an 
emotion-specific ANS activity would be found for happiness since it is not obvious 
why an ability to smile or to detect happiness would be of any survival advantage to 
an orgamsm. 
Further evidence to support the idea that organisms may be biologically prepared to 
respond to expressive cues was suggested by Orr and Lanzetta (1980). We monitor 
the facial expressions of others on the assumption that particular facial expressions 
are linked with particular outcomes. For example, the expression of happiness 
typically signals a pleasant outcome, whereas a fearful expression could signal an 
aversive encounter. Orr and Lanzetta (1980) used facial expressions of emotion as 
conditioned stimuli in an investigation of autonomic response in humans. They 
measured galvanic skin response when subjects were presented with stimuli which 
paired congruous expression and outcome (fearful expression followed by a mild 
electric shock) and incongruous expression and outcome (a happy facial expression 
followed by an electric shock). They found that both the magnitude and the rate of 
acquisition of the conditioned response was greater when the fear stimuli was 
reinforced by shock than when the happy face was reinforced by shock. Orr and 
Lanzetta (1980) proposed that well established codes which relate signals of affect 
to specific outcomes exist in our long-term memory stores. Their results would 
support this idea as when participants were presented with congruous pairings of 
expression and outcome, a scenario which would match stored codes, conditioning 
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was achieved very quickly. Conversely, when the experimentally presented 
contingencies were incompatible with the codes in long term memory stores this 
actually served to inhibit the learning of a new code. 
Hemispheric Specialization in Affect Processing 
Evidence from neuropsychological patients and visual field experiments has shown 
that the right cerebral hemisphere plays a more significant role than the left in 
processing expressions of emotion (Ley & Strauss, 1986; Sergent, 1986). Patients 
with damage to their right cerebral hemispheres tend to have more problems in 
processing facial affect than those patients with damage to the left hemisphere. 
When pictures of facial expressions are presented to participants' left and right 
visual field, they are faster and more accurate to identify the expression when it is 
presented to the left visual field i.e. the right hemisphere. If the two halves of the 
face portray different expressions, the expression presented to the participant's left 
visual field will tend to have a stronger influence on their response (Atkinson, 
Atkinson, Smith, & Hilgard, 1987). 
It is not impossible, however, for damage to the left cerebral hemisphere to result in 
impaired facial affect processing and in normal participants, the degree of 
hemispheric specialization may not be as extensive as imagined. Heller and Levy 
(1981) tachistoscopically presented left and right handed participants with 
photographs of facial composites which were constructed so that the face was 
divided vertically with half of the face smiling and the other half not smiling. Both 
left and right handers perceived faces as happier when the left half of the image 
contained the smile. In addition, right handers and not left handers perceived faces 
as happier when the smiling half face was presented to the left visual field. Left 
handers displayed no overall advantage for either visual field although individual 
left handers each showed their own preference for one field or the other. The 
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majority, but not all, of right handers appeared to be specialized for the perception 
of emotion in the right hemisphere, and Heller and Levy (1981) report that even 
when there was a right hemisphere advantage, the magnitude varied significantly. 
They suggest that the hemispheric specialization for the discrimination of facial 
affect signals in right and left handers is more variable than is the lateralization of 
the cognitive aspects of verbal and non-verbal processes. In addition they found that 
left and right-handed actors who posed the expressions expressed more happiness 
on the left side of their faces. 
However, there is considerable additional evidence that the right cerebral 
hemisphere is better than the left at perceiving facial expressions of emotion since it 
is typically patients with right hemisphere damage who have been found to be 
impaired at discriminating signals of facial affect. 
Hemispheric specialisation has also been examined in participants from different 
socioeconomic groups. Alvarez and Fuentes (1994) tested the ability of the right 
hemisphere to recognise facial affect signals of happiness, anger, sadness, disgust, 
fear and surprise in a tachistoscopic task. Participants from a university and others 
from a low-socioeconomic group were tested. All were male and right handed. The 
university students recognised facial affect images presented to their left field (right 
hemisphere) significantly better than with their right field (left hemisphere). The 
low-socioeconomic group showed no difference in their abilities to recognise facial 
expressions when the images were presented to the left or right field, however their 
performance was significantly worse than that of the university students in the right 
hemisphere condition. Alvarez and Fuentes (1994) suggest that these results provide 
evidence for greater hemispheric specialisation in the university sample group. 
Unfortunately, Alvarez and Fuentes (1994) did not report recognition scores for the 
individual expressions and instead provided an overall mean. It would have been 
particularly interesting in the context of this thesis (see chapter 5) if the overall 
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mean for the low socioeconomic group was due to difficulties experienced for 
specific expressions. The overall means presented were actually very low for each 
of the groups. The university and low socio-economic group scored 22.26 and 20.85 
respectively out of a possible 45 when the images were presented to the left 
hemisphere, and 26.95 and 21.7 respectively when the images were presented to the 
right hemisphere. It would have been useful to know the errors for the individual 
expressions to see if the mean was greatly decreased due to one or two expressions, 
or if performance was generally bad for all expressions. 
How are Expressions Perceived? 
Face recognition has been extensively studied by researchers from a number of 
diverse fields: psychologists, neurologists, clinicians, and more recently engineers 
and computer scientists have adopted the challenge of discovering the processes 
behind recognition. Far less interest has been concentrated on the understanding of 
the signals which transmit socially relevant information regarding a person's 
emotional expression. Over three decades ago, Paul Ekman began what is now 
considered to be a seminal research programme into the recognition of our facial 
expressions. Despite this, and the contributions of other research groups, our 
understanding of these signals is still in its infancy. 
One of the controversial areas of expression recognition is how these signals are 
perceived. There are two basic viewpoints: the first suggests that we encode facial 
expressions in terms of a number of underlying dimensions (Schlosberg, 1952, 
1954; Russell, 1980). Schlosberg (1952) envisaged a circular representation of 
emotions which involved dimensions of atteption-rejection and pleasantness-
unpleasantness. Later, he suggested a third dimension, sleep-tension (1954). The 
second view suggests that emotions are perceived in distinct categories. Ekman 
(1992) suggests a small number (six or seven), basic emotion categories, and more 
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recent perceptual research has supported this view (Ekman, 1992; Etcoff & Magee, 
1992; Calder, Young, Perrett, Etcoff, & Rowland, 1996b; Young, Rowland, Calder, 
Etcoff, Seth, & Perrett, 1997) 
A Circumplex Model of Emotion 
Russell (1980) supports the idea that affective states are best represented as a circle 
in a two dimensional bipolar space. He suggests that affective dimensions are 
interrelated in a highly systematic manner. His circular model of affect, shown in 
Figure 1.2, has the following order: pleasure (0°), excitement (4Y), arousal (90°), 




Sleepiness _______ ~~-------Arousa1 
Depression Distress 
Displeasure 
Figure 1.2: Circumplex model of affect, from Russell (1980). 
In this model, opposing emotions are positioned at opposite ends of the bipolar 
space, e.g. pleasure at 0° and displeasure at 180°. Russell (1980) argues that it is our 
interpretation of emotional information, be it labelling facial expressions, or self 
report, rather than the actual information we receive which produces our affective 
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experience. In this way, the experience of an emotion only occurs as the outcome of 
a cognitive process which conceptualizes emotion. Russell believes that this 
cognitive conceptual structure is suitably described by this circumplex model. 
Categorical Perception of Facial Expressions 
Russell's (1980) description of a circular model of affect with expreSSIOn 
recognition occurring by locating its position within a dimensional space was 
challenged by Etcoff and Magee (1992) who used the idea of categorical perception 
to investigate expression recognition. They used sets of computer generated line 
drawings each consisting of a series of faces which varied by constant physical 
amounts running between expressions. Participants performed a discrimination task 
and an identification task which revealed that the expressions were being perceived 
categorically since faces within a category were discriminated more poorly than 
faces belonging to a different category despite the fact that the images differed by a 
constant physical amount. 
Young et al (1997) also presented convmclng evidence for the categorical 
perception of facial expressions using a more ecologically valid stimulus set. They 
used computer-manipulated images of photographs depicting facial expressions 
taken from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series. A set of images was created 
interpolating between prototype images of two expressions to create a series of 
pictures with smooth transitions between different expressions. Participants were 
asked to label each image as to whether it was most like happiness, sadness, anger, 
disgust, fear or surprise. Young et al (1997) found that there were abrupt shifts 
between perceiving one emotion and another near the mid-point of each continuum. 
Such abrupt shifts would not be consistent with a dimensional account. Young et al 
(1997) also described a matching task in which pairs of adjacent images had to be 
judged as 'same' or 'different' along the continua from one expression to another. 
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Once again, Young et al (1997) predicted that if expressions are perceived along 
some kind of dimension then the predicted performance would be almost linear, 
however, performance was found to be highly non-linear with peaks corresponding 
to the boundaries between expressions. These data strongly support the idea of 
categorical perception. Categorical perception would also support the idea that 
instead of a single system devoted to the analysis of facial expressions, we may 
possess a number of discrete systems each tuned to a specific emotion. This 
suggestion is strongly supported by much of the recent research on patients with 
amygdala damage who experience specific difficulties with the expression of fear 
(Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Calder, Young, Rowland, Perrett, 
Hodges, & Etcoff, 1996a; see chapters 5 and 6). 
Gaze 
Our eyes have the ability to send a range of very powerful, socially relevant signals. 
The amount of eye visible to an observer varies according to our facial expression, 
and the direction of our gaze signals the focus of our interest, or perhaps the 
referent of a remark (Kleinke, 1986). We also use our gazing behaviour to signal 
turn taking during conversations. The role of eye gaze in communication has been 
usually considered to be the domain of social psychologists who have studied 
gazing behaviours during social interactions (Kendon, 1967; Kendon & Cook, 
1969; Cook, 1977). Kendon (1967) suggested that where a person is looking during 
an interaction serves to regulate the maintenance and exchange of speaker role. 
Kendon noted that when the roles of the speaker and auditor were exchanged, 
typically, the speaker would end hislher utterance while maintaining eye contact 
and the auditor would look away as s/he began speaking. He also found that 
speakers would maintain eye contact during periods of fluent speech, but would 
look away during periods of broken speech to avoid interruption. Exline and 
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Winters (1966) suggested that an alternative explanation for this pattern of gazing 
behaviour could be that the speaker looks away so as to avoid any distracting 
effects from the listener's face and likewise, they suggest that this explains why a 
speaker looks away at the beginning of an utterance, to enable them to formulate 
carefully what is to be said. 
Mutual gaze can, especially if it is extended in time, indicate to a participant that the 
attention of the person extending the gaze has shifted away from the common focus 
of the encounter. Now the person's attention is focused entirely on the other 
individual which appears to have the effect of intensifying the interactions between 
the participants (Kendon, 1967). Regulating the amount of mutual gazing within an 
interaction controls the intimacy between participants. The amount of mutual gaze 
increases in a friendly encounter but is seen to decrease when the individuals 
concerned are eager to terminate the interaction. It is also possible for the amount of 
eye contact to be reduced during a friendly encounter if the interactants are smiling 
a lot. This could be in an attempt to reduce levels of arousal. Chance (1962) 
observed the behaviour of fighting rats and noticed that one of the essential 
elements of the rats defensive posture was for it to ensure that it couldn't see its 
opponent. The consequence of this behaviour is that the rat will be unable to receive 
any visual input by which its aggressive behaviour could be influenced, but the 
advantage is that the reduced input will have the effect of lowering the rat's general 
arousal level which means that it can be more flexible in its behaviour and resume 
aggressive action. 
Kobayashi and Koshima (1997) propose that the reason for the lack of a white 
sclera in non-human primates and most other animals is to conceal cues which 
could be interpreted as a direct stare - a signal of threat or dominance. In humans, 
the presence of the white sclera which forms a marked contrast against the coloured 
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iris, and the width to height ratio of our eye structure, all combine to give us a 
unique signalling device. 
Sensitivity to Gazing from Others 
How sensitive are we to the minute changes in gazing behaviour which signal the 
attentional focus of other individuals? The power and saliency of eye contact, and 
the arousal it appears to evoke, would suggest that we must be very sensitive to 
these cues. In this thesis, sensitivity to gaze direction is measured using a 
psychophysical technique both in a 'live' set-up and in a screen based task. In the 
light of plentiful evidence from neuropsychological and neurophysiological 
investigations, Baron-Cohen (1995a) has proposed the existence of a specialised 
system tuned to detecting the presence of eyes, or eye-like stimuli. He suggests that 
an 'Eye Direction Detector' (EDD) exists to locate the presence of eyes and to 
determine if the eyes are directed toward the individual or to an object in the scene. 
Baron-Cohen (1995a) suggests that the ability to detect eye gaze and to process this 
information subsequently to establish joint attention is an important stage in the 
development of a child's understanding of mental state concepts such as desire and 
belief. 
The importance of the eyes in signalling their focus of attention is not in question. 
However, we may also use cues from head orientation and/or body posture to 
augment these decisions. Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, and Benson (1992) located cells 
in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) of the macaque which were responsive to eye 
position but also to the position of the head and body. For example, Perrett et al 
(1992) found that the same cells which were preferentially excited by eyes looking 
downwards also demonstrated a preference for a lowered head and a quadrapedal 
body posture. Perrett and his colleagues have suggest that more than just eye 
direction detectors, these cells determine the "social attention" of an individual. 
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Later, Perrett and Emery (1994) proposed the existence of a more general 
"Direction of Attention Detector" (DAD) which combines the information from the 
eye, head and body positions to determine the direction of another's social 
attention. The information received from each of these inputs is arranged 
hierarchically with information on eye position capable of overriding information 
regarding head position if it is incompatible, and information regarding head 
position overriding information on body posture. In this way, the STS cells use 
information from the eyes if it is available to determine the direction of attention, 
but if the eyes are obscured by long distance or poor lighting, this system can 
default to using the information from the head orientation. Similarly, if the head is 
also obscured from view, the cells rely on postural information. 
This model of social attention detection is very attractive, however, a few studies 
have demonstrated a more important role for the head in the determination of social 
attention than Perrett et aI's (1992) hierarchical model would suggest. Vecera and 
Johnson (1995) demonstrated that participants' sensitivity to gaze direction from a 
schematic face was worse when the eyes were presented in the context of an 
inverted or scrambled face compared to an upright presentation suggesting that the 
information provided by the face influenced the processing of information from the 
eyes. 
Not only has the context of the face been shown to influence gaze perception but 
also the orientation of the looker's head has been shown to be important in 
perceptions of a looker's gaze. Gibson and Pick (1963) demonstrated this in their 
gaze set-up where a looker and a participant were seated opposite one another at a 
distance of 2m. The looker was told to fixate their gaze on each of several markers 
positioned horizontally on a wall positioned just behind the participant's head. Each 
of the markers was separated by IOcm, equivalent to an angular separation of 2.9°. 
Three head orientations were tested: 0°, head oriented toward the participant; 30° to 
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their left; and 30° to their right. The task for the participant was to determine if the 
looker was gazing directly at them or not. Gibson and Pick (1963) found that when 
the looker's head was averted, participants misjudged a fixation of 2.9° in the same 
direction as a gaze that was looking directly at them. From this finding, they 
concluded that in order to detect eye contact from a looker, the observer attended 
not only to the central position of the iris in the sclera but also to the position of the 
eyes in the face and their relation to the orientation of the whole head. 
Cline (1967) conducted a similar study in which observers were requested to 
indicate the line of regard of a looker whose head was oriented 30° to the right 
whilst their eyes were fixed on targets at 0°, 4° or 10° to the right or left of the 
observer. Cline (1967) found that the observer's perception of the looker's gaze was 
influenced by the orientation of the looker's head and that the head orientation and 
eye gaze direction interacted such that the perceived direction of the looker's 
attention fell somewhere between these two positions. 
More recently, Maruyama and Endo (1984) reported that an observer's perception 
of the direction of gaze from schematic faces was at an intermediate point between 
the correct line of gaze and the orientation of the face. They described this effect by 
describing the orientation of the head as "towing" the perceived line of gaze. 
However, they found that head orientation was not influenced by the perceived line 
of regard of the eyes. This result and that reported by Cline (1967) and Gibson and 
Pick (1963), would seem to suggest some kind of interaction between head and 
gaze information at a perceptual level. Participants appeared to be combining the 
information they received from the eyes with that apparent from the head 
orientation, a process which resulted in a perceived direction of attention which 
falls somewhere between the actual direction of gaze and the actual orientation of 
the head. The finding by Maruyama and Endo (1984) that the eyes were unable to 
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influence the perception of head orientation is not consistent with Perrett et al' s 
(1992) hierarchical attention detector. 
The way in which individual facial features may, or may not, be influenced by the 
facial surround has also been investigated in the context of the perception of face 
identification. The next section is a brief digression which introduces this work as it 
is relevant to later studies in this thesis. 
The Saliency of the Face 
Our faces belong to a highly homogenous group of stimuli and in order to 
distinguish one from another we have developed a highly tuned process which is 
sensitive to minor variations between faces. 
The processing of faces from individual features or wholes is explored in this thesis 
in an investigation of gaze direction sensitivity when the eyes are presented in 
various facial surrounds. Young, Hellawell and Hay (1987) demonstrated the 
importance of configural information in the recognition of familiar faces with the 
use of composite faces where the top and bottom halves of known people were 
arbitrarily combined to create a plausible new identity. The new unfamiliar facial 
configuration was found to disrupt the process by which the individual facial 
features could be recognised. In an identification task, participants were slower to 
name composite faces compared to non-composite faces and the effect was more 
obvious when participants were requested to name the top portion of the composite. 
Young et al (1987) found that this effect disappeared when the composites were 
inverted and in fact the task became easier. 
Young et al' s (1987) results demonstrate the importance of configural information 
in face perception and that this information is only available when the face is in its 
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characteristic orientation. However, individual facial features can play an important 
role in recognition, particularly if the features are distinctive in some way, e.g. 
Cerano de Bergerac's nose. The two processes could compliment each other, each 
providing information for the common goal of recognition. 
Tanaka and Farah (1993) also supported a more holistic view of face processing 
with the finding that participants were less accurate at identifying the parts of faces 
when presented in isolation than they were at identifying whole faces. In contrast, 
the disadvantage for part identification was not found for scrambled or inverted 
faces or other homogenous stimuli such as houses. 
Additional support for the holistic processIng of faces comes from 
neurophysiological investigations. Perrett, Mistlin and Chitty (1987) reported a 
subpopulation of cells in the STS which respond to the sight of facial parts and 
wholes. Desimone, Albright, Gross and Bruce (1984) discovered that the deletion of 
a facial feature did not greatly effect the excitation of these cells but if the 
individual features were all present but scrambled the excitation was abolished 
altogether, a finding consistent with a holistic view of face representation. The 
presence of cells which respond solely to the eyes may not be involved in a feature 
based recognition scheme but instead be more involved in the perception of other 
social cues such as gaze direction and attentional focus. 
In this thesis, the importance of our individual features for signalling socially 
relevant information is investigated in tasks which test our perceptual abilities in 
determining gaze direction from a real face when the eyes are presented upright or 
inverted within the context of an upright, inverted or absent face. 
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This Research 
Our ability to detect social signals from the face is explored in this thesis with 
investigations into sensitivities to facial affect and gaze direction. Many problems 
which are inherent in popular techniques such as forced choice and free naming for 
the interpretation of facial expressions are described in Chapter 2 with the results of 
a small cross cultural study highlighting some of these problems. In Chapter 3, 
attempts are made to measure our sensitivity to expressive signals from the face in a 
way which avoids the need for participants to interpret what they see. Two 
psychophysical methodologies are employed which require participants to 
discriminate the presence of a signal - a facial expression, from a non-signal - a 
neutral face. The distance over which these stimuli were viewed was varied. In this 
way, our sensitivity to each of the facial expressions could be determined by 
measuring the distance over which the signal could be detected. Manipulations were 
made to the image set to illustrate the power of these facial signals and to 
investigate the salience of the face in processing these signals. 
The importance of the face as a context for the perception of gaze direction 
detection is considered in Chapter 4 and performance in a live gazing set-up is 
compared with a screen based task. 
A number of congenital conditions and brain injuries result in impairments 
associated with certain aspects of face processing. Some of those that affect the 
analysis of facial expressions are described in Chapter 5. One of the pathologies 
which has been shown to play a central role in processing socially relevant 
information, is damage to the amygdala. Two patients with bilateral amygdala 
damage are described in Chapter 6 and their performance on a range of the tasks 
developed in earlier chapters of this thesis are reported. Chapter 7 summarises the 
findings of this thesis and discusses the possibilities for future research in this area. 
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Interpreting Facial Expressions 
Overview 
In this chapter, the methodologies that are commonly employed to explore our 
interpretation of facial expressions are reviewed. The authenticity of a new set of 
facial affect images is evaluated using a forced choice paradigm, and the results 
compared to performance in a free naming task where participants are not confined to 
using a given list of emotion labels, but are still restricted to using only one word. 
The same tasks are also performed by a group of Japanese participants, the results of 
which are compared with the data from the British group. The difficulties of 
implementing the tasks and translating the data are described. The limitations of these 
techniques is discussed and the potential for a new approach introduced. 
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Emotions on Faces 
The vast majority of us are equipped with the ability to determine a person's internal 
state simply by looking at their external countenance (assuming no attempt at 
deception has been made). Why an emotional experience should manifest itself in our 
facial expressions has been an area of interest for well over a century. In fact, many 
of the ideas under investigation by researchers of the twentieth century can be found 
in early Greek and Roman texts. Aristotle (384-322 Be) supposed that the face was 
able to provide a myriad of information about a person; soft hair was the trait of a 
coward, poor proportions belonged to a rogue and a smile was a sign of a happy 
person. The latter supposition has withstood the test of time although soft hair and 
poor proportions are thought to tell us significantly less about a person. 
Darwin (1872) considered that the ability to express emotions either by gesture or 
expression was an important evolutionary factor. The ability to outwardly express 
internal emotions can communicate to other humans the emotional state experienced at 
a particular time and also provide information about what behaviour to expect. Being 
able to detect and interpret these signals accurately is an obvious advantage as it could 
lead to the avoidance of a confrontation and hence increased chances of survival for 
both the expressor and the person (or animal) observing the expression. This chapter 
and the next, concentrate not on why we exhibit our internal emotions using external 
signals, but rather how sensitive we are in detecting and recognising these important 
social signals. If the configuration of our features into a smile when we are happy, 
and a scowl when we are angry, for example, are remnants of our ancient ancestry, 
then it is reasonable to suppose that these expressions could be universal signals 
amongst all humans and that they are perhaps genetically determined. The next section 
considers both suppositions. 
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Genetic Basis of Facial Expressions 
Evidence for the genetic origins of facial expressions comes from observations of 
infants who have been blind from birth. These children exhibit the same facial 
expressions under the same emotional conditions as sighted children despite the fact 
that the visually impaired children have obviously not been able to learn these facial 
configurations from visual cues (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1972). Field, Woodson, Greenberg 
and Cohen (1982) presented evidence that infants as young as thirty-six hours were 
able to imitate the facial expressions of happiness, sadness and surprise as portrayed 
by a model. Both the neonate and the model were filmed during their interactions and 
independent judges were able to determine, significantly better than chance, the 
expression portrayed by the neonate from observing its face. Field and her colleagues 
suggest that from birth, we have an innate ability to compare the sensory information 
of perceived facial expressions with proprioceptive feedback of the movement of the 
facial muscles used in the generation of these facial signals. Of course, copying does 
not necessarily mean the recognition of the emotional content of the expressions, 
although accurate copying would require that there was perceptual discrimination 
between expressions. 
However powerful these genetic vestiges may be, we are all capable of overriding 
them by portraying an expression which does not reflect the true emotion we are 
feeling. For example, we sometimes choose to hide our true feelings and instead 
project the expression we would like people to interpret as our true emotion. 
Klineberg (1940) described how cultural norms often dictate when to mask, inhibit or 
exaggerate natural facial expressions. 
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Universality of Facial Expressions 
Evidence for the universality of facial expressions comes from a large number of 
cross cultural studies (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1971; Ciiceloglu, 1970; 
Russell, 1994) which have tested literate and pre-literate cultures using photographs 
of facial affect. Ekman tested native American and Japanese participants and also 
members of an isolated New Guinea tribe with pictures of Western faces. All 
participants made similar judgements which Ekman and colleagues interpreted as 
providing evidence for universal signals of facial affect. Those involved III 
researching universality are in agreement that there are 6 basic emotions: happiness; 
sadness; anger; disgust; fear and surprise which are used pan-culturally to signal the 
same affect. Klineberg (1940), although not opposed to the idea of universality, 
suggested that different scenarios could be responsible for generating different 
emotions in different cultures. He also found some facial expressions which appeared 
to be genuinely culture specific, for example tongue protrusion amongst the Chinese 
to display the emotion of surprise. 
Russell (1994) reVIews the universality thesis by considering the views held by 
different researchers as lying somewhere on a continuum with the extreme dipoles 
describing a non-specific and a specific definition of universality. The non-specific 
end would be defined by the belief that some facial expressions have some sort of 
emotional attribute which is interpreted by others at an above chance level by some 
people in most cultures. The conclusions asserted by Klineberg (1940) would fall 
towards this end of the continuum. At the other extreme end would be the belief that 
there are specifically six facial expressions which explicitly signal six distinct 
emotions which are effortlessly recognised by all people regardless of cultural 
background. The conclusions asserted by Ekman and Izard fall towards this more 
specific end of the continuum. 
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Universality studies have contributed a substantial volume of data to the field of 
expression analysis. However, the methodologies that are employed in the task of 
investigating affect 'recognition', for example, free and forced choice paradigms, are 
not without their problems and the data obtained using these paradigms should be 
interpreted with care. The next section reviews these methodological techniques and 
also addresses some of the common procedural practices in their implementation. 
Methods for Investigating Facial Expression 
Recognition and their Problems 
Most research on facial expressions in a laboratory setting has used static, posed 
stimuli. In our interpersonal interactions we do not see a disembodied two 
dimensional face in isolation but are privy to body language, gesticulations, auditory 
information and contextual cues that complement the movements of the facial features 
into affect signals. The combination of all these actions leads us in our everyday lives 
to make rapid and effortless decisions about a person's emotional and communicative 
state with a high level of accuracy. However, static posed expressions are widely 
used due to the difficulties in assembling a set of informatively equivalent 
experimentally produced expressions. 
A great deal of the literature which investigates facial expression recognition has been 
concerned with the universality argument or the perceptual aspects of facial 
identification, and there is a relative paucity which has investigated our sensitivity to 
these expressions and considered them as facial signals (Hager & Ekman 1979). In 
addition facial expression research has largely relied on forced choice labelling of the 
stimuli in ways which are often difficult to control; for example, Hager and Ekman 
(1979) used live performances for part of their study. 
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In a forced choice paradigm, participants are required to label expressions from a 
given list of emotion categories provided by the experimenter, previewing stimuli is 
also a frequent practice as is maintaining a constant viewing order between 
participants. In cross cultural studies, designing experiments can be problematic as 
can interpreting the data. The next section discusses the problems which are inherent 
in many of the procedures which are commonplace in expression research. 
Free and Forced Choice Tasks 
The use of forced choice tasks in expression recognition studies is fairly standard but 
actually only provides a very limited insight into the signals being perceived by the 
observer. The task forces participants to label an expression from a given list and as 
such experimenters are forcing participants to claim that they are perceiving a specific 
signal. They may, however, not wish to attribute any of the labels to the images they 
are presented with but instead are forced to use a 'best guess' and thereby provide the 
experimenter with the information they require. 
Both the forced and free choice technique presuppose that participants are actually 
perceiving an emotion when they are asked to label an expression image. They may in 
fact only be interpreting the facial expression as a response to a situation, for 
example, the response "looks as though she has seen a ghost". From this an emotion 
may be inferred but only because the participant is being asked to ascribe an emotion 
to the image which may not be something the observer would do naturally. 
In addition, the word 'recognition' is used ubiquitously and implies that what is being 
'recognised' is truly there, but this may not be the case. When a forced and free 
choice paradigm are compared, it becomes apparent that observers do not necessarily 
wish to use the labels they are provided with in the forced choice task. This has the 
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effect of inflating the 'recognition' scores in the forced choice experiments to levels 
which do not accurately reflect the participant's true interpretation. 
Russell (1994) discusses the limitations of the use of free and forced choice 
paradigms in expression labelling tasks and remarks that by their very nature the 
experimenter is presupposing that there is only one word which can accurately 
describe the expressions shown to the observers. He suggests that this implies a 
dichotomous relationship between emotion labels and facial expressions. Neither of 
these techniques allows the participant the freedom to express a wider description of 
the stimuli which they may actually perceive as portraying a mixture of emotions. 
Ekman et al (1987) presented participants with a set of expressions and asked them to 
give each image a rating on an eight point scale as to how accurately the face 
portrayed the intended expression. In addition, they were asked to give ratings for 
how accurately another expression label could describe the same image. For example, 
the expression chosen by Ekman to represent 'anger' was rated 6.0 for anger, 5.6 for 
disgust, 4.9 for afraid, 4.4 for calm and so the list continues. These results clearly 
demonstrate that participants do not interpret facial expressions dichotomously. If this 
were the case, participants would give very high ratings for the target expression and 
very low or zero ratings to the others. However, one problem with this interpretation 
is that the participants could have felt compelled to provide the experimenter with a 
rating for each expression without genuinely feeling that a particular label was 
appropriate. This notion is perhaps supported by the fact that the average score for 
each label was approximately 4 which is the mid-point of the scale which could also 




In much of the literature on facial expression recognition, participants are presented 
with the stimulus set prior to testing in order to familiarise themselves with the task. 
Providing participants with a preview of the stimuli to be used within a task has the 
benefit of helping the participant to adopt a response criterion which would minimise 
noise within the experiment as the participant would be more likely to maintain a 
constant response strategy. However, previewing has its drawbacks. If the observer 
is aware that there are an equal number of exemplars representing each expression, 
performance in a forced choice task could be facilitated, particularly if the entire set 
has been shown to the participant. Russell (1991) reported that the expression of 
contempt used by Matsumoto and Ekman (1988) was judged as contempt in a within 
participants design and disgust in a between participants design. The physiognomic 
difference between the two expressions is obvious if the images can be compared 
simultaneously. However, Russell (1991) reported that both stimuli would be labelled 
as disgust when viewed separately, but the same participant would differentiate 
between the two if they had previewed the entire image set and if they were 
participating in a forced choice task which provided them with the labels. 
Order of Presentation 
The response made to a given stimulus is often dependent on what has come before. 
For example, a neutral face could be labelled as happy if it was presented in the 
context of a set of happy faces or sad if presented in the context of a set of sad faces. 
The opposite could also be true that a neutral face embedded amongst happy faces 
could appear sad by comparison, or happy if placed amongst sad faces, (Russell & 
Fehr, 1987). In general, the order of presentation is important in these tasks since if 
each participant is presented with the same stimulus set in the same order, then this 
could have the effect of increasing the amount of agreement amongst participants. 
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This level of agreement could serve to mask true 'recognition' scores or alternatively, 
serve to inflate evidence for a hypothesis. In many of the studies that Russell (1994) 
describes in his meta-analysis of expression recognition, the order of presentation 
was constant between participants. The implication of this is that participants are not 
simply responding to anyone individual expression but rather to that expression in 
the context of the preceding images and each participant will be potentially influenced 
in the same way. 
Translating data from cross cultural studies 
In cross cultural studies, difficulties can arise in the translation of responses in a free 
naming task, or in the choice of labels used in a forced choice task especially when 
cultures which differ greatly from our own are involved. When Ekman and Friesen 
(1971) were testing a pre-literate society, members of the Fore tribe in New Guinea, 
they experienced difficulties in designing a task that would be appropriate. Since the 
members of the tribe could not read, they could not be asked to choose a word from a 
printed list, and if the list was repeatedly read to them on each trial they had problems 
in remembering the list. Ekman and Friesen also (1971) doubted whether the meaning 
of an emotional concept could be adequately translated from one English word into 
one Fore word. In addition, they discovered that there was no indigenous word for 
surprise amongst the Fore. 
Summary 
The sections above illustrated the limitations of free and forced choice tasks and the 
practice of maintaining a constant viewing order or previewing stimuli. However, 
these tasks are still useful in some contexts. In the following section, a Six Alternative 
Forced Choice (6AFC) task is used to authenticate a new set of expression images 
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which were created for this thesis. A free naming task is also used to demonstrate the 
inflated scores obtained using forced choice and to illustrate the variety of words 
participants choose to use when they are not constrained by a list. The performance of 
a group of Japanese participants in these tasks is also measured and the results 
compared with the British group. However, this is only a starting point since the 
purpose of developing this image set was to go on to develop tasks which do not have 
the same limitations. 
Western and Japanese interpretations of images of 
facial affect 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with creating a new set of facial 
expressions to be used in a variety of investigations in this and subsequent chapters. 
In this chapter, performance of Western and Japanese participants in forced and free 
naming tasks using the new image set is compared. The results from the Japanese 
group serve to illustrate some of the difficulties experienced in cross cultural studies. 
The problems of design and procedure discussed earlier are of great importance when 
investigating our interpretation of these facial signals. The limitations of using forced 
and free choice paradigms need to be recognised and the results obtained using these 
techniques interpreted carefully. We need to ensure that the tasks used to assess these 
sensitivities are not merely implementing self fulfilling hypotheses. 
Creating the new image set 
Ekman and Friesen's (1976) images of facial affect have enjoyed something of a 
monopoly over the last three decades in expression research. The majority of tasks 
designed to explore the processing of facial expressions have used the same 
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techniques and the same stimuli and consequently agreement between researchers has 
been high. A new facial affect database of images was created for the investigations 
reported in this thesis. Twenty-four staff and student volunteers (referred to as 
expressors in the text), whose ages ranged from 20 to 35 years participated in this 
procedure. Spectacles, if worn, were removed during filming. 
All expressors were filmed in the same location seated against a black background 
under the same lighting conditions. Only the head and neck were framed in the image. 
Expressors were instructed to look into the camera and in their own time perform the 
chosen selection of facial expressions. Six emotions were portrayed which signal six 
distinct affects: happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise. 
Equipment 
Expressors were filmed using a Sony Video Hi8 Handycam video recorder mounted 
on a tripod. The tape was then played through a Macintosh Centris 660 av computer 
and the images grabbed using Apple Software. All of the following experiments were 
run on a Macintosh Centris 660 av using Superlab 1.5.7 Beta 10. Examples from the 
expression set are shown in Figure 2.1. 
Six-AFC (Image authentication) 
Despite the shortcomings of the forced choice technique described earlier in this 
chapter, this technique was used as a means of validating the images which were to be 
used in subsequent experiments. For each expressor, the best representation of each 
expression was chosen from the video and the image printed so that the expression 
exemplars could be labelled by independent judges. 
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Participants 
Ten volunteers took part in the forced choice task. All were undergraduate students at 
Stirling University with an average age of 21.7 years. 
Procedure & Results 
Participants were asked to attribute an expression to each image from a given list of 
the six expressions used. The list of expressions was available for reference 
throughout the task. There was no previewing of the expression set and the order in 
which the images were presented was randornised between participants. 
Only those images which were labelled with an accuracy of 100% were retained for 
use in subsequent experiments resulting in 10 exemplars of each of the six 
expressions. It was important for the subsequent psychophysical tasks that 
participants were at ceiling on the interpretation of these signals. Contributions from 
21 of the 24 expressors were used although it was not possible to use all 6 
expressions from each expressor. This would have been the preferred design since it 
is desirable to have all items (facial identities) appearing equally often in all conditions 
(facial expression set). This would increase the certainty that the observable effect 
was caused by the manipulation and not by the specific item. Unfortunately however, 
it was not possible to use all exemplars from each expressor and maintain the quality 
of the image set. The final set consisted of: five male and five female exemplars for 
the expressions of happiness, surprise, sadness and anger; four male and six female 
exemplars for the expression of disgust and six male and four female exemplars for 
the expression of fear. (A table which illustrates the contributions made by each 





Figure 2.1: Images (a) to (j) show examples ajthe expressions ojhappiness,jear, 
surprise, sadness, anger and disgust. 
The actors who contributed to the Ekman and Friesen (1976) image set were trained 
to produce each of the facial expressions using a system called Facial Action Coding 
(FACS) (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). Using this system, actors were taught to contract 
42 
specific facial muscles to create an expreSSIOn. In this way, the intensity of 
expressions between expressors could be controlled. The actors who contributed to 
the image set used in this study were not trained in any way prior to filming and 
therefore the emotional intensity of the expressions could vary. This is of obvious 
concern in signal detection studies as the same expression may have a varying 
intensity depending on the expressor portraying it. However, the complex procedures 
required to control for expression intensity were out with the scope of this 
investigation. 
Free Naming Expression Allocation Task 
Participants 
Ten undergraduate students from Stirling University took part III this study. 
Participants had a mean age of 25.2 years. 
Procedure 
Participants were shown the 60 expression faces and 21 neutral faces (one for each of 
the expressors) and asked to define the emotion they believed to be portrayed in a 
'free choice' expression naming task. Participants were requested to use one word 
which they felt best described the emotion depicted. Words which were synonymous 
with the target label were scored as correct. 
The figures presented in Table 2.1 compare very favourably with identification means 
from other studies. Russell (1994) quotes mean 'recognition' scores from eight 
different studies with literate participants. The majority of these studies used forced 




Expression % of responses Synonym (%) Incorrect 
which match label labelling (%) 
from list 
Happy 95 5 0 
Sad 63 23 14 
Anger 75 20 5 
Disgust 45 39 16 
Fear 16 59 25 
Surprise 73 22 5 
Neutral 61 17 22 
Table 2.1: Mean performance (%) of ten participants in a free choice expression 
allocation task. 
Table 2.2 provides the means obtained from Russell's meta-analysis and compares 
them with the means obtained in the 6-altemative forced choice and the free naming 
expression allocation tasks described in this study. 
I Happy Sad Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
Russell ('94) 96.4 80.5 81.2 82.6 77.5 87.5 
Forced choice 
Jenkins 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Forced choice 
Jenkins 100 86 95 84 75 95 
Free naming 
Table 2.2: Forced choice data from a meta-analysis of eight separate studies as 
reported by Russell (1994), and forced and free choice data from this study. (All 
scores represent mean % correct). 
Performance in the free naming task was inferior to that recorded in the forced choice 
task (Mann-Whitney V-test, V = 0, p < 0.01). This finding serves to illustrate how 
performance scores can be inflated when a forced choice paradigm is used. However, 
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the labelling accuracy is still high in the free naming condition and the scores from the 
Jenkins affect image set compare very favourably with those from the forced choice 
studies that Russell (1994) reports, with higher labelling accuracieslhits for all 
expressions with the exception of 'fear'. This comparison also serves to illustrate that 
the quality of the images used in this thesis compares very well with stimuli used in 
published studies. 
The relatively high number of 'misses' for the neutral exemplars could be explained 
by the fact that participants were asked to allocate an 'expression' to the images and 
may have been reluctant to say 'no expression'. Most participants who did not report 
'blank' or 'neutral' for these stimuli labelled them with words such as 'calm', 
'peaceful' or 'relaxed' and did not confuse them with the exemplars of sadness. 
Discussion 
The images created for use in this thesis have been authenticated by ten independent 
judges who each accurately attributed an expression label to a set of emotional 
exemplars using a forced choice paradigm. When a further ten judges were requested 
to attribute an emotional label to each of the images in a free naming task, the potency 
of the stimuli was seen to decrease slightly with some errors, particularly for the 
negative expressions, and a large number of responses using synonyms of the target 
expression. This finding in itself exemplifies the need for caution in the interpretation 
of data obtained using a forced choice paradigm in expression research. 
The remainder of this chapter describes the use of this new image set using the same 
free and forced choice paradigms to test the performance of a group of Japanese 
participants. 
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A Cross Cultural Comparison 
In this study, the ability of a group of Japanese participants to interpret facial 
expressions from Western faces was investigated. The problems encountered in 
implementing these tasks within a different cultural group, and the difficulties 
experienced both for the participants performing the tasks and for the analysis of the 
data are described. 
Six-AFC Expression Task 
The ability of Japanese participants to interpret signals of facial affect from Western 
faces was measured using a forced choice paradigm. As mentioned earlier, the 
labelling accuracies are not reported as 'recognition' scores but performance between 
Japanese and Western participants is compared. 
Participants 
Ten Japanese volunteers participated in this investigation, five were staff members at 
the Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute in Kyoto, and five were 
undergraduate students visiting the Institute from Doshisha University, Kyoto. Eight 
females and two males took part who had an average age of 25.3 years. 
Procedure 
Instructions for this task were explained to the pa..rticipants in Japanese. Participants 
were shown a list of the six expression labels in English and Japanese, each label also 
corresponded to a number. The list was available for consultation throughout the task. 
Five of the participants responded using the English labels. The other five participants 
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recorded their results using the label number. Results are shown in Table 2.3 which 
compares the results with data obtained from Western participants in the same task. 
Results 
Participants Happiness Sadness Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
Japanese 98 78 57 75 36 86 
Western 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 2.3: Comparison of Western and Japanese participants in a 6AFC expression 
allocation task. Figures represent mean % correct for 10 participants. 
Performance by the Japanese participants was lower than the Western sample in every 
case with performance for the expression of fear being particularly poor. 
Table 2.4 presents data from six independent studies of forced choice tasks performed 
by Japanese and American participants. The data is taken from Ekman, Sorenson and 
Friesen (1969), Izard (1971), Ekman et a1 (1987), Matsumoto and Ekman (1988), 
Matsumoto and Ekman (1989), and Matsumoto (1992), as reported in Russell 
(1994). 
Happiness Sadness Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
American 97.1 92.2 86.5 79.8 83.6 83.9 
participants 
Japanese 94.1 88.2 75.4 52.9 68.5 64.8 
participants 
Table 2.4: Mean % correct scores from 6 separate studies in a 6AFC task with 
Japanese and American participants 
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For each of the expressions, labelling accuracy is lower in the Japanese group. From 
the results shown in Table 2.3, fear stands out as being particularly poorly 
interpreted. Fear has also been found to be poorly interpreted in other studies as can 
be seen from the meta-analysis reported in Table 2.4, although disgust and surprise 
were labelled with even less accuracy. Two of the studies that contributed to the data 
in Table 2.4 were reported by Matsumoto and Ekman (1988; 1989). They reported 
mean 'recognition' scores for fear of 37.6% and 30.8%. The number of participants 
contributing to these studies was 154 and 110 respectively. Despite the small number 
of participants who contributed to the present investigation, the low score for fear 
would not appear to be particularly low when compared with reports from other 
research. 
Free Naming Expression Allocation Task 
Participants 
Participants were five female and five male members of staff at the Advanced 
Telecommunications Research Institute in Kyoto with an average age of 33.4 years. 
Procedure 
In this task, participants were instructed to use one word which best described the 
emotion portrayed in each one of the 60 expression exemplars in the Jenkins affect 
set. Instructions were given in Japanese and six out of the ten participants recorded 
their responses in Japanese, the remaining four participants were confident in their 
English vocabulary and chose to write their responses in English. 
The data was translated by two independent judges; a research assistant at the Institute 
whose English was very good, although not perfect, and a Japanese student at 
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Stirling University who spoke Japanese as a first language but was also fluent in 
English having lived in this country for most of his life. Responses were scored as 
correct if the translated word was synonymous with the target label. 
Results 
Participants Happiness Sadness Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
Japanese 97 77 62 40 28 90 
Western 100 86 95 84 75 95 
Table 2.5: Performance (mean % correct) of 10 Japanese and 10 Western participants 
in a free naming expression allocation task. 
As in the forced choice task, accuracy scores in this task were lower for the Japanese 
group compared to the British group. If the data in Table 2.5 and Table 2.4 are 
compared, it is possible to see that the expressions which are labelled with poor 
accuracy in the forced choice task (fear, anger and disgust), are labelled with an even 
greater inaccuracy in the free choice task. This finding demonstrates how a forced 
choice task serves to inflate accuracy scores by providing an emotion label which the 
participant would not spontaneously choose themselves. Instead, the participant 
adopts a 'best guess' strategy thus artificially raising the accuracy scores. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the data obtained from the two groups. Both the Japanese and 
the Western participants experienced most difficulty with the negative expression 
exemplars, particularly fear and disgust. Performance for the positive expressions of 
happiness and surprise was considerably better and was equivalent to performance by 
the British participants which demonstrated that the goal of the task was understood. 
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Figure 3.11: Performance (mean % correct) of 10 Japanese participants and 10 British 
participants in a free naming expression allocation task. 
A 2(participant group) x 6 (expression) ANOV A revealed a main effect of participant 
group [F (1, 18) = 32.61, P < 0.001], and of expression [F (5, 90) = 31.33, P < 
0.001] with a significant interaction [F (5, 90) = 9.90, P < 0.001]. Simple Main 
Effects analysis revealed that there was a significant effect of participant group for the 
expressions of fear, disgust and anger (P < 0.001) but not for the expressions of 
happiness, surprise and sadness. There was also a significant effect of expression for 
the two cultures (p < 0.01). A Tukey HSD (ex = 0.05) revealed that the accuracy for 
labelling expressions of anger, sadness, surprise and happiness was significantly 
better than for the expressions of fear and disgust. The Tukey HSD test also revealed 
that fear was a difficult expression to interpret for the Western participants with a 
significant difference between fear and each of anger, surprise and happiness. 
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General Discussion 
The performance of the Japanese participants was inferior to that of their Western 
counterparts in both the forced and the free naming task. In particular, the Japanese 
participants experienced difficulty with expressions of negative affect. Japanese 
culture dictates that outward displays of emotion should be controlled, as a result, true 
feelings are often masked. Perhaps the results reflect a general unfamiliarity with 
examples of negative expressions in conjunction with an unfamiliarity with Western 
faces. However, this should not be a factor if such expressions are indeed universal. 
The poor performance measured in the free naming task may have improved if only 
those exemplars which were consistently scored as correct in the forced choice task 
had been used. If the participants were poor at interpreting some of the facial 
expressions when they were given a choice of labels, their performance without any 
possibility of a 'best guess' strategy is almost certainly going to be worse. If the 
exemplars that the Japanese found most difficult had been removed from the image set 
after the forced choice task, performance in the free naming task may have been seen 
to improve. 
The free and forced choice tasks performed by the Japanese participants and by the 
patients who will be described in Chapter 6, did not include the neutral exemplars as 
these were collected for use in the psychophysical tasks descibed in Chapter 3. A 
retest of the free and forced choice tasks without the neutral exemplars with a new 
group of healthy British participants may have yielded slightly less than perfect scores 
as the lack of neutral faces may exert some effect. This is only a remote possibility as 
the neutral faces are only likely to effect the interpretation of the sad exemplars and 
these were not found to be confusable in the tasks reported here. 
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There are of course certain limitations in describing the data obtained in this study as a 
comparison of the performance of British participants in equivalent tasks using 
Japanese faces was not possible. 
Ekman and Friesen (1971) in their study also found that the expression of fear caused 
the most difficulty for members of a New Guinea tribe who were tested in their ability 
to allocate a facial expression to an emotional story. In this task, a story was told to 
each participant which was intended to arouse feelings of happiness, sadness, anger, 
disgust, fear or surprise. Three photographs depicting three different expressions 
were presented to the participants who were requested to choose one of the pictures 
which they felt best portrayed the emotion described in the story. When participants 
were told a story which was intended to describe a fearful situation, only 28% of 
participants chose the fearful exemplar with the remaining participants choosing the 
face that portrayed surprise. However, when participants were told a surprising story, 
71 % were able to choose the correct exemplar and did not confuse this emotion with 
the fearful distractor. It appears as if the expression of fear is the most difficult of the 
six expressions to interpret for most of the cultures that have been tested. This 
observation will be important when we tum to consider the neuropsychological 
impairments which affect the perception of fear. 
However, it is not only fear that the Japanese participants in this study experienced 
problems with. As mentioned, two independent judges were used to score the data 
from the free naming expression allocation task. This was decided after the first judge 
expressed difficulties in translating some of the responses. The difficulty in the 
translation became evident with a greater understanding of the Japanese language. 
Problems arose due to the participants being asked to use only one word to label the 
expression exemplars. Japanese is written using a combination of three different 
alphabets, the primary alphabet uses kanji, symbols which represent concepts, or 
words which only take on their meaning when written in the context of other kanji. 
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This means that the same kanji could have subtle or gross differences in its meaning 
depending on the context within which it is written. Some of the participants took 
their instructions for the free naming task quite literally and tried to respond using 
only limited kanji which then caused difficulties at the translation stage. Others wrote 
whole phrases to try and capture the emotion they felt was being portrayed. 
Unfortunately, the meaning of many of these phrases was lost in the translation. For 
example, two responses translated by the research assistant in Japan were: "Once on 
shore we pray no more"; and "The danger past and God forgotten". Quite what 
emotion these phrases were intended to convey is unclear. However, despite a few 
problems, agreement between the two translators was very high (approximately 97%) 
but there were a few important contradictions. On ten occasions the translators 
differed in their interpretations with the same kanji generating a translation of sadness 
from one and disgust from the other, or anger from one and disgust from the other, or 
sadness from one and anger from the other. Although these interpretational difficulties 
only arose ten times out of a possible three hundred and sixty, they cause concern as 
they were translated as completely different emotion labels. In addition, when setting 
up the study the Japanese translator had to discuss with several colleagues the most 
appropriate kanji to use to translate the English label of 'disgust'. In a further study 
conducted at A TR, which is briefly mentioned in Chapter 7, it became apparent that 
actors used for an expression data base who were all drama students were unable to 
pose the expression of disgust as they were not familiar with the facial physiognomy 
for this affect. The difficulties experienced by the Japanese with the expression of 
disgust were not limited to their ability to portray this emotion, they were also poor at 
labelling it as shown in the results of the free and forced tasks where their 
performance was well below that of their Western counterparts. Their difficulty in the 
forced choice task could have arisen as a result of the kanji chosen to represent the 
English word of disgust. Perhaps some participants interpreted the kanji differently 
from others. 
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It is interesting to note that the expressions which caused the Japanese participants the 
most difficulty are the ones which seem to present difficulties with certain groups of 
neuropsychological patients (see Chapters 5 and 6). For example, patients with 
damage to the amygdala are impaired in their ability to label fear from faces and some 
also show difficulty with the expression of anger (Calder, Young, Rowland, Perrett, 
Hodges, & Etc off, 1996). In addition, Huntington's disease sufferers have been 
shown to be impaired in their perception of disgust from faces (Sprengelmeyer, 
Young, Calder, Karnat, Lange, Homberg, Perrett, and Row land, 1996). The results 
reported here are from a group of healthy individuals, but a group who are less 
familiar with Western faces and consequently less experienced in processing signals 
of affect from Western faces. It seems unlikely that exposure alone could account for 
the poor performance since Western culture has been highly pervasive in Japan for a 
number of years through the film and music industry. In addition, all of the 
participants who took part in the free naming task were members of staff at the ATR 
Institute, a place where approximately 40% of the staff at anyone time are 
Westerners. Perhaps the poor performance observed from patient studies are a 
consequence of the fact that these particular expressions are simply the most difficult 
to interpret and a more highly tuned system sensitive to these signals is required. 
Such a system could develop with increased exposure and expertise with faces (hence 
the low scores from the Japanese participants) but could perhaps also be the most 
vulnerable to damage (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
Summary 
In this chapter the methods which are commonly employed to investigate the 
interpretation of facial expressions were reviewed. Forced choice and free choice 
paradigms were used to assess a new facial affect image set containing 10 exemplars 
of each of happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise. The same tasks were 
also performed by a group of Japanese participants whose accuracy in interpreting the 
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images was inferior to that of the British group, particularly for the expressions of 
fear and disgust. The forced and free choice paradigms are useful for comparing 
behaviour between participants but their use for the purpose of explicitly measuring 
recognition is limited. As long as there is an awareness of the limitations of these 
tasks then they still have an important role in investigating comparative behaviours 
between groups. The limitations of the free and forced choice paradigms described in 
this chapter motivated the design of a task which could measure our sensitivity to 
signals of facial affect, without the need for interpretation. Chapter 3 describes the 
design of such a task and its implementation in exploring a range of aspects concerned 
with the signalling of our facial expressions. 
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Psychophysical Investigations Into 
Facial Expression Detection 
Overview 
The methodological difficulties involved in the use of free and forced choice tasks 
were reviewed in the previous chapter and the need for a more controlled approach 
became apparent. A number of questions have arisen as a result of the performance of 
the Japanese participants described in Chapter 2: Are the expressions that generate 
low scores in these tasks simply harder to see? Are they weaker signals? Or is it the 
interpretation of these signals which causes the poor performance? 
The experiments descried in this chapter were motivated by the wish to attempt to 
answer these questions. A task was designed to investigate our sensitivity to 
expressive signals from the face in a way that required no direct interpretation of the 
expressive signals presented. All experiments described in this chapter used images 
from the Jenkins facial affect set, the production of which was described in Chapter 
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2. A two alternative forced choice (2AFC) paradigm was used for most of the tasks 
described in this chapter. Participants were never required to recognise, label or 
interpret the stimuli they were shown but were simply required to detect the difference 
between a signal - one of six expressions, and a non-signal - a neutral face. All trials 
were randomised to ensure that the context of each presentation was different for 
every participant. In addition, using a 2AFC paradigm meant that each trial involved 
making the distinction between signal and non-signal, so the expressive content of the 
previous trial held little significance. Manipulating the viewing distance allowed the 
signalling strengths of the individual expressions to be explored and provided a 
technique for examining our sensitivity to these signals under increasingly demanding 
circumstances. 
The following set of experiments were designed to investigate our sensitivity to facial 
expressions, manipulating the viewing distance from an expressor (the expressor is 
the person portraying the expression). The first task was designed to establish the 
optimum presentation duration for the stimuli. Once an optimum duration had been 
found which avoided floor and ceiling effects, this duration was implemented in all 
further tasks. Participant's sensitivity to the stimuli was then measured in experiments 
two and three which described the implementation of two psychophysical techniques; 
2AFC, and a signal detection paradigm (lAFC), to determine if the methodology used 
could influence participant's responses. The power of the signals transmitted by the 
face were then investigated in Experiment 4 by presenting the facial expressions as 
very impoverished signals of only I-bit per pixel. The results of all of these studies 
revealed that some expressions were capable of transmitting a detectable signal over 
further distances than others. Thus human vision is more sensitive to some 
expressions than others. The question arose as to how these images were being 
processed. Did the task simply engage low level visual processes which detected 
contrast in a complex pattern, or were these images engaging higher order processing 
which considered the images as faces? Inverting faces is known to impair recognition 
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and to interfere with face processing. This effect was used as a tool in Experiment 5 
to explore the nature of the processing which generated the results in the upright 
condition. If the performance of participants in the upright condition was due to 
responses made to a complex pattern alone, then no effect of inversion would be 
expected, and the same pattern of results should be observed. If however a decrease 
in performance was observed then this would indicate the disruption of a process 
linked to the perception of faces as a specific stimulus class. 
General Procedure 
In the 2 Alternative Forced Choice (2AFC) task, there were two events separated by 
an interstimulus interval (lSI). One of the events comprised the target stimulus, and 
the other the distractor stimulus. Each presentation of two intervals is called a trial and 
in these studies 60 trials comprised one block, or run, (1 trial for each of the 60 
expression exemplars). The experiment was designed with a 0.5 probability of the 
target stimuli appearing in the first interval and the task for the participant was to 
identify the location of the target. Figure 3.1 illustrates the form of the 2AFC task. 
In the experiments described in the remainder of this chapter, the target is always any 
one of the six facial affect signals: happiness; sadness; anger; disgust; fear or 
surprise, and the distractor is the neutral expression of the corresponding actor. The 
participant responded using a keyboard pressing '1' if they detected the target in the 
first interval and '2' if they detected it in the second. Both target and distracter stimuli 
were immediately followed by the presentation of a mask for 100msec. Two masks 
were created, a male mask to follow a male face and a female mask to follow a female 
face. The masks were created using Apple software. The outline of the face and 
hairline were retained but the internal features were scrambled and overlaid. The faces 
used to generate the masks were not used in any other part of the experiment. There 
was an inter-stimulus interval (lSI) of 1000ms which separated each event. The end 
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of each trial was punctuated by the presence of a blank screen which would remain 
until the participant had made their response. No feedback was given to the 
participant. The next trial began as soon as the participant' s response had been 
recorded. 
ISI 
100 ~o/l~ 1000 ~o/l~ 100 ~o/l~ 
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the content of each experimental block in a 2AFC task. 
Experiment 1: Preliminary Study of Facial Expression 
Detection 
This study was performed to determine the optimum presentation duration for 
investigating the detection of facial expressions. Results from this study were 
subsequently used in further tasks where the exposure duration was constant and the 
viewing distance manipulated in order to measure the signalling strengths of facial 
expressions with increasing distance from the display. 
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Participants 
Six participants were employed in this investigation, all were undergraduate students 
from Stirling University aged between 18 and 30 years. All participants reported 
normal, or corrected-to-normal vision and were paid for their time. 
Design and Procedure 
This experiment was conducted as a within-subjects design with two factors. The first 
factor was facial expression (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise). 
The second factor was display duration (1, 2, 3,4 and 5) measured in screen cycles. 
(The refresh rate of the screen was 60Hz, as measured using an oscilloscope, the 
screen cycles quoted above are approximately equivalent to 011, 16, 32, 48 and 64 
milliseconds) . 
The design of this experiment is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The experiment was divided 
into five separate blocks with each block containing all 10 examples of each of the 6 
expressions. Within a block, the 60 images were divided into five sets of 12 stimuli 
so that each set could be displayed at one of five test durations. Each set of 12 
exemplars consisted of 2 examples of each of the 6 expressions under test. 
Participants completed each of the five blocks so that at the end of the task, all 
expression exemplars were seen at each of the 5 durations. 
The order of presentation of expressions and durations was randomised by the 
computer. Participants were able to take a short break between blocks to prevent them 
tiring. The screen was viewed binocularly at a distance of 1 m. Each stimulus 
subtended 4 0 of visual angle. Participants were instructed to fixate on the centre of the 
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the content of each set within one block, where H = 
happiness, S = sadness, A = anger, D = disgust, F = fear, Su = surprise. 
Participants were shown a brief demonstration to ensure they understood the verbal 
instructions they had been given. All image display durations were increased for the 
demonstration and different faces to those in the test phase were used. 
Results 
Figure 3.3 shows a plot which illustrates the mean performance of six participants at 
the five image display durations measured in this task. (No error bars are illustrated as 
the graph would become too cluttered, standard errors for all experiments in this 
chapter are reported in the Appendix section). At one screen cycle, participants were 
behaving randomly with performance for all the expressions at chance. At five screen 
cycles, performance was at ceiling for the majority of expressions with only sadness 
61 
not being recognised with an accuracy over 80%. Note that the expressions of fear 
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Figure 3.3: Performance of six participants in a 2AFC expression detection task at 
five presentation durations. 
The duration of three screen cycles (approximately 32ms) was chosen as it produced a 
range of scores which avoided floor and ceiling performance. This duration was used 
in all of the following tasks. 
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Experiment 2: Using a 2AFC Paradigm to Measure 
Sensitivity to Expressive Signals from the Upright Face 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate our ability to detect emotional signals 
from the face. The viewing distance from the stimuli was varied in order to measure 
the signalling strength of the individual expressions. 
The ability to detect the facial expressions of another individual is important if we are 
to monitor and control our conduct with them appropriately. An interesting 
observation is that our facial expressions are capable of sending an effective signal 
over very large distances, distances well beyond those of intimate face-to-face 
interactions. However, researchers have not shown a great deal of interest in this 
observation and those that have report widely differing results. Hall (1969) claimed 
that 9.15m was the limit of discriminability for facial expressions and that beyond this 
distance the details of these facial signals disappear. Hager and Ekman (1979) 
proposed that certain facial expressions could be reliably identified at distances over 
ten times greater than Hall's original estimate. Hager and Ekman (1979) also reported 
differences in the effective signalling of male and female expressors, with male angry 
faces being perceived at greater distances than female angry faces. However, the 
methods used in these previous experiments were not well controlled. Experiment 2 
explores this issue again using the psychophysical method developed in Experiment 
1. 
Participants 
Six participants were employed in this investigation, all were undergraduate students 
from Stirling University aged between 18 and 30 years. All participants reported 
normal, or corrected-to-normal vision and were paid for their time. 
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Design and Procedure 
This experiment was conducted as a within-subjects design with two factors. The first 
factor was facial expression (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise). 
The second factor was distance (equivalent to a real face at distances of 10m, 20m, 
30m, 40m, SOm). 
A 2AFC paradigm as described in the general procedure section, and Figure 3.1, was 
used in this study. This task was presented to the participants in five blocks, one 
block for each of the five distances measured, with all sixty expression exemplars 
appearing in a random order in each block. The duration of the image display was 
constant throughout the trials at 3 screen cycles. The lSI was maintained at 1000ms 
and the mask remained on for lOOms after each presentation of a face. 
The viewing distance was physically manipulated by the participant moving hislher 
chair to markers on the floor which were positioned so as to be equivalent to viewing 
a real figure at distances of 10, 20, 30, 40 and SOm. The 'equivalent' viewing 
distances were calculated by simply scaling the size of the images with reference to 
the size of a real head. Short breaks between block presentations prevented the 
participants from tiring. 
The order in which participants completed the task (i.e. the order of vIewmg 
distances) was randomised. In this task due to the large distances involved between 
participant and screen, the participant was required to give hislher decisions orally to 
the experimenter who would record the responses on their behalf using the keyboard 
as described in the previous section. 
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Results 
Figure 3.4 shows a plot of the mean performance calculated for six participants in this 
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Figure 3.4: Mean accuracies expressed as percentages for six participants in a 2AFC 
expression detection task. 
A 5 (viewing distance) x 6 (expression) analysis of variance (ANOV A) conducted on 
participants accuracy scores revealed a main effect of distance [ F (4, 20) = 54.11, P 
< 0.01] and expression [F (5, 25) = 7.41, p < 0.01] with a significant interaction [F 
(20, 100) = 2.48, p < 0.05]. 
A Simple Main Effects analysis revealed that the effect of expression was significant 
at all of the distances measured (p < 0.05) except at the 50m viewing distance. 
A Tukey HSD test revealed that at 10 and 20m, all expressions, with the exception of 
anger, were detected significantly better than sadness. Only the expression of 
happiness was detected significantly better than sadness at 30m. At 40 and 50m, no 
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significant differences III performance were recorded for any of the expressions 
tested. 
Participants found the expression of sadness the most difficult to detect. Simple Main 
Effects analysis demonstrated that detection accuracy for all of the expressions 
decreased with increasing viewing distance with the exception of sadness (p <0.01). 
A Tukey HSD test showed that distance was not a significant factor for this 
expressIOn with no significant difference in performance over all the distances 
measured. 
Discussion 
This psychophysical task revealed that some facial expressions were capable of 
transmitting their affect over greater distances than others. In particular, the 
expressIOns of happiness and surprise were the most reliably detected. At 40m 
participants were able to discriminate these affect signals from neutral with an 
accuracy above chance. The ability of participants to discriminate sadness from 
neutral was poor over all the distances measured. For all the expressions, excluding 
sadness, the greatest decrease in performance occurred between 30 and 40m 
suggesting that beyond this distance our facial signals become indistinct. Watt (1992) 
predicted that at a distance 40m, it was possible to recognise a highly familiar face, in 
addition, at this distance he suggested that observers may be able to discern if the 
person's mouth was open or closed. As such, the gross expression of the individual 
may be just detectable at this distance. At 20m, Watt (1992) reported that the brows 
and mouth were easily visible and the eyes just about so, making finer discriminations 
regarding expression possible at this distance. These predictions, which Watt (1992) 
proposed from theoretical knowledge of the visual system, such as two point 
resolution, have been supported in this study which demonstrated that expression 
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detection for all expressions with the exception of sadness was highly accurate at 20m 
and significantly impaired a 40m. 
To investigate Hager and Ekman's (1979) finding that male angry faces were capable 
of transmitting a stronger signal than female angry faces, participant's responses to 
these stimuli were analysed separately. An ANOVA showed there to be no significant 
difference between the ability of these expressors to transmit this emotion. [F( 1, 5) = 
0.429, P = 0.542]. The finding in Hager and Ekman's (1979) study could have been 
the result of stimulus artefact rather than any generalis able property of male angry 
faces. 
In Experiment 3, a different psychophysical paradigm was used to measure 
expression detection. Participants' performance in a signal detection (1AFC) 
paradigm was measured and compared with that obtained in this experiment. 
Experiment 3: Using a Signal Detection Paradigm to 
Measure Sensitivity to Expressive Signals from the 
Face 
This experiment was conducted to investigate the possibility that participants' 
performance in the previous expression detection task could have been influenced by 
the nature of the psychophysical methodology used. Using a 2AFC paradigm 
essentially allows the participant 'two chances' to categorise the stimuli as target or 
distractor. In this experiment, the participant was required to generate a decision 
based on only one presentation; either the signal, or the non-signal. Using this 
technique, the participant was presented with either an expression or a neutral face 
and their task was to label each stimuli as 'expression' or 'neutral'. 
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Participants 
Six participants were employed in this investigation, all were undergraduate students 
from Stirling University aged between 18 and 24 years. All participants reported 
normal, or corrected-to-normal vision and were paid for their time. 
Design 
This experiment was conducted as a within-subjects design with two factors. The first 
factor was facial expression (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise). 
The second factor was distance (lOrn, 20m, 30m, 40m, SOm). Participants viewed all 
expression exemplars at each of the five viewing distances. The complete facial affect 
set was used in this task as well as an additional 39 neutral exemplars which made the 
total number of distracters 60. This was to ensure an equal probability of being 
presented with an expression or a neutral face. 
Procedure 
As in the previous task, the viewing distance was manipulated to investigate the 
signalling strength of the affect signals. Each trial in this task consisted of one interval 
in which either an expression or a neutral face appeared for 3 screen cycles 
immediately followed by a mask presented for 100ms. A blank screen followed 
which was displayed until the participant voiced hislher decision to the experimenter 
who recorded the response using a keyboard. The task for the observer was to 
determine whether they had been presented with a neutral face or anyone of the six 
expression exemplars. Each block consisted of 120 randomised trials (60 targets and 




The analysis was performed on the hit rate data as there is no sensible way to allocate 
false positives to different expressions. A S (viewing distance) x 6 (expression) 
ANOVA conducted on the hit rate data revealed a main effect of distance [F (4, 20) = 
14.3, P < 0.01] and expression [F (S, 2S) = lS.838, p < 0.01], with a non-
significant interaction [F (20, 100) = 1.S36, p > O.OS]. 
The overall false positive rate collapsed across expression at each of the distances is 
shown in the Table 3.1. These scores represent the proportion of trials in which a 
neutral exemplar was presented which participants believed to be an expression. 







Table 3.J: Overall false positive rate at each of five viewing distances measured in the 
JAFe expression detection task. 
For completeness, a Simple Main Effects analysis was carried out as the interaction 
approached significance. This analysis revealed that all expressions with the exception 
of sadness (p > 0.1) were significantly affected by the viewing distance (p < O.OS). 
The analysis also revealed that the effect of expression was significant at all viewing 
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Figure 3.5: Peiformance of six participants in a JAFe expression detection task. 
(Mean percentage calculatedfrom the hit rate data). 
A Tukey HSD analysis revealed that at 10m, the expressions of happiness, anger, 
disgust and surprise were all detected significantly better than sadness (p < 0.05). At 
20m, the expressions of happiness, fear, anger and surprise were still being detected 
significantly better than sadness (p < 0.05). At 30m, only happiness remained 
significantly better detected than sadness (p < 0.05). 
Discussion 
The pattern of results found in this experiment were very similar to those found using 
the 2AFC methodology. The same overall trend in expression discriminability was 
shown by participants, with sadness proving to be the most difficult, and happiness 
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Figure 3.6: Overall performances collapsed across expresswn m a 2AFC task 
(Experiment 2) and a JAFC task (Experiment 3). 
Figure 3.6 shows a plot of the overall performance, collapsed across expressIOn 
calculated for six participants from each of the two psychophysical experiments 
described. A 2 (experiment) x 6 (expression) x 5 (distance) ANOVA performed on 
the hit rate data from each experiment revealed a non-significant 3 way interaction [F 
(20,200) = 1.021, P > 0.05], a significant main effect of distance [F (4, 40) = 51.4, 
p < 0.01] and a significant main effect of expression [F (5, 50) = 22.54, P < 0.01] 
with a significant interaction [F (20, 200) = 2.77, P < 0.01]. There was also a 
significant main effect of experiment [F (1, 10) = 6.51, p < 0.05] with a significant 
interaction with distance, [F (4, 40) = 3.44, p < 0.05]. As can be seen from Figure 
3.6, at the 40 and 50m viewing distances, there are no significant differences in 
performance between the two paradigms. 
However, the important finding was that despite the performance in the 2AFC 
experiment being significantly better than that measured using the 1AFC paradigm, 
'experiment', as a factor, did not significantly interact with 'expression'. This means 
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that the overall pattern of expression detection did not differ significantly between the 
two psychophysical paradigms. 
Experiment 4: Facial Expression Detection from I-bit 
per pixel images 
The advantage of the psychophysical method is that it may provide a more sensitive 
way to assess the signalling strength of different images. This point is illustrated in 
the next experiment using a threshold manipulation. A large amount of the visual 
information we process may actually be superfluous and not required for many of the 
tasks we perform. To examine this, a 2AFC expression detection experiment using 
thresholded images (I-bit per pixel) was designed to investigate our ability to 
recognise expressions from a considerably depleted image. In addition, the 
transformed images were printed and presented to a group of participants to label in a 
6AFC task. 
Participants 
Sixteen participants were employed in this investigation, ten postgraduate students 
aged between 21 and 36 years volunteered to take part in the forced choice task. 
The remaining six participants were undergraduate students from Stirling University 
aged between 18 and 22 years. All participants reported normal, or corrected-to-





Figure 3.6: Images (a) to (f) show examples of the expressions of happiness, fear, 
surprise, sadness, anger and disgust when the amount of visual information has been 
reduced to i-bit per pixel. 
All exemplars in the Jenkins affect image set were thresholded i.e. converted to I-bit 
per pixel stimuli, the grey levels were removed using Image 1.49. This software 
works by setting an arbitrary threshold above which all grey levels are turned to 
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black, and below which all grey levels are transformed to white. Examples of the 
images used are shown in Figure 3.6. 
Design and Procedure 
In the first task, the transformed images were printed and shown to ten volunteers 
who allocated an expression to each image from a given list, as described in the 6AFC 
task of Chapter 2. 
To investigate the detection of these transformed images in a psychophysical task, a 
2AFC paradigm was used. The procedure for this task was as for that described 
under the general procedure section and the 2AFC task using full grey level images, 
(page 58 and 64), with the exception that performance in this task was only measured 
over the first three viewing distances as the task became too difficult thereafter. 
This experiment was conducted as a within-subjects design with two factors. The first 
factor was facial expression (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise). 
The second factor was distance (lOrn, 20m, 30m). 
Results and Discussion 
The 6AFC task revealed that labelling accuracies for each of the expressions remained 
high (see Table 3.2) despite the large loss in visual information. 
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6AFC Happiness Sadness Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
Grey-level 100 100 100 100 100 100 
I-hit/pixel 99 98 82 73 80 95 
Table 3.2: Comparison between scores of mean % correct from 10 participants in a 
6AFC task using full grey-level images and 1 bit per pixel images. 
The worst performance was recorded for the expression of disgust, although labelling 
accuracy was still very high at 73%. Importantly, the measured performance for 
several of the expressions remained near ceiling, suggesting no loss of signal from 
the reduced grey scale. 
The results of the psychophysical experiment demonstrated that performance 
decreased with increased viewing distance and was also worse than performance at 
equivalent distances when full grey scale images were used, although a similar trend 
was observed. Figure 3.7 shows a plot of mean % correct as a function of increasing 
distance. Sadness was the most difficult expression to detect with performance 
fluctuating around chance over all the distances measured. As in Experiment 2, the 
expressions of happiness and surprise were detected with the most accuracy. In this 
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Figure 3.7: Mean performance (%) of six participants in a 2AFC expression detection 
task using i-bit per pixel images. 
A 3 (viewing distance) x 6 (expression) ANOVA conducted on accuracy scores 
revealed a main effect of distance [F (2,10) = 32.291, p < 0.01] and of expression [F 
(5,25) = 5.647, P < 0.01] with a significant interaction [F (l0, 50) = 3.0, P < 0.01]. 
Simple Main Effects analysis revealed that viewing distance had a significant effect 
for five of the expressions (p < 0.05), only the expression of sadness was unaffected 
by viewing distance (p > 0.1). The analysis also revealed significant effects of 
expression at 10 and 20m (p < 0.05) but not at 30m (p > 0.1). 
As was found in the 6AFC investigation, the expression of disgust proved to be 
difficult to detect with performance showing a rapid decrease and falling to chance 
levels at only 20m. At this viewing distance, a Tukey HSD test revealed that the 
expression of happiness was detected significantly better than both of disgust and 
sadness (p < 0.05). 
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A 2 (experiment) x 6 (expression) x 3 (distance) ANOVA to compare the results 
obtained in the full grey level and I-bit per pixel tasks showed main effects of 
distance [F (2, 20) = 38.38, P < 0.01], expression [ F (5, 50) = 17.56, P < 0.01] 
and experiment [F (1, 10) = 97.84, P < 0.01]. Simple Main Effects analysis revealed 
that performance was significantly better at each of the viewing distances in 
Experiment 2 (full grey-level) than in Experiment 4 (1-bit per pixel). Once again 
however, expression was not found to interact with experiment which illustrates that 
the same overall pattern of detectability was measured in both of the tasks. 
The results of the 6AFC investigation show that in a free viewing task participants are 
able to make accurate identifications of several of the expressions shown, but with 
increasing task demands, such as brief presentation and increased distance, detection 
of a target stimuli from a distracter stimuli becomes more difficult. Therefore this 
shows how a detection task might be a more sensitive task than a 6AFC paradigm for 
examining our sensitivity to expressive signals. 
Experiment 5: Using a 2AFC Paradigm to Measure 
Sensitivity to Expressive Signals From the Inverted 
Face 
Thus far, psychophysical methods appear to provide a promising way to explore 
expression perception without requiring any problematic interpretation. However, a 
plausible explanation for the pattern of results obtained from the psychophysical tasks 
described so far, is that participants were responding to a pattern of stimulation 
corresponding to light and dark areas, with some patterns (expressions) containing 
more contrast and hence being more visible than others. To be really useful as tests of 
expression perception, performance should be attributable to the operation of face 
processing and not merely pattern processing. The recognition of familiar faces is 
77 
... 
found to be impaired if the faces are inverted, (Yin 1969; Valentine, 1991 ; Young 
Hellawell & Hay, 1987), as such, the inversion of facial stimuli is often used as a tool 
to estimate the contributions of higher order processes. Based on raw image 
properties alone, no effects of inversion would be expected for the images used in the 
first 2AFC task since inversion only trivially effects image properties. If however the 
stimuli are being processed as faces and not just complex patterns, then a large effect 
of inversion, similar to that found for recognition would be expected. Before 
describing this experiment, a brief review of studies using inverted faces is provided. 
The recognition of faces is more severely impaired by inversion than is the 
recognition of other types of objects. Yin (1969) found that recognition memory for 
upright faces was better than that for pictures of other stimulus classes e.g. houses 
and aeroplanes. However, when these images were inverted, faces were found to be 
disproportionately difficult to recognise compared with the other stimulus groups. 
Typically for faces there is a 20-30% decrement in recognition accuracy associated 
with the inversion condition, compared with 0-10% inversion decrement for stimuli 
from other classes. This finding could be a consequence of the ubiquitous nature of 
upright faces. The more familiar we are with a characteristic orientation for an object, 
the more detrimental the effect of changing that orientation will be on subsequent 
recognition. In addition, faces belong to a highly homogenous class of stimuli. Each 
face can be defined in terms of a fixed set of points, this is not the case for a randomly 
chosen set of landscapes, houses or bridges for example. 
Diamond and Carey (1986) have attributed the inversion effect to the use of second 
order relational properties that are important for but not unique to face recognition. 
Second order relational properties are described as the distinctive relations among the 
elements of a stimulus class that define the shared configuration. For faces, the most 
relational features include face shape, ratios of distances and the internal spacing of 
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the eyes, nose and mouth. It is this dependence on second order relational properties 
that distinguishes the recognition of faces from that of most other stimulus classes. 
Young et al (1987) using composite faces, demonstrated that the encoding of spatial 
relations among facial parts was orientation sensitive. In an upright composite face, 
the top and bottom halves fuse to make a plausible 'new' face, making the 
identification of the person in the top half difficult. This phenomenon is not seen if the 
face is inverted. 
Diamond and Carey (1986) found that the disproportionate effect of inversion was not 
specific to just faces, but was also likely to be found for the recognition of any highly 
familiar and highly homogenous stimulus class. They found that dog experts showed 
a similarly large inversion effect in their ability to recognise individual dogs. 
According to Diamond and Carey's hypothesis (1986), a large inversion effect will be 
found if there is common configural information shared by all exemplars of a stimulus 
class with only small differences in the second order relational information. Also, 
observers must be sufficiently expert to distinguish between exemplars on the basis of 
these differences in configural information. The notion of expertise is supported by 
the finding that compared to adults, children are far less sensitive to the inversion 
effect of faces. This suggests an increased reliance on configural aspects of faces with 
increasing age and exposure to the stimulus class and also the development of a rigid 
schema for faces. 
Materials 
The Jenkins affect image set was used in this study. All images were rotated by 180 0 
before presentation. 
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Design and Procedure 
This experiment was conducted as a within-subjects design with two factors. The first 
factor was facial expression (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise). 
The second factor was distance (10m, 20m, 30m, 40m, 50m). The procedure for this 
task was as for that described under the general procedure section and the 2AFC task 
using upright faces. 
Results and Discussion 
Expression detection performance from inverted faces is shown in Figure 3.8. 
Comparison with Figure 3.4 shows that inversion had a detrimental effect on 
participants' ability to differentiate between neutral face stimuli and any of the six 
expressions tested. In the upright condition, the expressions of happiness and 
surprise were the most successfully detected out of the six different expressions. This 
was also found to be the case in this experiment but only for the 10m viewing 
distance. Performance for all expressions fell to chance levels between 20 and 30m. 
This represents a shorter viewing distance than was found in the upright condition. In 
the upright condition, performance did not reach chance levels until between 40 and 
50m. 
A 5 (viewing distance) x 6 (expression) ANOVA conducted on the accuracy data 
revealed a main effect of distance [F (4, 20) = 30.51, p<O.Ol], performance at 10m 
and 20m was significantly better than at any of the further distances measured. There 
was no significant effect of expression [F (5, 25) = 1.093, p = 0.389] and no 
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Figure 3.8: Mean accuracies (%) representing the perfonnance of six participants in a 
2AFC expression detection task using inverted faces. 
A 2(experiment) x 6 (expression) x 5 (distance) ANOVA was performed to compare 
the performance between the upright (Experiment 2) and inverted (Experiment 5) 
experiments. The analysis revealed a significant 3 way interaction, [F (20, 200) = 
1.798, P < 0.05], a significant main effect of experiment [F (1, 10) = 138.3, P < 
0.001]. A Tukey HSD test showed significant differences in performance at 20, 30 
and 40m (p < 0.05). The difference in performance between the two conditions is 
illustrated in Figure 3.9 which shows the mean performance collapsed across 
expressions in both the upright and inverted conditions. Performance between the two 
tasks is only comparable at a viewing distance of 50m which corresponds to chance 
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Figure 3.9: Mean performance (%) in a 2AFC expression detection task with upright 
and inverted faces in Experiments 2 and 5. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Detection Versus Identification 
The questions presented at the beginning of this chapter were aimed at discovering the 
signalling strengths of our facial expressions, and at establishing whether the 
expressions we find difficult to recognise are also the ones that are most difficult to 
detect. In this chapter, two psychophysical tasks were designed to measure sensitivity 
to signals of facial affect. Neither of the tasks required overt recognition of the 
expressions presented but instead required a discrimination of an expression from 
neutral. Participants' performance in these experiments demonstrated that when no 
interpretation of the affect stimuli was required, a pattern of performance different to 
that obtained in recognition tasks was observed. Sadness was poorly detected over all 
distances in the psychophysical tasks, but was not difficult to recognise in a free or 
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forced choice task. In the forced choice task, sad expressions were recognised with 
an accuracy of 100% and the neutral faces were not mistaken for sad exemplars in the 
free naming task, a finding which indicates that these exemplars are not confusable in 
labelling tasks. 
In the free nallllng task described in Chapter 2, both Western and Japanese 
participants experienced most difficulty labelling the expression of fear. Fear was not 
found to be difficult to detect in the psychophysical tasks with performance for this 
expression being detected significantly better than sadness and being detected with 
accuracies similar to surprise, anger and disgust, as shown in Table 3.3. Similar 
results were found in the detection and recognition tasks for the expressions of 
happiness and surprise. These expressions are accurately labelled in the free and 
forced choice tasks and also transmit an affective signal over the greatest distances. 
Viewing Happy Sad Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
distance (m) % correct % correct % correct % correct % correct % correct 
10 95 70 91.7 98.3 93.3 100 
20 95 56.7 78.3 86.7 85 86.7 
30 91.7 63.3 80 75 71.7 78.3 
40 68.3 66.7 55 51.7 48.3 66.7 
50 60 53.3 56.7 43.3 53.3 50 
Table 3.3: Mean scores/or six participants in a 2AFC expression detection task atfive 
viewing distances 
Despite this similarity, detectability is not a good predictor of recognisability but it 
does provide a representation of the strength of the individual expressions. It also 
demonstrates that the expressions which are most difficult to see are not the ones 
which are most difficult to interpret. However, there may be some confusion between 
83 
different negative expressions which would not be noticed using this psychophysical 
methodology. 
The ability to interpret the expression of fear has obvious survival benefits for an 
organism and yet it is this expression that often yields the lowest scores in forced and 
free naming tasks. However, the psychophysical tasks reveal that it is reliably 
detected, and is detected with similar accuracies to other negative expressions (anger 
and disgust). Detection is an important first step in identification, that is, an 
expression must first be detected before its emotional content can be interpreted. If, in 
the real world, we were to encounter another individual with a fearful expression, it is 
unlikely that we would be in any doubt as to their internal state. We would inevitably 
have access to emotional cues from many other sources which would compliment the 
information being signalled in the face. 
Many neuropsychological patients are known to have specific facial processmg 
difficulties, a task like this could attempt to establish the nature of the difficulty. For 
some, the problem may be one of perception i.e. the patient may simply be unable to 
see the expression. Alternatively, it may be an inability of the patient to access 
semantic information regarding expressions, in which case, a task like the one 
described here which does not require interpretation, would not present a difficulty to 
such a patient since they are only required to differentiate between a signal and a non-
signal. Later in this thesis, a patient with bilateral amygdala damage who has 
difficulties with some aspects of face processing is described. His ability to 
discriminate between affect signals and neutral distractors is investigated using the 
signal detection paradigm, which we have seen yields a similar pattern of results to 
the 2AFC paradigm. 
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Expression detection from an impoverished source 
Removing all the grey-levels from the expression set to create the I-bit per pixel 
images quite dramatically illustrated how little visual information we require to make 
quite complicated decisions. Performance in Experiment 2, with upright full grey 
level stimuli obviously exceeded that seen in Experiment 4 with the grey-levels 
removed, however, the signals were still detected over very large distances. The 
results of the forced choice task produced very high recognition scores although not 
as high as in the equivalent task with the grey-levels present. Disgust proved to be the 
most difficult expression to recognise generating a mean of 73%. The expression of 
disgust is most easily recognised by a wrinkling of the nose rather than any 
characteristic eye configuration, as the nose is not a feature that varies greatly in 
contrast, it produced only scant information in the I-bit per pixel form. The 
psychophysical task demonstrated the power of the expressive signals, despite the 
lack of grey-levels to provide detail and shading information, the gross configurations 
of the expressions in the I-bit per pixel form was sufficient for the discrimination of 
these signals at considerable distances. 
Mode of processing 
Inverting the grey level images had a very detrimental effect on the ability of 
participants to perform the detection task. The results of this investigation support the 
suggestion that the responses made to the individual expressions in the 2AFC upright 
expression detection task were made as a result of the images being processed as 
faces, and as such showed a large sensitivity to orientation due to the disruption of 
second order relational information. However, the results of this study only allow us 
to suggest that the images are being processed as faces. It cannot tell us if the images 
are being processed specifically as facial expressions rather than just an unusual face 
pattern with no reference to affect. Despite this obvious drawback, these results do 
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suggest the role of a higher order function, although low level visual processing could 
also be affecting judgements. The patterns of contrast created by the configuration of 
the facial features in particular expressions create specific shading patterns which are 
more prominent in some expressions than others. Nonetheless, the results of this 
study do show that certain expressions are capable of sending an affect message over 
further distances than others. The mouth, the eyes and eyebrows comprise the three 
main features which signal information to an observer. If we look at these features 
individually we can estimate the contribution made by each in signalling a particular 
emotional state. 
The Eyes 
The eye is composed of the white sclera which surrounds the dark iris and pupil. A 
marked contrast is produced by the boundaries of the sclera and iris. As the eye or 
eyelid is moved the amount of sclera visible to an observer is modulated which 
provides powerful cues to expression recognition and eye gaze direction detection. 
Kobayashi and Koshima (1997) describe the morphology of the human eye as 
unique, comparing it to 88 other primate species. Humans are the only primate 
species to possess a white sclera. Humans also have the greatest ratio of exposed 
sclera in a horizontally elongated eye outline. They suggest that this is an adaptation 
which allows for extended eye movement, particularly in the horizontal direction, 
which consequently extends the range of the visual field. In addition, it aids the 
detection of where another individual is gazing. The colouration of the sclera in other 
primates is suggested to have arisen to prevent other individuals perceiving a directed 
stare since this can often result in a confrontation (Kobayashi & Koshima, 1997). It 
may also serve to deceive predators. If a predator believes its prey to be aware of its 
presence then it may be less likely to attack. Kobayashi and Koshima (1997) suggest 
that a small change in the colouration of the sclera may have had the effect of 
changing "gaze camouflaged" eyes to "gaze signalling" eyes. An exception to the 
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exclusively dark sclera's noted in all non-human primates is the white sclera observed 
in the macaque monkey which is present until the macaque reaches juvenile age 
(Perrett and Mistlin, 1990). As an infant, it may be more important for the individual 
to be able to send effective gaze signals to its carer. In addition, adults within a 
monkey group would be unlikely to perceive a directed stare from an infant as 
threatening. As the individual matures, it becomes increasingly important to avoid eye 
contact and consequently the amount of pigment in the sclera increases to camouflage 
gaze direction. Perrett and Mistlin (1990) describe how adult macaque monkeys 
observe each other by averting their heads, but keeping watch out of the comer of 
their eyes. In this way they can covertly gather information and avoid the risk of a 
confrontation. 
For humans, the risk of predation probably decreased with increased body size and 
the use of tools and fire. The evolution of the white sclera we have today could have 
developed to satisfy the need for enhanced communication between individuals and 
indeed the contrast it produces allows for its detection over great distances, especially 
in the expression of surprise where the area of exposed sclera is increased. 
The Mouth 
Open mouth expressIOns particularly happiness and surpnse produce a facial 
configuration which generates quite marked contrast across the face. When the mouth 
is open, the mouth cavity is revealed which produces contrast against the lighter lips 
and teeth. In the investigations described in this chapter, participants frequently 
reported that the visibility of the teeth provided a powerful cue in the detection of the 
target. Bared teeth in other primates is usually a signal of threat or a display of 
dominance. Our sensitivity to what are now fairly tame orthodontics could be a 
consequence of our ancestors needs to detect the threat of attack. 
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The Eyebrows 
Our eyebrows can be highly prominent features. In our evolution from hirsute 
creatures to largely smooth skinned organisms there must have been a selective 
advantage in retaining a small area of hair above the eyes. Their primary role is 
considered to be one of protection, shielding the eyes from sweat running from the 
forehead, however, they also lend themselves to communication. Perhaps we have 
adopted these features and learnt to mobilise them to signal affect. Large brow 
movements alter the amount of visible sclera dramatically as well as increasing the 
distance between the eyebrow and the eye. More subtle movements only change the 
distance between the eye and the eyebrow without altering the amount of visible 
sclera. The eyebrows are capable of moving not only upwards and downwards, but 
can also be brought together, or angled away from one another. 
(i) Happiness and Surprise 
Taking these properties of the signalling features into account it is possible to propose 
explanations for the results obtained in this study. The expressions of happiness and 
surprise appear to be capable of transmitting their affect over the furthest distance. In 
happiness, the eyes are slightly compressed as a result of the cheeks moving 
upwards. The images of happiness used in these experiments all have broad smiles 
with the lips separated and the teeth exposed. This kind of smile causes a deepening 
of the nasolabial folds generating prominent contours on the face. In the expression of 
surprise the eyebrows are curved and drawn upwards displaying a large area of eyelid 
and the amount of visible sclera is greatly increased enhancing the strength of the 
contrast against the dark iris. The jaw is lowered causing the mouth to open resulting 
in exposure of the teeth and the mouth cavity. 
The fact that these gross movements of the facial features produce large fluctuations in 
light and dark regions across the face could explain why the expressions of happiness 
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and surprise are capable of being transmitted over the furthest distances. Perhaps the 
ecological value of the ease of recognition for surprise stems from its similarity to the 
friendly greeting which shares the characteristic brow raise. The detectability of the 
expression of happiness could be attributed to the bared teeth and the confusability of 
this signal with a threat gesture. Both of these facial movements would be useful to 
detect at a distance since they could prime our 'fight or flight' response if we could 
distinguish between an approaching figure with a friendly or hostile countenance. 
In addition, the smile is thought to have served a very different purpose in our 
evolutionary past which could explain the importance of developing the ability to 
transmit this signal well. Van Hooff (1972) proposed the view that human laughter 
and smiling had different phylogenetic roots. A relaxed open mouth display in non-
human primates is widely believed to be the phylogenetic precursor of human 
laughter, and the silent bared teeth display as the possible ancestor of the human smile 
(Preuschoft, 1992). The silent bared teeth display is used by non-human primates to 
signal submission and appeasement while the relaxed open-mouth display, which is 
often called the 'play face' is an expression of fun. The play face is intended to 
function as a metacommunicative signal to clarify ambiguous movements in pretend 
biting or fighting. In the course of evolution the 'smile' has become emancipated from 
its original motivational background of appeasement and is now used by humans in 
similar contexts as laughter. 
(ii) Sadness 
The expression of sadness has the least powerful signal and is characterised by a 
lowering of the eyes with the inner region of the brows turned upwards and drawn 
together. The mouth is closed and the comers of the mouth may be turned 
downwards. None of these actions allow for large variations in contrast across the 
face and could explain the weakness of the signal. In addition, it is not immediately 
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obvious why an ability to transmit or detect this expression over great distances 
would be of any benefit to an organism. 
(iii) Anger, disgust and fear 
Anger, disgust and fear all elicited a similar performance level in both psychophysical 
tasks. All are open mouth expressions in which the teeth are visible. The eyebrows 
play important expressive roles in each of these states being drawn downwards and 
together in anger, lowered in disgust and straightened and raised in fear. The most 
prominent cue for the recognition of disgust comes from the nose and upper lip. 
Usually the upper lip is raised which lifts the flanges of the nose. The bridge of the 
nose is often wrinkled and sometimes the tongue is brought forward in the mouth in 
an action simulating the expulsion of food. All of these facial movements lead to the 
generation of powerful communicative signals capable of travelling over fairly large 
distances, but do not produce changes in contrast as marked as those in the facial 
movements of happiness and surprise. 
Calculations of visibility 
Finally, the results found in this study confirm Hager and Ekman's (1979) finding 
that the face is a long distance transmitter which is capable of generating an effective 
signal with the strength to project over large distances. From the results of this study 
however, it seems unlikely that any of the expressions could be reliably detected at 
distances between 100 and 220m as Hager and Ekman (1979) proposed. If we 
consider the resolving power of the human visual system, the high frequency cut off 
point for a standard observer can be determined from the contrast sensitivity function 
plot. The finest, useable spatial frequency is approximately 60 cycles/deg. If we 
assume an average face width of 0.15m, at a viewing distance of 220m the face 
subtends 0.039 degrees of visual angle which translates to 2.34 cycles per face. With 
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only such coarse visual information available, it seems highly improbable that any 
categorical decisions could be made about any expression being portrayed or in fact 
even if the stimuli would be recognisable as a face at all. Figure 3.10 shows a male 
'happy' face at an equivalent viewing distance of 220m. (This image was created 
using software written by Roger Watt). 
Figure 3.10: Full grey-level image of a male 'happy' face filtered to represent a real 
face at a 200m viewing distance. 
Summary 
In this chapter, our sensitivity to signals of facial affect was measured using two 
psychophysical paradigms. These techniques avoided the problems associated with 
the forced and free naming tasks described in Chapter 2 and revealed our sensitivities 
to each of six of our facial expressions. The results of these studies suggest that the 
expressions which are labelled with the least accuracy in free and forced choice tasks 
are not simply the hardest to see, and do not have the weakest signal. Expressions of 
fear and disgust which were labelled with the least accuracy in the tasks described in 
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Chapter 2 were not found to be difficult to detect. This suggests that these 
expressions are simply the most difficult to interpret, a finding which is important in 
later chapters of this thesis. 
In the next chapter, our sensitivity to another of the social signals our faces convey, 
eye gaze direction, is measured and compared between a 'live' set-up of gazer and 
observer, and a screen-based task. In addition, the contribution of the facial surround 
in judgements of gaze direction is investigated. 
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Detecting Gaze Direction 
Overview 
In this chapter, sensitivity to gaze direction is measured and compared using two 
psychophysical techniques. The first examines the detectability of gaze direction 
between a gazer and an observer in a live set-up, and the second explores 
performance in an equivalent screen-based task using full grey-level images of the 
same gazer. The advantages of using a screen based task are many, but the primary 
advantage is that it allows for manipulations of the facial stimuli that are obviously not 
possible for a real face. The contribution of the facial surround in detecting gaze 
direction is investigated. Gaze direction sensitivity is explored in a variety of facial 
contexts, the eyes are presented upright or inverted, in isolation, or within the context 
of an upright or inverted face. 
First, some of the literature on gaze perception which motivated these studies is 
described in more detail than was provided in Chapter 1. Gaze detection is an aspect 
of face processing that Bruce and Young (1986) omitted from their model of face 
processing. Neuropsychological evidence exists to support the idea that gaze and 
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other types of face infonnation are processed separately. In addition, 
neurophysiological evidence has shown the existence of populations of cells within 
the non-human primate which are specialised for the detection of faces and some 
which show specific sensitivity to eyes. The saliency of our eyes to the human 
neonate are described, but first some early psychophysical studies are reported which 
demonstrate how accurately we are able to detect these signals. 
Psychophysical Investigations of Gaze Detection 
Cline (1967) used an experimental set-up which was constructed similarly to that 
which will be described in this chapter. The apparatus were assembled such that the 
gazer was able to view a target board and the observer had a frontal view of the 
gazer's face and eyes. This was achieved by using a semi-silvered mirror. Fixation 
markers were positioned on the target board representing 2°, 8 ° and 12° of angular 
rotation of the gazer's eyes upwards, downwards, and to the left and right. (Only the 
horizontal gaze movements are of interest in this thesis). The observer had a circular 
response board in their reach which contained 65 points, including 13 which 
corresponded to the actual target markers radiating out from the central target. 
Observers were requested to point to the marker on the board which corresponded to 
the line of regard of the gazer. Cline reported that the lateral displacement of the 
gazer's eyes that the observer could just detect was 0.75°. 
Gibson and Pick (1963) used the method of constant stimuli to determine gaze 
direction sensitivity in their study. A gazer gazed in tum at one of seven markers 
positioned along a horizontal line on or near to the face of the observer. Out of the 
seven markers, marker 'four' corresponded to a straight ahead look and markers three 
and five related to the observer's right and left ear respectively. Gazer and observer 
were separated by 200cm. Gibson and Pick calculated a threshold for detecting a 
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deviation of the gazer's regard from the straight ahead position which corresponded to 
an angular deviation of the gazer's eyes of2.8°. 
Both of the psychophysical tasks described above demonstrate our acute sensitivity to 
where another individual is gazing. However, neither task allows for much 
experimenter control. The use of a response board like that described by Cline (1967) 
which required the observer to point to the target under fixation could result in the 
observer moving in such a way as to disturb the relative locations of the markers. In 
addition, the spacing of the 52 distractor points was not exactly specified but the first 
marker from the central target was at an eccentricity of 2° to the left and right. The 
very low threshold reported in their study could be due to the experimenter's 
sampling too coarsely at the upper end of the psychometric function (i.e. if 2° fell in 
the upper portion of the psychometric function). The use of a response board as 
described by Cline (1967) does not appear to be a very satisfactory way of conducting 
investigations into a highly sensitive process. 
The psychophysical tasks in this chapter were designed so that only limited demands 
were made of the observers. Instead of observers having to point to markers or report 
that the gazer was looking at their nose or left shoulder, in these tasks, participants 
simply had to decide if the gazer was looking to their left, or to their right. This was 
the case for both the live gaze experiment and the screen based task. 
Gaze Awareness 
Despite our apparent sensitivity to eye contact when explicitly measured in 
psychophysical tasks, studies which have investigated sensitivity to gazing awareness 
during an interaction have shown that people are largely insensitive to the precise 
gazing pattern of their interactant (Argyle & Cook, 1976). The inference that most 
people draw from the directed gaze of another is that the person is attending to them. 
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Kleinke and Bustos (1973) reported that participants who were told that their fellow 
interlocutor looked at them less than normal (regardless of their actual gazing pattern) 
rated that person as less attentive. This finding demonstrates the way in which we 
attribute mutual gaze as a sign of interest when engaging in conversations with others, 
and failure to do so, as a sign of impoliteness or lack of concern. In many situations 
the very act of 'catching someone's eye' is sufficient to engage them in subsequent 
interaction. As a result of the strength of this facial signal, many waiters have 
developed a highly specialised mechanism for avoiding such ocular encounters. 
In any given dyadic interaction, there is a certain amount of 'intimacy' which is 
signalled by various factors such as the nature of the conversation, the physical 
proximity of the interactants, smiling and eye-contact (Argyle & Dean 1965). These 
variables were reported to share an interactive relationship such that if one factor was 
disturbed, the others could compensate to return the levels of intimacy to their 
acceptable, or appropriate level. 
Stephenson, Rutter and Dore (1972) manipulated the viewing distance between pairs 
of interactants and found that the duration of eye contact and the proportion of a pair's 
looking which resulted in eye contact increased with distance. This behaviour could 
be explained by considering Argyle and Dean's (1965) idea of intimacy levels. When 
the separation between interactants is large, there is a loss of intimacy which could be 
compensated for by an increase in the amount of eye contact. When the interactants 
are seated close together, intimacy levels may be too high and so the amount of eye 
contact is reduced to return the equilibrium. 
When the viewing distance from a confederate is increased, or illumination decreased, 
participants are found to be more willing to assume eye contact (Martin & Jones 
1982). The same result is apparent even when the gaze stimuli consists of a video 
recording which would have the effect of decreasing the intimacy of the task (Martin 
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& Rovira 1981). A preference to report eye contact when this signal becomes obscure 
could be explained if we assume on a basic survival level there would be a greater 
penalty for ignoring eye contact than for imagining its presence. 
In the investigations reported in this chapter, gaze sensitivity is measured between a 
gazer and an observer and also when the observer discriminates gaze direction from a 
face presented on a computer screen. Performance in the two tasks is compared. It is 
expected that observers would experience different levels of intimacy in performing 
these tasks and that this may have an effect on their accuracy. 
Gaze Detection in Infants 
Developmental studies can provide us with indications regarding the maturation of the 
neural substrates which may underlie processes such as gaze detection. Baron-Cohen 
(1995a) has proposed that humans are born with a "mentalist bias" and as such are 
sensitive at an early age to signals which specify the intentions of other individuals. 
Baron-Cohen (1995a) suggests that the importance of the eyes in humans and 
primates in signalling potential threat and also in more pro-social behaviour, has led to 
the development of a neurocognitive system tuned to detect the eye orientation of 
other individuals, a system which Baron-Cohen has termed an eye direction detector 
(EDD). This EDD is supported by an intentionality detector (ID) which interprets 
directed movement as volitional and purposeful. The combination of the EDD and the 
ID would predict that young infants would interpret an adult who turned both their 
face and eyes towards them as an act which was goal directed and intentional and 
would interpret averted gaze as an interruption in communication. From this model, 
Caron, Caron, Roberts and Brooks (1997) predicted that the direction of an adult's 
gaze, towards or away from an infant should affect the responsiveness of the child, 
with infants decreasing their levels of smiling when gaze was averted. Caron and his 
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colleagues presented three and five month old infants with video tapes of adult 
interactors who either appeared or did not appear to make eye contact. A lack of eye 
contact was produced in three different ways, by the adult averting just their eyes, 
averting the head and eyes and closing the eyes. A fourth condition involved averting 
the head alone but maintained eye contact. Their findings demonstrated that the 
younger infants were insensitive to adult eye gaze direction and were instead 
predominantly influenced by head orientation, and if the face was frontal, to eye 
visibility. The older infants were also found to be predominantly influenced by the 
orientation of the head but showed sensitivity to the visibility of the eye and also to 
the orientation of the eye. However, Caron et al (1997) found that the stimulus to 
which the infants were most attuned was frontal head with visible eyes, regardless of 
the direction of the gaze. Caron et al (1997) suggest that if infants do possess a 
neurocognitive system tuned to these social cues, it is more likely to involve a 
sensitivity to head direction and an eye detector rather than an eye direction detector as 
Baron-Cohen (1995a) has suggested. Caron et al (1997) defend their use of video 
episodes as stimuli by observing that a similar study conducted by Hains and Muir 
(1996) found comparable behaviour when the adult interactor was on video or when 
the set up was live. 
Vecera and Johnson (1995) also conducted studies on the ability of young infants to 
discriminate between directed and averted gaze direction. They used a two choice 
preferential looking paradigm and formed a prediction based on the assumption that 
infants would show a difference in looking behaviour to the two stimuli if they 
perceived a difference between the faces. They made no predictions regarding which 
type of stimuli the infant would prefer to look at. They found that 4 month old infants 
were able to distinguish between direct and averted gaze from photographs of faces if 
the eyes were averted by a large amount (30°). An eccentricity of 15° was not 
distinguishable from a direct gaze. Samuels (1985) presented 3 month old infants 
with two images, each of the same face but one with a directed gaze and the other 
98 
showing an averted gaze. The infants demonstrated no preference for either of the 
images and gazed equally at both the averted and the directed gaze. This finding 
would be consistent with the suggestion that young infants (below three months of 
age) are stimulated by an en face adult regardless of their eye direction. Vecera and 
Johnson (1995) suggest that the human infant may acquire the ability to discriminate 
gaze cues somewhere between 2.5 and 4 months postnatally. Caron et aI's (1997) 
study would support this general suggestion although their results would suggest that 
the ability to discriminate gaze direction may take upwards of 5 months. 
Vecera and Johnson (1995) also investigated whether or not young infants would 
show context effects in gaze discrimination tasks. They suggested that if infants were 
found to be influenced by the context of the surrounding face, this would support the 
hypothesis that gaze discrimination abilities emerge as a result of the maturation of 
central face processes, as opposed to the development of visual acuity or contrast 
sensitivity. These lower stages are not thought to be specifically tuned to processing 
gaze information, but are needed in order to perceive gaze direction, and as such, any 
difficulties with the detection of gaze in young infants could be attributable to the 
immaturity of these operations. Using a standard infant-controlled habituation task, 
infants were presented with schematic faces which were either intact or scrambled. 
Their investigations showed that 4 month old infants were able to detect the difference 
between directed and averted gaze and concluded that the ability to do this task was 
not therefore solely attributable to visual processes such as acuity. Performance in the 
task was attributed to the infant identifying and processing the stimuli as a face, which 
would indicate the role of higher order functions. When Vecera and Johnson 
conducted the same experiment with younger infants of 2.5 months of age, the results 
suggested that the majority (but not all) of these younger participants were unable to 
perform the gaze discrimination task. Vecera and Johnson (1995) cited this as 
providing evidence that the ability to discriminate gazing patterns is not innate and 
arises once the infant has experience of faces. However, just because an ability is not 
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present from birth, does not necessarily preclude an innate contribution e.g. walking, 
ejaculation. 
Neurophysiological and Neuropsychological Studies of Gaze Detection 
Cells which respond selectively to faces have been found in the macaque brain in 
several sub-areas of cortex; the lateral and ventral surfaces of the inferior temporal 
cortex (IT) and the upper bank, lower bank and fundus of the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS). Each area is thought to be responsible for a particular role in face 
processing. Cells in the IT are concerned with the identification of familiar individuals 
whereas STS cells have been shown to be specialised to different views of the face 
and head (Perrett, Smith, Potter, Mistlin, Head, Milner, & Jeeves, 1985; Perrett, 
Oram, Harries, Bevan, Hietanen, Benson, & Thomas, 1991; Heywood & Cowey, 
1992). Perrett et al (1991) reported that out of a sample of 119 cells in the STS, 110 
exhibited view selectivity to the head. Furthermore, approximately 65% of these were 
found to be sensitive to gaze direction. Importantly, cells which were most excited by 
a frontal view of the face preferred eye contact, whereas those which were sensitive to 
a face in profile preferred gaze that was averted. From this observation, Perrett and 
his colleagues predicted that these cells could have a role in social attention. The 
ability to determine where another individual is attending would require a system 
which was capable of making very fine discriminations. Perrett and his colleagues 
concluded that these cells exhibited conjoint sensitivity to eye gaze and head 
orientation, but information from gaze cues could override information regarding head 
orientation. 
The eye and head sensitivity exhibited by cells in the STS reported by Perrett et a1 
(1985; 1991) was confirmed by Campbell, Heywood, Cowey, Regard, and Landis 
(1990) who explored the sensitivity of gaze direction in monkeys in which the rostral 
STS had been removed and also in two prosopagnosic patients. Both patients were 
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impaired in their ability to recognise familiar individuals, label facial expressions, and 
in judging gender and age from the face. The gaze task in this investigation used 
stimuli which consisted of head and neck photographs of a single gazer who looked 
5, 10 and 20° to the left or right with the head angled 20° to the left or right or straight 
ahead. In the study reported by Campbell and her colleagues, monkeys were taught to 
discriminate between the pairs of photographs. This task was readily learnt by the 
monkeys pre-operatively but performance was impaired after STS ablation. However, 
the specificity of the deficit could not be asserted as some visual functions may also 
have been disturbed. The same stimuli were used for the human participants who 
were asked to choose which of two faces was looking at them in a series of trials 
which incorporated all head and eye angles. Control participants were also shown the 
face pairings and a number of them also performed the task with the faces inverted. 
They found that for the seven control participants who viewed the stimuli in the 
inverted condition, gaze detection accuracy was only significantly impaired when the 
eyes were deviated by 5°. The prosopagnosic patients were impaired to different 
extents in the gaze discrimination tasks. KD was only impaired at discriminating eye 
deviations of 5° from the straight ahead faces. AB performed at chance levels for most 
of the discriminations and depended heavily on head posture rather than eye 
orientation when attempting to solve the task. AB' s inability to perform gaze 
discrimination tasks was not simply due to poor vision, her visual acuity and contrast 
sensitivity were found to be good when measured using gratings. So, despite the 
similarity in the impairments experienced by both of the patients reported by Campbell 
and her colleagues, they showed a dissociation in their ability to discriminate gaze 
direction in addition to the dissociation between gaze direction perception and other 
face processing tasks. 
Campbell et al (1990) found that normal participants discriminating gaze direction 
from inverted faces were less accurate when the faces were presented in this 
orientation for the 5° deviations compared to the upright condition although a high 
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level of accuracy was apparent for the larger gaze deviations. Campbell et al (1990) 
compared this 'mild' effect of inversion with the more dramatic detrimental effects 
inversion has on identity recognition (Yin, 1969). They concluded that the detection 
of a straight ahead gaze need not be dependent on configural information which 
defines the relative positions of the facial features and that the presentation of two 
eyes in their correct horizontal alignment, albeit upside-down, was sufficient to 
support sensitivity to gaze direction perception. 
In addition, patients AB and KD illustrated the fact that good acuity and contrast 
sensitivity are needed for, but not sufficient to perform the detailed analysis required 
for gaze direction detection. Campbell et al (1990) suggest that adequate gaze 
discrimination must require deeper levels of processing which they propose requires 
the establishment of a detailed representation of facial features within the context of a 
facial frame. 
Coincident with this research, Vecera and Johnson (1995) investigated adult 
sensitivity to directed and averted gaze from different facial surrounds. They used 
simple schematic faces in their investigations representing upright, inverted and 
scrambled faces. The eyes either looked directly at the observer or the pupils were 
moved O.lcm (0. r of visual angle) to either the left or the right of the central 
position. All other facial features were constant in each of the conditions to maintain 
equal amounts of visual information. The task for the observers was to decide if the 
eyes were looking directly at them or away from them. They found that sensitivity to 
gaze direction was significantly higher in the upright face condition which Vecera and 
Johnson (1995) suggest provides evidence for the role of cortical circuits III gaze 
sensitivity which are also involved in other aspects of face processing. 
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Aim of the Present Study 
The experiments described in this chapter investigate the contribution of the facial 
surround in processing gaze direction and also challenge the view presented by 
Campbell et al (1990) that eyes in an inverted configuration are able to support our 
sensitivity to gaze direction perception. Gaze accuracy is measured in a screen-based 
task when the face is upright, inverted or absent and when the eyes within these facial 
contexts are themselves either upright or inverted. Firstly, a straightforward measure 
of our accuracy in perceiving these signals is investigated in a psychophysical task 
with a gazer and an observer. This task was designed to capture sensitivities to a wide 
range of gaze eccentricities including a very narrow range around the 'straight ahead' 
position using a psychophysical technique designed to adapt to the performance of 
each participant. A comparison between the 'live' gaze task and the 'upright face-
upright eyes' screen based task is made although the number of physical changes 
makes a direct comparison difficult. 
Experiment 1: Measuring Gaze Direction Sensitivities 
Between a Gazer and an Observer. 
This task used the psychophysical technique of Adaptive Probit Estimation (APE) 
which is an adaptive version of the method of constant stimuli (Watt & Andrews 
1981). APE generates a range of stimulus levels between zero and infinity. At APE = 
100% the target stimuli (i.e. the fixation marker) is presented at a large eccentricity 
and the participant is expected to perform perfectly. At APE = 0%, the target is 
presented in the straight ahead position, so the discrimination task is impossible and 
the participant is expected to respond randomly. During the course of the task, the 
APE program plots a psychometric function of the participant's responses which is 
adapted on each trial. APE presents a range of stimuli in a pseudo random sequence 
which is influenced by the participant's own response pattern. It samples most 
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heavily at those points on the psychometric function where the participant's 
performance changes most rapidly. This paradigm is sensitive to the participant's 
performance during the task and can adjust its range of stimuli accordingly. Probit 
analysis is applied to the data to determine the best fitting cumulative Gaussian. 
Participants 
Four postgraduate students from the Psychology department at Stirling University 
participated in this study and were paid for their time. The average age of the 
participants (referred to as observers) was 26 years. All observers had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. 
Design 
The gazer was required to produce and hold a fixed gaze on a series of markers which 
were generated on a computer screen positioned directly in front of the gazer at a 
distance of 1.5m. As mutual gaze is believed to be such a powerful and salient 
stimulus, it was essential for this set-up that the gazer and participant be positioned 
such that they could experience this phenomenon. To allow the gazer an unobstructed 
view of the observer and the computer screen, a semi-silvered mirror was positioned 
at a 45° angle between the gazer and the screen. The distance between the gazer and 
the computer screen was equivalent to the apparent distance between the gazer and the 
observer (i.e. the sum of the distances of each to the mirror, x = y + Z in figure 4.1). 
The experiment was conducted in a small room in which the walls had been covered 
with black card to increase the contrast of the reflected image by reducing any stray 
light. Two lamps were positioned overhead and on either side of the gazer to provide 
a uniform and powerful illumination of the gazer's face. All observers reported that 
the experience of looking at the image of the gazer in the mirror was as powerful as if 
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they were looking directly at the gazer's face. To summarise, in this set-up, the gazer 
could see the computer screen and the face of the observer, and the observer could 
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Figure 4.1: Plan of apparatus 
Observers were seated during the experiment with their heads restrained by a chin rest 
with vertical supports to prevent lateral head shifts. The gazer's head was also 
prevented from making any movements by the use of a foam rubber head support 
which was positioned behind the gazer on the wall. The support was designed to cup 
the back of the head and to be invisible to the observer. This type of head restraint 
was chosen instead of a chin rest as it allowed a more natural view of the face. 
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Procedure 
Observers took part in fourteen experimental blocks each containing eighty trials. 
Each block of trials began with the presentation of a large cross in the centre of the 
computer screen. The purpose of the cross was to align the gazer and observer. The 
gazer was able to instruct the observer to alter the position of the chin rest until the 
image of the horizontal part of the cross was at the same height as the observer's 
eyes, and the vertical component bisected the distance between the eyes. This was to 
ensure that a fixation target presented in the straight ahead location would appear 
directly between the observer's eyes. The experiment began once the observer was in 
the correct position. 
A single trial consisted of the presentation of a small white target (lcm in diameter) 
which was presented straight ahead, or to various eccentricities to the left or right of 
centre along a horizontal axis. The observer was able to look at the gazer's face for an 
unlimited duration. Their task was to determine whether the gazer was looking to their 
left or to their right. The observer responded by pressing one of two keys to indicate a 
leftward or rightward gaze. 
The observer was required to close their eyes immediately after making each decision. 
This was to prevent the observer viewing the gazer while they adjusted their fixation 
to the next target. This was to prevent the possibility of the observer perceiving a shift 
of focus to the left, for example, from a large rightward gaze to a smaller rightward 
gaze as a gaze in a leftward direction. While the observer's eyes were closed, the 
gazer would quickly relocate their gaze, the participant would open their eyes for the 
next trial after the presentation of an auditory signal. 
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Results 
The sensitivity of each observer was calculated and their mean thresholds are reported 
in Table 4.1. APE operates using an arbitrary threshold of 84%, therefore the 
interpretation of a threshold of 1.89° is that an angular deviation of this amount to the 
left or right of 0°, will be reported as 1.89° to one side on 84% of trials, and on 16% 
of trials will be perceived as a gaze in the opposite direction. 
Observer Mean threshold SD 
PI 1.89° 0.65° 
P2 2.56° 1.52° 
P3 1.41 ° 0.36° 
P4 2.62° 0.78° 
Table 4.1: Mean threshold scores (degrees) for 4 participants in a gaze direction 
sensitivity task. 
Gibson and Pick (1963) reported that a gazer's line of regard displaced by 9cm as 
seen from 200cm was just visible. This corresponds to an angular deviation of 2.6° 
which is comparable with the worst participant in this task, but slightly larger than the 
group's overall mean of 2.12°. Cline (1967) reported a threshold of 0.75° which is 
considerably smaller than the thresholds reported in this study. However, the 
response board used in his study was constructed with targets radiating out from a 
central position with the first marker positioned at an eccentricity of 2°. It could be the 
case that at a viewing distance of 122cm, participants were very accurate at 
discriminating between a straight ahead gaze and one averted by 2° and so made few 
errors when the gaze was at 0°. In addition, if we consider that in the psychophysical 
task described in this chapter, an angular displacement of 2.12° was detected 
significantly above chance at a viewing distance of 150cm, it is conceivable that the 
separation on the target board used by Cline (1967) was just great enough for a 2° 
gaze to be consistently discriminated from straight ahead. 
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Experiment 2: The Contribution of the Facial Surround 
in Gaze Discrimination Tasks (I) 
Gaze direction sensitivity was measured when participants viewed grey level images 
of the same gazer who participated in Experiment 1. If Argyle and Dean's (1965) 
theory regarding eye contact and intimacy is correct, it may be the case that 
participants who took part in Experiment 1 felt uncomfortable maintaining a directed 
stare at the gazer to interpret their direction of gaze, particularly when the gaze was 0° , 
or close to 0°, and consequently made their decisions more rapidly and with less 
accuracy than they would have had the stimuli been presented to them on a screen. 
Conversely, the transition of the stimuli from a live set up to a grey-level image, 
reduced in size, could have the effect of reducing accuracy due to the artificiality of 
the stimuli. However, Martin and Rovira (1981) reported that a willingness to report 
eye contact when distance increased, or lighting decreased was evident from a live 
display and from a video taped display (Martin & Jones, 1982). In the next two 
investigations, sensitivities to gaze direction perception are measured using gaze 
stimuli presented on a screen and performance is compared to that found in 
Experiment 1. 
The context of the facial surround, and its contribution to discriminating gaze 
direction is also investigated. Investigations by Vecera and Johnson (1995) coincident 
with this research demonstrated that gaze judgements were influenced by the facial 
context in which the eyes were presented. Their stimuli consisted of schematic faces 
upright, inverted and scrambled. In all conditions, the location of the eye region was 
maintained at fixation. They found that performance was significantly improved when 
the eyes were embedded in an upright face compared to either a scrambled or inverted 
face. 
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In the next experiment, the gaze stimuli are full grey-level images of a gazer's face 
presented upright and inverted. In addition, eyes are presented in isolation, without 
the presence of the facial surround in both an upright and inverted orientation. In 
Experiment 3, further manipulations of the stimuli are made and a more sensitive 
measure of observer's threshold obtained. 
Participants 
Forty undergraduate students from Stirling University participated in this study. Ages 
ranged from 17 to 23 years with a mean of 20.1 years. All participants reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Materials: Creating the stimuli 
The first set of images created for use in this task were obtained by filming the gazer 
while they fixated on a range of markers which were presented on a gaze chart in 
front of them. A video camera was positioned immediately beneath the gaze chart at 
the central position. When the video tape was examined it was found that the gazer 
did not appear to look straight ahead when the gazer fixated at 0°, but instead 
appeared to be gazing upwards slightly due to the relative positions of the camera and 
the chart. It was important for the design of the task for the line of regard of the gazer 
to appear to be directed towards the observer's eyes. To overcome the problem, the 
same experimental set-up was employed as was described in Experiment 1 (Figure 
4.1). The video camera was positioned in the location of the observer and the gaze 
chart positioned in place of the computer screen. The semi-silvered mirror allowed a 
straight ahead gaze to be captured and despite the fact that the stimuli were reflections, 
the quality of the images was not impaired. The chart displayed a range of markers 
representing visual angles from 0 to 13.3° left and right in 0.23° increments. Each 
marker was revealed one at a time to the gazer who fixed their gaze on each of the 
targets in tum. Prior to each fixation, the gazer would hold up a label which 
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corresponded to the next viewing angle. This was to ensure that the correct gaze 
eccentricity would be grabbed from the film when the stimuli were created. 
To create the stimuli, the video tape was played through a Macintosh 660av computer 
and an image representing each gaze eccentricity grabbed using Apple software. The 
frame that was selected to represent a given angle was chosen after a succession of 
frames in which the eyes remained static. 
The stimuli for the 'eyes only' condition were created by selecting the eye and brow 
region from the full face exemplars at each of the gaze angles. Care was taken to 
ensure that each image was the same size. Examples of the stimuli used in this 
experiment are shown in Figure 4.2 
(a) Upright Face and Eyes (-2.75°) (b) Inverted Face and Eyes (+2.75°) 
( c) Face Absent Eyes Upright (+7.3°) (d) Face Absent Eyes Inverted (-7.3°) 
Figure 4.2: Examples of the stimuli used in Experiment 2 (not shown to size) 
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Design 
This experiment was conducted as a between-subjects design with two factors. The 
first factor was facial context (present or absent). The second factor was orientation 
(upright or inverted). 
The experiment was created using Superlab software. Stimuli were made for gaze 
eccentricities from 0 0 increasing in 0.23 0 increments to 2.76 0 and then in increments 
of 0.46
0 
until an eccentricity of 13.3 0 in both a leftward and rightward direction. Each 
cue value was presented to the observer in a random order a total of three times. This 
made a total of 216 trials with an additiona112 trials of 'straight ahead' gaze (i.e. 00 ). 
Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, the task for the observer in all of the following conditions was to 
decide if the gaze was directed to their left or to their right and to guess if they were 
undecided. Observers were not told that a proportion of trials consisted of straight 
ahead views only that some of the angular deviations were very small. Observers 
viewed each presentation of a stimulus for an unlimited duration and made their 
responses on a keyboard positioned in front of them. Once the observer made their 
decision a blank screen would be presented for 250 msec the offset of which triggered 
the next stimulus to appear. The screen was viewed binocularly and at a distance of 
1m. The full-face images measured 11cm x 8.5cm and subtended 6.3 0 of visual 
angle, the 'eye's only' images measured 4cm by l.4cm and subtended 2.29 0 of visual 
angle. Thus the eye features were the same size in each condition. 
The task for observers taking part in either of the inverted conditions remained the 
same. There was no requirement for the observer to 'mentally rotate' the images, if 
the eyes appeared to be gazing in a leftward direction they were asked to respond by 
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pressing the left key press regardless of the fact that the face was inverted and 
therefore displaying a rightward gaze. 
Results and Discussion 
Probit analysis was applied to the data to detennine the best fitting cumulative 
Gaussian. From this analysis, thresholds were calculated which are reported in Table 
4.2 as mean thresholds for ten participants in each condition. 
FACE CONTEXT 
Face present Face absent 
Threshold SD Threshold SD 
Orientation Upright 3.17° 2.040 3.20 1.04 0 
Inverted 3.98 v 1.180 4.340 1.54 0 
Table 4.2: Mean thresholds (degrees)for 10 participants in each offour gaze direction 
detection tasks. 
The mean thresholds reported in Table 4.2 illustrate that sensitivity to gaze direction is 
greatest in the 'upright eyes' condition and the 'upright face-upright eyes' condition. 
Performance is also very similar between both the inverted conditions but with lower 
thresholds compared to the upright conditions. A 2 (context) x 2 (orientation) 
ANOV A conducted on the threshold scores revealed a non-significant two way 
interaction [F (1, 36) = 0.112, p > 0.05], a significant main effect of orientation [F 
(1, 36) = 4.21, P < 0.05], and a non-significant effect of context [F (1, 36) = 0.16, p 
= 0.69]. 
The cue values were sampled with a very high frequency, particularly around the 
smaller gaze eccentricities, and as a result of the small number of trials at each cue 
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value, the data appeared to be very noisy. In Figure 43th ~ 
. e peuonnance of one 
participant in the 'face upright-eyes upright' condition was taken and neighbouring 
cue values pooled to eliminate some of the noise. The data was plotted in bins of 20 
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Figure 4.3: Psychometric function illustrating the peiformance of one participant in 
the 'face upright-eyes upright' condition of Experiment 2 with cue values pooled to 
eliminate noise. 
The threshold for the upright face and eyes condition is higher in this experiment than 
that measured in the live gaze set up of Experiment 1 (3.17" compared to 2.12°). 
However, the number of trials at each of the cue values was much lower in this 
experiment so the power of the calculation is decreased. 
In this experiment it would appear that sensitivity to gaze direction is not influenced 
by the facial surround. However, the power of the experiment was quite low with 
only three trials for each value of the cue. In the next experiment, the number of trials 
for each cue was doubled and the range reduced to avoid wasted trials at the larger 
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eccentricities where petformance was at ceiling for all observers. In addition, context 
was confounded with orientation in the design. In the next experiment, these factors 
are manipulated independently in further investigations into the contribution of the 
facial surround in gaze direction detection. 
Experiment 3: The Contribution of the Facial Surround 
in Gaze Direction Detection Tasks (II) 
A more sensitive test of gaze direction detection was employed in this experiment with 
more trials petformed at each of the gaze eccentricities, and a narrower range of 
angles tested. Two additional conditions were tested in this experiment which 
presented the eyes in an incongruous orientation to the face. If the facial surround was 
found to contribute to our ability to perceive gaze direction, then petformance in these 
conditions was expected to exceed that of the 'eyes only' conditions despite the fact 
that the facial surround and the orientation of the eyes was incongruous. In addition it 
was predicted that a contribution of the facial surround to gaze direction detection in 
the conditions described in Experiment 2 would be evident with an increase in the 
power of the design. 
Participants 
Thirty-six observers took part in this study (six in each of the six conditions). 
Observers were Open University students attending Summer School at Stirling 
University. The age of the observers ranged from 28 to 56 with a mean age of 37.9 




Creating the stimuli for the first four conditions was described in the materials section 
of Experiment 2. To create the stimuli illustrated in Figure 4.4 the eye region was 'cut 
out' of each of the gaze stimuli and pasted over the face in its new orientation. A 
blending tool was then used to eliminate sharp lines so that the resulting 'face ' 
appeared smooth. Each 'face' condition measured Ilcm by 8.5cm and subtended 6.3 0 
of visual angle and the 'eye's only' condition measured 4cm by I.4cm and subtended 
2.29 0 of visual angle. Thus the size of the eye features in each condition was the 
same. 
(a) Inverted Face Upright Eyes (+0.46°) (b) Upright Face Inverted Eyes (+0.46°) 
Figure 4.4: Examples of two of the conditions used in Experiment 3 (not to size) 
Design 
This experiment was conducted as a between-subjects design with two factors. The 
first factor was facial context (upright, inverted or absent). The second factor was eye 
orientation (upright or inverted). 
In Experiment 2 it was found that a proportion of the cues representing the large gaze 
angles were superfluous as participants were found to reach ceiling performance at 
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eccentricities of approximately 80 • For this reason, cues exceeding 80 were removed 
from the study and a greater proportion of trials were repeated around the smaller 
angles. The number of trials at all the remaining cue values was increased to six. This 
resulted in 264 trials with an additional twelve at 00 • The procedure was the same as 
that described in Experiment 2. The task in all cases required the observer to 
discriminate the direction of gaze to their left, or to their right. Observers were not 
told that a proportion of trials consisted of straight ahead views only that some of the 
angular deviations were very small. 
Results 
Mean thresholds and standard deviations are reported in Table 4.3 for six observers in 
each of the six conditions tested. As predicted, with an increase in the power of the 
design, differences in performance between the conditions became apparent. From the 
threshold data it is evident that participants demonstrate greatest sensitivity when the 
face and eyes are in the upright orientation. To compare performance in each of the 
conditions, the data was submitted to an ANOV A. 
FACE CONTEXT 
Upright Inverted Absent 
Threshold SD Threshold SD Threshold SD 
Eyes 2.55° 1.18° 3.24° 1.07° 4.86 0 0.55° 
Upright 
Eyes 6.79° 4.39° 6.62° 3.84° 5.78° 3.91 ° 
Inverted 
Table 4.3: Mean threshold (degrees) for six participants in each of six gaze direction 
detection tasks. 
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The measures of standard deviation of the mean thresholds varied more than eight 
fold between two of the conditions. This result violated the assumptions of ANOV A, 
therefore the data was transformed by taking the reciprocal of the threshold values. 
The results of this 3 (face context) x 2 (eye orientation) ANOVA showed there was no 
significant effect of the orientation of the face [F (2,30) = 2.397, P > 0.1], but a 
significant effect of eye orientation [F (1, 30) = 10.827, P < 0.01] and a significant 
interaction [F (2, 30) = 3.397, p = 0.047]. Simple Main Effects analysis revealed a 
highly significant effect of context (i.e. the face) in the eyes upright condition [F (2, 
60) = 5.66, P <0.01] and a non-significant effect of context in the inverted eyes 
condition [F (2,60) = 0.135, p = 0.875], so the context of the facial surround did not 
influence gaze direction detection when the eyes were inverted. A post-hoc Newman 
Keuls (p<0.05) test revealed that performance in the 'Upright Face-Upright Eyes' 
condition was significantly different to that of the 'Face Absent-Eyes Upright' 
condition. 
Simple main effects analysis also revealed that the orientation of the eyes was 
significant when the face was in the upright orientation [F (1, 30) = 12.37, P < 
0.001], similarly, the orientation of the eyes was significant when the face was 
inverted [F (1, 30) = 5.15, p < 0.05]. There was no significant effect of the 
orientation of the eyes when the face was absent as can be seen in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: Mean peiformance of six observers in each of six conditions investigating 
the contribution of the facial surround in the detection of gaze direction 
Summary 
When the facial surround is absent and the eyes are presented in isolation, 
performance is not affected by the orientation of the eyes. Figure 4.5 illustrates that 
performance in the face absent condition is poor and independent of eye orientation. 
Performance in the 'upright face-upright eyes' condition is significantly better than 
that measured when the eyes are presented in isolation demonstrating the importance 
of the facial surround in this gaze discrimination task. The importance of the facial 
surround is also apparent when the eyes are presented in an upright orientation within 
the context of an inverted face. Despite the incongruity of the image, performance in 
this condition exceeds that seen when the eyes are presented in isolation although this 
does not reach statistical significance. 
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An alternative measure of sensitivity 
The threshold values reported in each of the gaze direction detection experiments 
provide a measure of sensitivity for observers in this task. Another more visual way 
of interpreting the data is to calculate the angle subtended at the observer's eye by the 
lateral displacement of the gazer's eye, i.e. the distance through which the gazer's eye 
has to move before it is reliably detected by the observer is calculated. Figure 4.6 
illustrates the angles and distances involved in the calculation and the results are 
reported in Table 4.4. 
Gazer's eye Observer 
a 
s 
Figure 4.6: Illustration of the distances and angles involved in calculating the angle 
subtended at the observer's eyes (a) by the lateral displacement of the gazer's eyes 
(d). 
e = the angle through which the gazer's eye must turn before it is reliably detected by 
the observer (this is the threshold measured in radians) 
s = the distance between the gazer and the observer 
r = the radius of the gazer's eye 
d = the distance through which the gazer's eye must turn before it is reliably detected 
by the observer 
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a = the angle subtended at the observer's eye by the lateral displacement of the gazers 
eye 
Therefore, a = (rls) 8 radians 
The lateral displacement is calculated from: 
d = r8 
Experiment a (arc mins) SD (a) arc mins d(mm) 
Experiment 1 1.0 0.24 0.44 
Experiment 2 0.7 0.43 0.22 
Experiment 3 0.6 0.28 0.18 
Table 4.4: Participants sensitivities to gaze direction as measured in three different 
tasks. Figures represent the angle sub tended at the observers eye (a) by the lateral 
displacement o/the gazer's eye (d). 
It is slightly ambiguous to compare a and threshold values obtained in the different 
tasks as they only covary when measured in the same task. Hence Experiment 1 
producing the smallest threshold but the largest a. However, these calculations 
provide us with a guide to sensitivity in each task. Clinically normal visual acuity is 
equivalent to one arc minute in the Snellen test, so it appears that performance in all of 
the gaze tasks is at least as good as Snellen acuity. 
(The ratio of the size of the head on screen compared to the real size of the head was 
accounted for in these calculations). 
The same analysis was applied to the data from Experiment 3 and the results are 
shown in Table 4.5. 
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FACE CONTEXT 
Upright Inverted Absent 
a (arc mins) d(rrun) a (arc mins) d(rrun) a (arc mins) d(mm) 
Eyes 0.6 0.18 0.78 0.23 1.2 0.34 
Upright 
Eyes 1.64 0.48 1.6 0.46 1.4 0.4 
Inverted 
Table 4.5: Analyses of the angle subtended at the observer's eyes (a) by the lateral 
displacement of the gazer's eyes (d) in six gaze direction detection tasks. 
In all of the gaze tasks which presented the eyes in an inverted orientation, regardless 
of the facial surround, the distance through which the gazer's eyes must be displaced 
before the deviation can be reliably detected is greater than in the upright eyes 
condition. 
General Discussion 
In this chapter sensitivity to gaze direction was measured from a live set-up of gazer 
and observer, and also from observer's perceptions of a screen image. In addition, 
gaze direction sensitivity was measured when the facial surround was manipulated to 
create different facial contexts. The aim of these investigations was to obtain a 
threshold measure for gaze sensitivity and to explore the contribution of the facial 
surround in making these fine discriminations. 
A smaller threshold was reported for performance in the live gaze task compared to 
the screen tasks although all sensitivities were very similar. The worst performance 
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was measured in Experiment 2, the first screen-based task, although the power of this 
experiment was limited due to the low number of trials at each of the stimulus values. 
Performance in Experiments 1 and 3 was very similar which would suggest that 
observers were not inhibited by the intimacy of a live gaze task and also that the task 
transferred well to screen. When the sensitivities of the observers in each of the 
experiments was compared by calculating the angle subtended at the observer's eye 
by the lateral displacement of the gazer's eye, it was apparent that sensitivities were 
very similar in all experiments. 
Gibson and Pick (1963) suggested in their psychophysical experiment which 
measured gaze accuracy of an observer in a live set-up, that it was conceivable that the 
gazer unconsciously betrayed themselves when maintaining a straight ahead look by 
some slight change in expression. They therefore recommended the use of a model or 
pictures which would enable the experimenter to have complete control over the 
experiment and guarantee the elimination of unintentional cues. It would appear that 
there was no such problem in Experiment 1 as perfonnance was found to be 
comparable between the live and screen based tasks. However, transferring the task 
to screen allowed for interesting manipulations of the stimuli. 
How sensitivity was affected by manipulations of the facial surround is illustrated in 
Table 4.5 which reports 'a,' and 'd' for each of the conditions tested in Experiment 3. 
In the screen based tasks, observers were most sensitive to gaze direction in the 
'upright face-upright eyes' condition where the direction of gaze could be reliably 
detected from a displacement of the gazer's eyes of O.18mm, in the 'upright face-
inverted eyes' condition, the gazer's eyes needed a lateral displacement two and a half 
times greater than this to be reliably detected by the observers. 
The aim of Experiment 2 and in particular Experiment 3 was to establish the influence 
of the facial surround in a gaze direction detection task. Figure 4.5 illustrates data 
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from Experiment 3 and the effect of facial context in this task is evident. Observers 
are most sensitive to gaze direction when the face and eyes are upright. When the 
facial surround is removed, performance is significantly impaired. There is also a 
trend in the data to suggest that the presence of the facial surround facilitates gaze 
detection even when the orientation of the face and eyes is incongruous. Inverting the 
eyes had a very detrimental effect on gaze perception, most dramatically illustrated if 
performance in the 'face upright-eyes upright' and 'face upright-eyes inverted' 
conditions are compared. Observers commented on the hideousness of the images 
created for the 'upright face-inverted eyes' condition, a facial manipulation famously 
modelled by Margaret Thatcher in Thompson's illusion (1980). When the face is 
inverted, the individual features are processed separately at a local level rather than 
processing configural information as would happen in an upright face. So, when the 
face is presented in an upright orientation with inverted eyes, configural processing is 
disrupted which would appear to interfere with gaze direction perception. However, 
inverting the eyes had a detrimental effect on gaze perception regardless of the 
orientation or presence of a facial surround. 
From these results it would seem that gaze discriminations from upright eyes are 
facilitated by the presence of the facial surround and as such it can be assumed that 
gaze discriminations are probably made in conjunction with other face processing 
analyses. These findings are consistent with Vecera and Johnson (1995) who 
concluded that a higher order mechanism was responsible for gaze discriminations 
and that low level visual characteristics like acuity and contrast sensitivity were simply 
needed for, but not responsible for gaze direction detection. Vecera and Johnson 
(1995) used schematic eyes and did not measure gaze sensitivity from eyes presented 
in isolation as they suggested that individual facial features could be discriminated as 
accurately as features presented in the context of an upright face (Homa, Haver, & 
Schwartz, 1976). The analyses performed on the data obtained in this study revealed 
that performance was significantly different in the 'face upright-eyes upright' 
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condition and the 'face absent-eyes upright' condition. It may be the case that the 
recognition of isolated facial features is not influenced by a facial surround, however, 
the ability to make fine judgements like those needed in gaze direction detection are 
affected. However, more recent studies than Homa et al (1976), have demonstrated 
the importance of holistic processing in face recognition tasks (Young et aI, 1987; 
Tanaka & Farah, 1993). The enhanced perceptibility of gaze judgements when the 
eyes are embedded within the context of the face is consistent with the operation of 
configural processes which operate not only for recognition, but also for the more 
finely tuned processes such as gaze direction detection. 
Campbell et al (1990) proposed that the detection of a straight ahead gaze was not 
necessarily dependent on configural information and that the presentation of the two 
eyes in horizontal alignment was sufficient to support sensitivity to gaze direction 
perception. This would certainly be true if the eyes were gazing at large eccentricities 
as performance reached ceiling within the range of cues used in these tasks in all 
conditions. However, at small gaze eccentricities, the orientation of the face and eyes 
significantly effects the sensitivity to displacements of a gazer's eyes. Campbell and 
her colleagues did predict that gaze discriminations would require the establishment of 
a detailed representation of facial features within the context of a facial frame, a 
prediction which has been supported by the findings of this study. 
These results are also compatible with neurophysiological studies which have 
reported populations of cells in the macaque STS which are sensitive to eye and head 
position (Perrett et aI, 1991). Perrett and his colleagues found that information from 
the eyes and head was complimentary but that information regarding eye orientation 
could override information regarding head orientation. The results of this study would 
support a higher order process for gaze and the existence of a specialised system 
tuned to the perception of these ocular signals. However, the results of this 
investigation would seem to suggest that we are more sensitive to the combination of 
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face and eyes and that the eyes presented in isolation have a significantly reduced 
signal value. Maruyama and Endo (1984) also found that the face had a powerful 
effect on the perception of gaze, describing the effect of the orientation of the head as 
"towing" the perceived line of gaze. This phenomenon would not occur if the eyes 
alone were capable of overriding signals from the face. 
Overview 
So far in this thesis, sensitivity to facial expressions and to gaze direction has been 
investigated using a variety of methodological approaches. The gaze tasks revealed 
sensitivity to gaze direction was in the region of Snellen acuity and that accuracy was 
comparable when the task was performed between a live gazer and observer and 
when the gazer's image was transferred to the screen. The facial surround was also 
found to contribute significantly to the detection of gaze direction. 
The tasks performed in Chapter 3 demonstrated the signalling strengths of our facial 
expression and our ability to detect them under less than perfect conditions. 
Performance with signals of positive affect were consistently detected with the 
greatest reliability. Negative affect images were not detected as well, and in particular 
the expression of sadness was poorly detected in all experimental conditions. 
In the next chapter, the neurological basis of social communication is introduced 
which describes a few of the many conditions that result in difficulties with 
processing social signals from the face. This chapter introduces some of the highly 
specialised problems experienced by patients suffering from congenital diseases or 
recovering from brain injuries. Chapter 6 then .describes the use of some of the 
methodologies described in this and earlier chapters in the appraisal of two patients 
with bilateral amygdala damage, a brain pathology known to interfere with the 
processing of socially relevant information. 
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• 
Neurological Basis of Social Communication 
Overview 
Investigations into the damaged human brain have revealed a number of distinct face 
processing impairments. Of obvious interest in this thesis are the impairments that 
result in specific difficulties with the processing of socially relevant information from 
the face such as emotion and eye gaze. In this chapter, a few of the 
neuropsychological conditions which are characterised by difficulties in processing 
these social signals are described. Damage to the amygdala is one brain pathology 
which has been shown to impair the processing of socially relevant signals and which 
appears to have a central role in many of the conditions described in this chapter. The 
pathology of other conditions described in this chapter, such as autism, is not entirely 
clear since many different areas of damage have been found in different cases (Baron-
Cohen, 1995a). 
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Over the years there has been a very extensive body of research which has 
investigated face processing impairments as a result of brain injury (For example, 
Heywood & Cowey, 1992; Young, 1992). In particular this research has 
concentrated on prosopagnosia, a patient's inability to recognise familiar faces, 
(Young, Newcombe, de Haan, Small, & Hay, 1993; Bruyer, 1993; Benton, 1990). 
Rather less is known about impairments of facial expression perception. However, 
the existence of a double dissociation between these deficits has been extensively 
documented in neuropsychological investigations (Young et aI, 1993), and confmned 
in PET studies (Sergent, Ohta, MacDonald, & Zuck, 1994). The evidence from 
human studies has been supported with evidence from studies on primates which 
have revealed cells selective for facial identity in the inferior temporal gyrus and cells 
which respond to expression in the superior temporal sulcus (Hasselmo, Rolls, & 
Baylis, 1989). Recently however, interest is increasing in the field of expression 
analysis with evidence for specific impairments for the processing of individual 
expressions. For example, patients with Huntington's disease have been reported to 
exhibit difficulties with emotion perception (Jacobs, Shuren, & Heilman, 1995a) with 
a differentially severe impairment for the expression of disgust (Sprengelmeyer, 
Young, Calder, Karnat, Lange, Homberg, Perrett, & Rowland, 1996). In addition, 
patients with damage to the amygdala have been reported to be severely impaired in 
the perception of the emotion of fear (Calder, Young, Rowland, Perrett, Hodges, & 
Etcoff, 1996; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio 1994; Scott, Young, Calder, 
Hellawell, Aggleton, & Johnson, 1997). 
In this chapter face processing impairments as a result of congenital conditions such 
as autism, Huntington's disease and Urbach-Wiethe disease are described, as well as 
the delusional syndromes of Capgras and Cotard. In addition, face processing 
impairments which have arisen as a consequence of brain injury, in particular damage 
to the human amygdala are described. Many of the conditions described, particularly 
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in relation to the damaged human amygdala, are very rare, consequently, evidence is 
often available from only a few patients. 
Autism 
Autism is a condition which severely affects many forms of social communication. 
Baron-Cohen (l995a) proposed three cardinal symptoms of autism: (i) abnormalities 
in social development, (ii) abnormalities in communication development, and (iii) 
abnormalities in pretend play. Autism effects 4-15 out of every 10,000 infants 
occurring more commonly in males than females. It is a disorder which occurs 
panculturally and crosses all social classes. At least some forms of autism are believed 
to be heritable and caused by biological factors since the risk of autism in identical 
twins or siblings is substantially higher than if autism simply struck by chance 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995a). The condition can also be associated with many biological 
abnormalities such as epilepsy, mental handicap and a number of brain pathologies. 
Autism and the Salience of the Face 
The face is where we, as un-brain injured people, focus our attention in order to 
communicate with other people since from it we are able to glean information 
regarding a person's affective state from the configuration of their facial features, 
attentional focus from their gaze and consequently perhaps their intentions. An autistic 
child appears not to have an understanding of the internal states of others such as their 
intentions, goals or desires, all of which can be inferred from facial signals. Autistic 
children lead very egocentric existences and do not invest the same interest in other 
people's faces as they fail to understand the communicative content of non-verbal 
gestures (Baron-Cohen, 1995a). 
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Autism and Gaze 
Autistic children are frequently reported to have abnormal eye-contact. For a time, this 
behaviour was attributed to gaze avoidance (Richer, 1978), although Hermelin and 
O'Connor (1970) demonstrated that gaze avoidance did not occur if the children were 
specifically asked to look at a face. More recently, it has been shown that autistic 
individuals engage in the same overall quantity of eye-contact, but do not use gaze 
information in the same way as non-autistic individuals (Baron-Cohen, 1988). Gaze 
processing abnormalities are not the result of a more generalised impairment in face 
processing skills since children with autism are able to recognise identity and gender 
from photographs of faces (Langdell, 1978) and can recognize basic emotional 
expressions from the face (Hobson, Ouston, & Lee 1988). However, Langdell 
(1978) reported that autistic individuals appeared to make less use of the eye region 
when making judgements of facial identity. 
Baron-Cohen (1994) and Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & 
Walker (1995b), described a series of studies designed to investigate if children with 
autism were able to understand and use gaze information in the same way as normally 
developing children. On the premise that one of the many roles of our gazing 
behaviour is to communicate interest in an external object, Baron-Cohen et al (1995b) 
conducted a series of experiments which used a cartoon drawing of a face which was 
shown with its line of regard directed towards one of four objects (sweets). The 
children were asked which of the sweets the cartoon character wanted. Autistic 
children failed to use the eye-direction of the cartoon figure to infer mental states such 
as interest or desire, and instead responded in an egocentric fashion by choosing the 
sweet they would like regardless of the gaze 01' the cartoon. Baron-Cohen et a1 
(1995b) did show that autistic children were able to judge which of a pair of cartoon 
faces was looking at them, illustrating that they understood the concept of directed 
and averted gaze. Baron-Cohen and his colleagues suggested that this provided 
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evidence that autistic children were able to attend to the eyes and face. However, the 
amount of information contained within a simple cartoon compared to the 
complexities of a real, animated face is hardly comparable. Cole (1997) in his book 
"About Face" describes encounters he has had with adult autistics who attribute their 
lack of eye contact to a defensive mechanism designed to limit incoming sensory 
information. For some, the intense arousal experienced in eye contact is too great and 
so to prevent a sensory overload, eye-contact is avoided. This description is 
reminiscent of Exline and Winters (1966) who described the gazing behaviour of 
normals during an interaction. They explained the action of a speaker looking away 
from their partner during an utterance as a sign that the speaker was organising their 
thoughts and that this required a decrease in incoming information which was 
achieved by averting their gaze from their partner's face. In autistic individuals, 
perhaps a similar system is in operation for much of the time but enormously 
magnified. Returning to Baron-Cohen's study, the autistic children's ability to judge 
where the cartoon face was looking at least demonstrated that their poor performance 
in the 'four sweets task' was not due to an inability to understand where someone 
was looking, but was caused by an inability to infer mental states from eye-direction. 
Baron-Cohen suggests that this is because children with autism have difficulty in 
mapping internal concepts like desire onto external behaviours such as gaze direction. 
Leekam, Baron-Cohen, Perrett, Milders, & Brown (1997) demonstrated that children 
with autism were able to determine what another person was looking at if instructed to 
do so. However, they were unable to follow another's gaze direction in response to 
head or eye movements. This finding illustrates that autistic children have the required 
geometric skill to compute gaze direction but lack the ability to employ this skill of 
their own volition. Leekam et al (1997) suggest that this could be the result of a 
general difficulty experienced by autistic individuals in shifting attention, or that 
children with autism are unable to marry the relation between the orientation of a 
gazer's head and the direction in which they should look. This latter suggestion is 
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supported by Baron-Cohen's (1995b) finding that autistic children failed to use gaze 
direction as a signal of intention or desire. 
Language development is abnormal and often severely delayed in autism. Baron-
Cohen et al (1997) suggested that the poor language abilities observed in autism could 
be attributable to an ignorance of the language conveyed by the eyes and describes 
children with autism as being relatively "blind" to the mentalistic significance of this 
facial feature. Their study investigated whether children with autism used the same 
strategies as normally developing children in inferring a speaker's intended referent 
by attending to the speaker's direction of gaze when the speaker used a novel word in 
the presence of novel objects. They found that only 29.4% of autistic children 
compared to 70.6% with mental handicap used this strategy and instead relied on an 
egocentric strategy which assumed that the novel word belonged to the object that the 
autistic child was looking at. Baron-Cohen et al (1997) suggest that this could explain 
the delay in language acquisition observed in some cases of autism since this strategy 
would lead to false mappings of words and objects. 
The origins of the egocentric behaviour observed in autistic individuals is unclear. It 
is possible that the egocentrism arises as a consequence of a lack of a 'Theory of 
Mind', equally the development of a 'Theory of Mind' could be denied as a result of 
the egocentrism. Assigning 'cause and effect' in this domain is not a simple task. 
Identity Reeo gnition in Autism 
Langdell (1978) tested two age groups of normal and autistic children and a group 
with mental handicap for their ability to recognise their peers from isolated facial 
features and inverted photographs. Normal children and those with mental handicap 
were found to rely on the upper regions of the face for identification, whereas the 
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younger autistic children found the lower features more useful. The older autistic 
children showed no specific reliance on anyone area and appeared to have a more 
homogenous knowledge of the entire face and could use both the upper and lower 
portions of the face for recognition. 
If the face is regarded as a simple visual pattern, the mouth and eye areas may rank 
equally as the most discriminable areas of the human face. If the face was not viewed 
as a social stimulus, the area of the face from the mouth down may be just as easy to 
recognise as the area from the eye upwards. 
The younger autistic children and their normal controls were found to be poor at 
identifying their peers from inverted faces, whereas the older autistic children 
performed very well. Langdell (1978) suggested that the younger autistic and normal 
children may both use a certain portion of the face as a focal centre, whereas the older 
autistic children did not appear to have a reliance on any specific area for recognition. 
Thus both the younger autistic and normal children may possess fairly well defined 
scanning strategies that centre around this focal area. Inversion of faces then, changes 
the relative position of the focal centre and may therefore disrupt the scanning strategy 
to much the same extent for each of these groups. The older autistic children by 
contrast, lacking a focal centre may have a less well defined or more flexible scanning 
strategy such that their recognition ability would be less affected by transformation of 
the faces. 
Cole (1997) reported a high functioning autistic adult who commented that she had 
only looked at her husband's face in its entirety twice, a strategy to limit incoming 
sensory information. She described how she would look at individual facial features, 
such as, an eyebrow. If autistic individuals do not process faces holistically and 
instead use a more feature based analysis which is not dependent on configural 
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infonnation, autistic individuals would be less likely to exhibit the same decrease in 
recognition shown by non-autistic individuals when a face is inverted. 
Facial Expression Sensitivity in Autism 
Weeks and Hobson (1987) devised a task in which autistic and non-autistic retarded 
children were required to sort a set of photographs either according to facial 
expression (happiness or sadness), type of hat, (floppy or woollen), or sex of the 
person depicted. They found that most non-autistic children chose to sort by facial 
expression before they sorted by type of hat whereas the reverse was true of autistic 
children. 
Hobson, Ouston and Lee (1988) investigated the ability of a group of autistic 
adolescents to recognise identity and emotion from photographs. In each of the 
photographs, the outline of the individual's face was cut out so as to mask the hair. 
Hobson and his colleagues used full face photographs, photographs in which the 
mouth had been blanked out and photographs in which the mouth and brow region 
had been blanked out. They used a total of sixteen photographs, of two males and 
two females each portraying the expressions of happiness, sadness, anger, and fear. 
The photographs were used in sorting tasks in tests of emotion recognition and 
identity recognition. Participants were required to recognise emotion across changes 
in identity and identity across changes in expression. 
Hobson et al (1988) found that the ability of the autistic group to match full faces for 
emotion and identity was not significantly different from that of their age and IQ 
matched controls. However, when the cues to emotion and identity were reduced by 
masking the facial features, the autistic participants demonstrated a decrease in 
perfonnance which was more profound for the recognition of emotion than identity 
relative to the non-autistic group. Non-autistic participants were able to sustain 
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relatively high levels of perfonnance in emotion recognition when blank mouth and 
blank mouth and forehead faces were presented. 
As in Langdell's study (1978), autistic individuals exhibited a supenor ability 
compared to their controls in processing infonnation from inverted faces. The autistic 
adolescents were found to outperfonn their control participants in judging inverted 
faces by identity both for photographs of their peers and for unfamiliar faces, and also 
by emotion. Hobson et al (1988) suggested that this superior perfonnance was a 
result of the autistic children using strategies which were different either in kind or 
efficiency from those used by non-autistic children. Hobson et al (1988) questioned 
the existence of a relationship between the degree to which recognition ability was 
orientation specific, and the degree to which individuals perceived the objects as 
meaningful. If autistic individuals view the face simply as an abstract pattern then they 
would employ the same strategy for person identification regardless of the orientation 
of the face. Hobson et al (1988) suggested that the children could have been sorting 
the upright faces with little or no regard for the meaning of personal identity or 
emotion and were matching the images purely as abstract patterns. However, the 
autistic participants were more proficient in sorting full upright faces than in sorting 
these same faces presented upside-down, a finding which may simply reflect the 
greater familiarity of upright faces rather than their meaning. 
Brain Pathologies in Autism 
Little is known about the site or sites of brain damage in autism since many different 
pathologies have been reported from different individual cases. Allman and Brothers 
(1994) have suggested that autism could stem from a defect associated with the 
amygdala since autistic individuals fail to use gaze direction cues nonnally (Baron-
Cohen, 1995b) and the amygdala is a brain region which has associations with gaze 
sensitive neurons (Brothers and Ring, 1993). In addition, patients with damage to the 
amygdaloid complex characteristically show abnonnalities of social perception, 
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diminished judgement of affective signals, in particular the emotion of fear, and a 
failure to attach emotional significance to stimuli, e.g. the threat potential of a 
dangerous situation, all of which are symptoms which are commonly observed in 
autism. 
Two other brain areas that have been shown to be dysfunctional in autism are the 
temporal and frontal lobes. Baron-Cohen (1995a) describes how many of the 
symptoms typical of autism are also associated with characteristic behaviours of brain 
lesions from these particular areas. For example, lesions to the Superior Temporal 
Sulcus (STS) involve impaired gaze direction detection and face processing tasks and 
possibly language difficulties. Damage to the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) often 
manifests itself with diminished aggression, excessive activity, abnormal pragmatics 
of language, impaired social judgement, diminished appreciation of danger and hyper-
olfactory exploration. Once again, these symptoms are common complaints 
experienced by people with autism. 
Delusional Syndromes 
Capgras delusion and Cotard's delusion are phenomenally distinct but share several 
similarities in that they are both very rare neurological syndromes which give rise to 
delusional beliefs about existence and also impairments in facial processing. 
Capgras Syndrome 
In Capgras syndrome patients come to regard close family members, typically 
parents, children, spouse or siblings as 'imposters'. Patients often claim that the 
imposter looks exactly like the family member but is not them. The Capgras patient, 
despite this bizarre delusion is often mentally lucid in other respects. Capgras 
syndrome is most commonly observed in psychotic patients although one third of 
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cases occur in conjunction with traumatic brain lesions which suggests a biological 
basis to the syndrome. 
Pathology of Capgras Syndrome 
Ellis and Young (1990) have proposed that Capgras syndrome is a 'mirror image' of 
prosopagnosia, a related although distinct disorder. Prosopagnosia is characterised by 
the patient's inability to recognise familiar faces (For example, Young et aI, 1993; 
Bruyer, 1993). This face agnosia typically occurs with bilateral lesions in the region 
of the brain believed to be partially specialised for face recognition, the inferior 
temporal lobes (IT). In some cases of prosopagnosia, covert recognition is possible, 
such that despite the patient reporting that they are unable to distinguish between a set 
of faces containing a mixture of both familiar and unfamiliar faces, they, like un-brain 
injured people, register a stronger skin conductance to the known faces. This covert 
recognition implies that the area of the brain responsible for person identity still has 
functional connections to the limbic system. Ellis and Young (1990) suggest that the 
recognition of a familiar face involves two components. The first is for the conscious 
recognition of the face and the recall of the relevant semantic information, and the 
second which is responsible for the limbic mediated emotional arousal which includes 
the feelings of familiarity which accompany the recognition of a familiar face. A 
dissociation between these components would explain the recorded skin conductance 
in the absence of covert recognition. In the case of Capgras delusion, Ellis and Young 
(1990) suggest that the ventral route from the visual centres to the temporal lobes is 
preserved which thus allows overt person identification, however, the dorsal visual 
route which is responsible for giving the face its emotional significance is damaged. 
As a result of the damage to these neuroanatomical pathways which are responsible 
for providing the emotional reactions to familiar visual stimuli, Young, Reid, Wright 
and Hellawell (1993b) suggest that the condition of Capgras delusion thus arises as a 
consequence of the patient attempting to reconcile the fact that these familiar stimuli no 
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longer have the appropriate emotional significance. This suggestion is consistent with 
the observation that Capgras patients most commonly misidentify their close relatives 
as presumably they would be expected to arouse the strongest emotional response. 
However, a patient, DS, described by Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) who had 
been diagnosed with this syndrome also produced mUltiple identities for an unfamiliar 
face which was used in a task of gaze direction perception (see later). 
Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) have proposed an alternative account of the 
pathology behind this delusional syndrome suggesting that Capgras arises in the event 
of a failure of communication between areas of ventral stream processing in the 
temporal lobe, for example they suggest IT and other face sensitive areas around the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), and the limbic complex. Hirstein and Ramachandran 
(1997) report how this breakdown in communication between areas of ventral stream 
processing in the temporal lobe and the limbic complex, particularly the amygdala, 
leads to disturbances in the management of memory. They explain the phenomena by 
supposing that each time we meet a new person, our brains open up a new file into 
which we put all information regarding this person. However, when DS meets a new 
person, his brain creates a new file, as it should, but on meeting this person for a 
second time, even if the separation is only a matter of minutes, instead of retrieving 
the original file, DS creates a totally new file. Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) 
suggest that the absence of any arousal of recognition when DS meets the person 
again causes the brain to create a new file. Alternatively, DS could have a more basic 
problem in his ability to extract and integrate common factors between episodic 
events. DS does not forget about the previous person but assumes that the next 
encounter with them is in fact a new person who simply looks a lot like the original. 
Cells selective for faces in the amygdala have been reported to be involved in linking 
successive views of the same face across time (Rolls, 1995). Leonard, Rolls, Wilson 
and Baylis (1985) have suggested that the social and emotional behaviour produced as 
a result of damage to the amygdala in monkeys, is in part due to damage to a neuronal 
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system which is specialized in using information from faces so that appropriate social 
and emotional responses can be made to different individuals. Damage to such a 
system in humans could be seen to result in the loss of affective attachment to familiar 
individuals seen in Capgras delusion. In addition, recent studies have revealed a role 
for the amygdala in the memory of emotional events (Cahill, Babinsky, Markowitsch, 
& McGaugh, 1995; O'Carroll, Drysdale, Young, Calder, & Cahill 1997). 
Case studies with these rare patients have revealed more generalised face processing 
impairments which are described in the next section. 
Facial Expression Recognition in Capgras Syndrome 
The patient DS was found to be unimpaired in a task of expression recognition 
(Hirstein and Ramachandran, 1997). Pairs of photographs were shown to DS of 
models posing basic emotions, the task for DS was to name the expression and also 
to decide if the two different models were expressing the same or a different emotion. 
This task posed no difficulty for DS. Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) suggested 
that DS' s problems were not in recognising emotion from the face, but in associating 
the appropriate affect in his memory for a particular familiar face. 
However, evidence for the impaired processing of facial expressions in Capgras 
syndrome was presented by Young, Reid, Wright and Hellawell (1993b). Patients 
ML and MC were both impaired in their ability to label facial expressions in a 6AFC 
task with faces from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series. Unfortunately the scores 
reported by Young et al (1993b) were collapsed across expression so the possibility 
that they were more impaired in labelling some expressions than others, or 
differentially severely impaired for a particular expression was not apparent. Young, 
Leafhead and Szulecka (1994) also reported that another Capgras patient, GS, was 
severely impaired in his ability to recognise emotion in a forced choice task. 
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Gaze Detection in Capgras Syndrome 
Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) reported that DS was severely impaired in a 
simple gaze direction detection task. DS was asked to determine if the person in a 
series of photographs was looking at him or away from him. The stimuli consisted of 
a series of photographs of a single model gazing at various eccentricities away from 
the straight ahead position. At small angular deviations, 3.3° and 6.6°, DS was only 
17% and 39% accurate respectively. Even at 9.9° when controls were performing at 
ceiling, DS only scored 50% correct. Although the identity of the model was the same 
throughout the task, DS perceived a total of three different models during the 30 trials 
of the task, attesting that they looked alike but that their ages were different. 
Familiar Face Recognition in Capgras Delusion 
Young et al (1993b) described two patients who had experienced Capgras delusion, 
MC and ML. Both patients were found to be impaired in their ability to name, or 
provide occupations for familiar faces. However, neither patient made errors in their 
ability to reject unfamiliar faces as faces that were not known to them. Both were also 
found to be impaired in their ability to match unfamiliar faces when presented with a 
target face and six possible identities. In the Warrington Recognition Memory Test, 
MC's performance was not significantly different to controls for her recognition 
memory of faces or words, ML demonstrated excellent recognition memory for 
words, but performed no better than chance in her recognition memory for faces. 
Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) reported that DS was unable to recognise himself 
from photographs, he would comment that the man in the picture was another DS 
who looked identical to him but was not him. He did not experience this delusion of 
himself when looking in the mirror however. 
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Cotard Delusion 
Cotard delusion sufferers come to the conclusion that they must be dead because they 
'feel nothing inside', this has parallels with the reported lack of affective responses in 
Capgras patients. 
Facial Expression Recognition in Cotard Delusion 
Young et al (1994) tested two patients, WI and JK on their ability to recognise 
emotional facial expressions using images from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series. 
The patients were required to attribute a label to 24 exemplars of facial affect. Both 
patients scored 19 out of 24 which was significantly below the control mean in this 
task. 
Person Identification in Cotard Delusion 
Young et al (1994) also tested the recognition of familiar faces by presenting a set of 
photographs to the patients which consisted of a mixture of familiar and unfamiliar 
individuals. The task for the patients was to identify the familiar individual and 
provide their occupation and name. Both patient's responses were significantly below 
that of the mean control data. Impaired performance was also measured on the Benton 
test of face recognition which requires patients to match a target face with one of 6 
simultaneously presented faces. Recognition memory as tested using Warringtons 
Recognition Memory Test (RMT) was impaired for both WI and JK. In marked 
contrast to the poor performance with faces, recognition memory for words was 
unaffected, a finding mirrored by the Capgras patients (Young et aI, 1993b). 
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Discussion 
The common factors between the two delusional syndromes described here is that 
both types of sufferer share a delusional belief about existence, either of their own, or 
of other people's, and that both experience difficulties with general face processing 
tasks. Young et al (1994) suggest that the pathophysiology and neuropsychology of 
the two syndromes may be related and that the delusions manifested by the patients 
are attempts to make sense of fundamentally similar experiences. Young also reports 
that cases of the syndromes co-existing or being experienced sequentially have been 
described which strengthens the idea of a link between the two syndromes. 
The exact pathophysiology has yet to be precisely determined. Ellis and Young 
(1990) proposed that the syndrome was the result of damage to the dorsal stream with 
the ventral stream intact. However, as Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) pointed 
out, the ventral stream is required to perform a variety of face processing tasks which 
are found to be impaired in patients with Capgras. They suggest instead, that the 
syndrome arises from a breakdown in communication between the ventral stream 
processing in the temporal lobe and the limbic system, in particular the amygdala. 
Face Processing in Patients with Amygdala Damage 
Selective damage to the human amygdala is rare. In the majority of cases, patients 
have incurred damage to this brain area as a result of surgical procedures for epilepsy, 
or as part of more widespread damage after brain injury. Urbach-Wiethe disease is an 
extremely rare hereditary disorder that causes calcium to deposit in the amygdaloid 
complex, and can occur without affecting neighbouring neocortical structures or the 
hippocampus. Recently a wealth of evidence from neurophysiological and 
neuropsychological research, has come to light which defines a role for this brain 
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structure in the emotion of fear and the appraisal of danger (LeDoux, 1995). Before 
the neuropsychological research IS presented, a historical background of the 
amygdala, and its emerging role as a brain structure involved in aspects of our 
emotions is described, with evidence from primate and human investigations. 
The Amygdala 
The human amygdala is roughly the size and shape of an almond nut and forms part 
of the limbic system. It lies deeply buried in the temporal lobe, in the oldest part of 
our cerebral hemispheres. Figure 6.1 illustrates its location in the human brain. 
The nuclei of the amygdaloid complex include the medial, lateral, basal and central, all 
of which are anatomically distinct. The limbic system also contains parts of the 
hypothalamus, the septal area, the hippocampus, the mammillary bodies and parts of 
the cortex. These structures form a crude border around the brain stem. As part of the 
limbic system, the amygdaloid complex has been implicated in many brain functions 
including emotion, learning, memory and epilepsy (Aggleton, 1992). 
The early anatomists assumed that the role of the limbic system was concerned 
exclusively with smell due to its connections with the olfactory receptors. Then, 
almost a half century ago, the physiologist MacLean (1949) noted that the evolution 
of the limbic system appeared to coincide with the development of emotional 
responses. Kluver and Bucy (1939) reported how damage to the limbic system had 
dramatic effects on emotional behaviour. However, early research which attempted to 
identify the role of the amygdala produced conflicting evidence since removal of the 
amygdala was found to have diametrically contrasting effects on emotional behaviour. 
Kluver and Bucy (1939) reported that damage to the amygdala resulted in extreme 
docility from normally irritable monkeys. In addition the monkeys were noted for no 
longer expressing any of their usual fears or avoidance responses and were found to 
142 
approach previously threatening stimuli. Karl Pribram in 1962 noted that in higher 
animals such as monkeys, the dominant-submissive hierarchy was under neural 
control and involved the amygdala. He discovered that removal of the dominant males 
amygdala resulted in submissive behaviour when reintroduced to the colony. This 
resulted in relegation to the bottom of the social hierarchy with the previous 'second 
in command' taking over as the dominant male. 
Figure 6.1: MRI scan showing the location of the amygdala 
In contrast, other non-human primate studies reported that removal of the amygdala 
produced rage, (Bard & Mountcastle, 1948). In humans, temporal lobe epilepsy, 
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which is a form of epilepsy in which abnormal electrical activity remains confined to 
the temporal lobes (which includes the amygdala) has been reported to produce 
violent behaviour in a small proportion of sufferers (Mark & Ervin, 1970). 
Egger and Flynn (1962; 1963) found that attack behaviour in monkeys generated by 
stimulating the hypothalamus could be inhibited if the basomedial nucleus of the 
amygdala was stimulated concurrently, and that it could be facilitated if the stimulation 
was from the posterior portion of the amygdala'S lateral nucleus. If as suggested, the 
amygdala has excitatory and inhibitory systems, then the observed behaviour post 
lesion could depend on the exact placement of that lesion. 
Historically then, the amygdala has been implicated in emotional behaviour, and 
damage to this brain structure has been reported to cause aggression or complacency. 
However, the precise function of the amygdala has been greatly underestimated. 
Recently, a more cogent picture is emerging through investigations into the 
behaviours and impairments demonstrated by individuals with damage to this 
important brain area (Calder et aI, 1996a; Young et aI, 1995; Adolphs, Tranel, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1995; Adolphs et aI, 1994; Andersen, 1978). Adolphs et al 
(1994) proposed that bilateral destruction of the human amygdala resulted in the 
impairment of essential elements of human behaviour including the recognition of 
some basic emotional facial expressions, and also the more complex recognition of a 
combination of several emotions shown in a single expression. In recent literature, the 
labelling of the negative emotions of fear and anger, but particularly fear, have 
frequently been reported to be impaired following damage to the amygdala, both in 
primates and humans. These findings suggest a more specific role for the amygdala in 
the appraisal of danger and the emotion of fear. Fear is a socially contagious emotion 
with a long evolutionary history. Displays of fear or anger by other people indicate a 
potentially dangerous situation. Therefore, a system specifically tuned to the 
perception of these important affect signals would be a significant survival advantage 
for an organism. 
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Adolphs et al (1994) described patient SM, who has a nearly complete bilateral lesion 
of the amygdala as a result of Urbach-Wiethe disease. SM was compared with twelve 
brain-damaged controls in her ability to perform a range of tasks involving facial 
expressions. SM was shown expressions of happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, 
surprise and neutral from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) face set and was asked to 
rate each face according to several emotional adjectives. Adolphs et al (1994) found 
that SM rated expressions of fear, anger and surprise as less intense than the controls, 
and also demonstrated a severe recognition impairment which was specific to the 
expression of fear. SM was however able to recognise identity, and to learn the 
identities of new faces. (This finding provides further evidence that expression and 
identity are subserved by anatomically separable neural systems). 
Adolphs et al (1994) also suggested that the amygdala was responsible for the 
recognition of multiple emotions which could be signalled in a single expression. 
They tested SM's ability to recognise similarities between expressions using a 
multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique. In an MDS plot, the perceived similarity 
between expressions corresponds to their proximity in the plot. For example, 
happiness and surprise are rated similar and so are positioned close together, but 
happiness and sadness are not similar and are consequently located far apart. SM was 
able to judge expressions from the same category as similar to one another but failed 
to recognise similarity amongst expressions of different emotions and did not produce 
the nearly circular ordering that the controls showed. 
Adolphs et al (1995) reported that bilateral, but not unilateral damage to the human 
amygdala results in an inability to process fearful facial expressions as a result of an 
insensitivity to the intensity of fear expressed by faces. Adolphs et al (1995) describe 
how in order to recognise someone as afraid, the amygdala must make the sight of a 
fearful face activate a number of cortical and subcortical areas whose co-ordinated 
activity constitutes the concept of fear. Adolphs et al (1995) suggest that the amygdala 
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engages limbic and somatic activity during danger or threat, and engages sensory 
cortices that represent items and scenarios related to fear. In this way, the amygdala 
may integrate patterns of neural activation from various parts of the brain that would 
encode features of the stimuli such as shape and position in space, and also the value 
that particular stimuli have to the organism (e.g. their emotional significance). 
Calder et al (1996a) investigated expression recognition in two patients who have 
both suffered bilateral amygdala damage, DR as a result of surgery for intractable 
epilepsy, and SE after suffering from presumed herpes simplex viral encephalitis. 
Calder et al (l996a) set out to investigate if the recognition of all emotions was 
compromised by damage to the amygdala, or if some expressions were more severely 
affected than others. SE and DR's ability to label expressions from the Ekman and 
Friesen (1976) series in a forced choice task was measured. Both SE and DR were 
only found to be significantly impaired in their labelling of the expression of fear. 
In a more complicated expression task, Calder et al (1996a) used photographs of 
affect posed by one actor from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series and ordered the 
expressions in terms of their maximum confusabilities. The resulting order ran 
happiness-surprise-fear-sadness-disgust-anger, the ends of the sequence were then 
joined to make a hexagon. Morphed images were created for the six continua that lie 
around the perimeter of this hexagon. Each continuum consisted of five morphed 
images, blending between two prototype images (e.g. happiness and surprise) to 
create the intermediate blends. DR and SE were presented with the resulting 30 
morphed faces and asked to decide whether the morphed image was most like 
happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear or surprise. Both patients participated in this 
task several times. DR and SE scored fewer overall correct responses across each of 
the regions. DR was particularly impaired in the recognition of fear, anger and disgust 
regions. SE was unimpaired with expressions of happiness, sadness, disgust and 
surprise and showed borderline impairment of fear and anger. In addition, both SE 
and DR made 'remote prototype errors'. This was the expression used by Calder et al 
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(1996a) to describe the situation where the patients labelled a photograph with an 
expression which was not typically confused with the exemplar (e.g. if a surprise 
morph was labelled with sad, disgust or anger). This task revealed overall difficulties 
with fear, anger and disgust for DR, and for SE difficulties with fear and possibly 
anger and surprise. Calder et al (1996a) also presented DR and SE with a simple two-
way forced choice task where they were presented with continua from anger to fear 
and happiness to sadness. They were required to categorise the morphs as 'anger' or 
'fear' in the former continuum and 'happy' or 'sad' in the latter. Both patients 
performed within the normal range for the happy-sad faces. DR was unable to 
categorise the faces in the anger-fear continuum and labelled all 11 images as afraid, 
in contrast, SE's performance fell within the normal range for this task, although as 
the authors point out, this task only requires the participant to identify one of the end 
points, anger in SE's case, which then only requires him to categorise the image at the 
other end of the continuum as 'not anger' . 
A similar experiment conducted with morphs of famous faces presented no problem 
to either patient. However, a more complex version which required the identification 
of the person in each morph, revealed that SE was impaired, a finding consistent with 
his mild prosopagnosia. DR showed no impairment in her ability to recognise 
identities from morphed images, thus confirming that the results for the expression 
task were not due to the level of task demand, and again providing evidence for the 
dissociation between expression recognition and person recognition. 
The Amygdala and Auditory Emotional Stimuli 
DR also participated in a study designed to test her ability to interpret emotion from 
auditory information. Scott, Young, Calder, Hellawell, Aggleton and Johnson (1997) 
performed this investigation in order to establish if the amygdala was specifically 
involved in the perception of visual signals of emotion from the face, or if its role 
involved perception of emotion from other sensory modalities. 
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DR was not found to have any generalised hearing deficit, or problems with speech 
perception. However, she was found to be impaired in a number of tasks which 
required the interpretation of auditory signals. Scott et al (1997) tested DR's ability to 
understand vocal expressions of emotion by presenting her with a tape which 
contained 24 sentences of a neutral content. The sentences were read with an 
emotional tone of voice and DR was asked to decide if the tone was happy, sad or 
angry. DR's performance was found to be well below that of normals. DR was also 
poor at deciding if speakers were the same or different when samples of sentences 
were read out by the same or different speakers. She was also poor at recognising 
familiar voices. DR also had difficulties distinguishing between sentences of neutral 
content read with intonation patterns indicating a question, a statement or an 
exclamation, despite the fact that DR was found to have no generalised hearing 
deficit. 
DR had impaired ability to make use of intonation patterns with communicative 
significance, including those used to signal emotion. Scott et al (1997) consider it 
likely that DR's problems in matching unfamiliar voices and recognising familiar 
voices is also derived from the same source, since intonation patterns form an 
important determinant of what voices sound like. 
DR was also tested for her ability to interpret basic emotions from a single word or 
emotions conveyed by a non-verbal sound pattern. The first test involved reading out 
single neutral words in an angry, happy, sad, fearful and disgusted tone. DR's 
performance was at floor level for the expression of fear, she was also impaired with 
anger and borderline for the expressions of sadness and happiness. 
The second test, which used stimuli such as laughing for happiness and growling for 
anger, revealed that DR was highly significantly impaired for anger and fear and 
normal for the other expressions. This finding demonstrated that DR had difficulties 
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with the interpretation of paralinguistic signals which are involved in day to day 
communication of emotion. 
Scott et al (1997) consider that as DR was impaired in her ability to recognise fear and 
anger from auditory cues, and that these were also the emotions which were affected 
in the visual domain, that this finding is consistent with the impairment of a 
mechanism which is able to interpret emotional signals regardless of their source, 
rather than a mechanism which is purely responsive to faces. Although it contains 
many cells responsive to faces seen, the amygdala is known to receive inputs from 
other sensory modalities and is therefore in a position to be involved in multimodal 
recognition. 
Scott et aI's (1997) findings in conjunction with those already discussed in this 
chapter confirm the suggestion that the amygdala forms part of the neural substrate for 
social cognition. The negative emotions of fear and anger seem to be primarily 
affected by amygdala damage and this appears to be independent of input modality. 
The Amygdala and Emotional Memory 
Cahill, Babinsky, Markowitsch and McGaugh (1995) have recently reported that the 
amygdala is involved in the long term memory of emotional events. Cahill et al (1995) 
tested BP, a patient suffering from Urbach-Wiethe disease in his recall of a story he 
had heard a week earlier. The story consisted of a brief narration accompanied by a 
slide show. The story was divided into three phases, the first and last contained 
relatively neutral material, but the middle phase contained highly arousing material 
involving severe injuries to a child involved in a traffic accident. Control participants 
consistently demonstrate superior recollection for the emotional phase of the story 
compared to the relatively unemotional initial and final phases. In contrast, BP 
showed no enhanced memory for the emotional events of the middle phase despite 
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normal memory recall for phase 1. BP's self assessed emotional reaction to the story 
as determined immediately after the story was comparable to that of the controls 
suggesting that the results were not due to a more generalised reduction in emotional 
responsiveness. Cahill, Prins, Weber and McGaugh (1994) have also shown that ~_ 
adrenergic blockade in normal human participants selectively impaired long term (1 
week) memory for the emotional events of the same story. Cahill et al (1995) 
concluded that the influence of emotional arousal on conscious long term memory 
involves ~-adrenergic receptor activation and contributions mediated by the amygdala. 
The Role of the Amygdala in Conditioning 
Human and non-human primate studies have established that the hippocampus and 
surrounding regions are necessary for establishing declarative knowledge. Bechara, 
Tranel, Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland, & Damasio (1995) reported a study with three 
patients: one with selective bilateral amygdala damage (who for ease of explanation 
will be referred to as S 1), a second (S2) with selective bilateral damage to the 
hippocampus, and a third (S3) with bilateral damage to the amygdala and 
hippocampus. Bechara et al (1995) conditioned participants with either auditory or 
visual stimuli and used a 100dB boat hom as the unconditioned stimulus. Skin 
conductance was used as the dependent measure of autonomic response since all three 
participants had a normal skin responses when the unconditioned stimulus was 
presented with the conditioned stimulus. This finding is consistent with Tranel and 
Damasio (1989) who found that the amygdala was not essential for the generation of 
electrodermal activity but was needed for associations of sensory stimuli with affect. 
They found that S 1 was unable to acquire a conditioned autonomic response to either 
visual or auditory stimuli but was able to acquire the declarative facts about which of 
the auditory or visual stimuli were paired with the unconditioned stimulus. The 
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opposite finding was true for S2 who did acquire a conditioned response to both 
types of stimuli but was unable to provide factual information about the nature of 
stimulus pairings. In keeping with these findings, S3 with damage to both amygdala 
and hippocampal areas was unable to acquire conditioned skin conductance responses 
and unable to acquire new facts. 
Bechara et al (1995) suggest that the amygdala is necessary for emotional 
conditioning and for the combination of external sensory information with internal 
information regarding somatic states and that the hippocampus is essential for learning 
the relationship amongst various exteroceptive sensory stimuli. Bechara et aI's (1995) 
study demonstrate a double dissociation between emotional and declarative learning in 
humans which offers some insight into how different forms of knowledge are 
integrated in the human brain. 
Activation in the Normal Amygdala 
Positron-emission tomography (PET) was used by Morris, Frith, Perrett, Rowland, 
Young, Calder and Dolan (1996) to measure neural activity whilst participants viewed 
photographs of fearful or happy faces which were systematically varied for emotional 
intensity. They measured regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) whilst participants 
viewed photographs of facial affect chosen from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) 
series. The task for the participants was to classify the images as male or female so 
that no explicit categorisation of emotional expression was required during the task. 
Morris et al (1996) compared regions of activity in response to the emotional 
expression contrasts which were fearful relative to happy expressions and happy 
relative to fearful expressions. 
Morris et al (1996) found that the presentation of fearful faces caused increased rCBF 
in the region of the left amygdala and left periamygdaloid cortex, there was no 
activation of the right amygdala. Other areas of activation included the left cerebellum, 
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left cingulate gyrus and right superior frontal gyrus. In contrast, when the participants 
were shown examples of happy faces, increased activation was measured in the right 
medial temporal gyrus, right putamen, left superior parietal lobe, and left calcarine 
sulcus. Morris et al (1996) report that as the intensity of the expressions was changed 
from the most happy condition to the most fearful condition, the measured rCBF 
response in the left amygdala increased monotonically. Morris et aI's (1996) results 
lend further support for a role of the amygdala in neural responses to fearful facial 
expressions. They also show that explicit processing of these fear faces is not 
essential for activation of the amygdala as demonstrated by the covert nature of their 
task. The amygdala is therefore able to process fearful stimuli without the need for 
higher level processing. The localization of neural activation measured when 
participants were presented with images of happy faces, suggest that it could be 
conceivable to find a patient with damage to these areas who would be impaired in 
their ability to recognise expressions of happiness. To my knowledge no such patient 
has yet been described. 
Does Amygdala Damage Necessarily Cause Impairment in the 
Processing of Fear? 
Contrary to the many reports expounding the role of the amygdala and the expression 
of fear, Hamann, Stefanacci, Squire, Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio and Damasio (1996) 
report findings from two men aged 73 and 57 years who both have complete bilateral 
lesions of the amygdala and additional temporal lobe structures as a result of herpes 
simplex encephalitis and yet both patients, EP and GT are unimpaired in their 
recognition of facial expressions including fear. Hamann et al (1996) make two 
suggestions for these opposing results. Firstly that damage to the amygdala in 
conjunction with damage to other areas outside of the amygdala are required to impair 
the recognition of facial affect. In Urbach-Wiethe disease, lesions can extend beyond 
the amygdala to include other brain areas. Secondly, Hamann et al (1996) favour the 
152 
explanation that lesions to the amygdala impair the recognition of emotion only if 
these lesions are incurred in early development rather than in adulthood. Urbach-
Wiethe disease is a congenital condition whereas EP and GT sustained their injuries 
after the age of 50 years. This second hypothesis is not supported by evidence from 
SE (Calder et aI, 1996a) who like EP and GT suffered herpes simplex encephalitis 
after the age of 50 years but unlike EP and GT, SE has been reported to be impaired 
in his ability to label facial expressions and in particular the expression of fear (Calder 
et aI, 1996a). A further patient, DR reported by Young et al (1995) also has difficulty 
processing signals of facial affect due to partial bilateral lesions to her amygdala and 
to the right basal ganglia. DR has epilepsy, the onset of which however was not 
triggered until her second pregnancy at the age of 28 years. The history of both these 
patients fails to support the second and preferred suggestion posed by Hamann et a1 
(1996) and instead lends more support to the first. However, Hamann et al (1996) 
also suggest that perhaps it is a combination of factors which may include a congenital 
lesion, low full scale IQ and/or additional damage to other brain areas. All of these 
factors could determine how readily other strategies are available for the identification 
of facial affect signals. 
Huntington's Disease 
Huntington's disease (HD) is a hereditary neurodegenerative disorder which arises as 
the result of a single gene mutation. The characteristic symptoms include involuntary 
choreiform movements, intellectual deterioration and attentional deficits. Affective 
disturbances, emotional problems and difficulties with visual and auditory perception 
of social stimuli are also commonly observed (Sprengelmeyer, Young, Calder, 
Kamat, Lange, Homberg, Perrett & Rowland, 1996). Jacobs, Shuren, and Heilman 
(1995a) reported that patients with HD also show an impaired ability to recognise 
emotional facial expressions. They tested the ability of five patients to match facial 
expressions, and also to discriminate between pairs of emotions (same or different). 
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In their study they used expressions of happiness, anger, sadness, fear and neutral. 
Unfortunately, they did not provide individual scores for each of the expressions but 
reported that the patient's overall scores were significantly impaired relative to the 
control data. However, Sprengelmeyer et al (1996) has recently shown that patients 
with HD exhibit a differentially severe impairment in their recognition of the 
expression of disgust, both from visual and auditory inputs. Jacobs et al (1995a) also 
reported that performance on the Benton Test of Face Recognition was impaired, a 
finding confirmed by Sprengelmeyer et al (1996). 
Pathology of Huntington's Disease 
Post-mortem examination on lID brains has revealed a 25% tissue loss in the 
amygdala and related structures (Sprengelmeyer et aI, 1996). In the final stages of the 
disease, cortical atrophy of up to 30% has been reported in areas associated with 
vision. As such, Sprengelmeyer and his colleagues suggest that any impairments in 
tasks of affect recognition may simply be the result of more basic visual problems. 
However, if this were the case, it would be expected that all expressions would be 
affected in the same way and that differentially severe impairments for one expression 
would not be predicted. Jacobs et al (1995a) reported degeneration of the tail of the 
caudate in the early stages of the disease and a general transneuronal degeneration 
from the caudate to its cortical connections. Sprengelmeyer et al (1996) also report 
atrophy in the striatum, occipital and parietal cortex, and paleocortical structures. 
Sprengelmeyer et al (1996) also noted that the basal ganglia could playa central role 
in the mediation of a disgust response since the basal ganglia show the earliest 
pathological changes in this disease. 
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Gaze Detection and Gender Discrimination in Huntington's Disease 
Sprengelmeyer et al (1996) reported that of the thirteen lID patients tested, none were 
found to be impaired in their ability to recognise sex and age from a person's face. 
However, their ability to discriminate between directed and averted gaze in a forced 
choice task was impaired relative to controls but still above chance performance. 
Expression Recognition in Huntington's Disease 
The amygdala has been shown to be a brain structure which is intimately involved in 
social communication (Aggleton, 1993), and a wealth of recent evidence has 
demonstrated that damage to the amygdala results in an impaired ability to interpret 
expressions of fear (Calder et aI, 1996; Adolphs et aI, 1994). Sprengelmeyer and his 
colleagues suggested that as the amygdala was damaged in lID patients, perhaps they 
would also exhibit more specific deficits focused on different emotions. 
Sprengelmeyer and his colleagues set out to establish whether lID compromised the 
recognition of all facial expressions of emotion, or if a more specific deficit was 
evident. 
Sprengelmeyer et al (1996) reported that HD patients were severely impaired in a task 
of expression labelling in a 6AFC task using images from the Ekman and Friesen 
(1976) series. The mean scores (out of 10) for the HD group for the expressions of 
disgust and fear were 1.9 and 2.9 respectively. The patients were also found to be 
impaired in their ability to identify emotion from vocal cues scoring 0.5 and 3.4 (out 
of 10) for the emotions of disgust and fear respectively. Sprengelmeyer et a1 (1996) 
point out that the differentially severe problem demonstrated by the Huntington's 
group with the expression of disgust was not simply a consequence of that emotion 
being the most difficult. In this study, controls found the expression of fear the most 
difficult to identify. However, both the control group and the patients found disgust 
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the most difficult to recognise from auditory stimuli. The finding that the control 
group experienced the most difficulty with the expression of fear in the visual 
modality is interesting as one possibility for the poor performance recorded from 
amygdala damaged patients (Young et al 1995; Adolphs et al 1994), is that the 
expression of fear is simply the most difficult expression to label. 
Sprengelmeyer et al (1996) used the same paradigm employed by Calder et al (1996), 
described earlier, which used the morphed images to investigate sensitivities to facial 
expressions. lID sufferers were found to have a severe deficit in their ability to 
discriminate fear from anger and were in fact impaired at recognising all emotions 
with the exception of happiness, both in terms of correct identifications and the 
number of 'remote prototype errors'. The lID group were found to have differentially 
severe impairments for the expression of disgust with performance no better than 
chance, this score was significantly below the next most badly affected emotion 
which was fear. 
lID patients were also shown to be emotionally less responsive as measured using 
self assessment questionnaires involving anger, fear and disgust. However the results 
only approached significance on the anger and fear questionnaire and on two out of 
the eight subsets of the disgust questionnaire. 
Sprengelmeyer et al (1996) commented that the lID sufferers appeared to be totally 
unable to perceive the expression of disgust. This perceptual difficulty could not be 
attributed to poor vision since all of the lID participants in this group were tested to 
ensure that none had any measurable impairment of basic visual function. 
Sprengelmeyer et al (1996) concluded that lID compromises the recognition of all 
emotions but has the most dramatic effect on expressions of disgust. They dismissed 
the possibility that the impaired performance seen for disgust was a result of this 
expression being the most difficult to decode despite the fact the controls found this 
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the most difficult expression to recognise from auditory signals. However, this was 
not the case for the visual modality where fear was the most difficult expression for 
the controls to identify. 
Young et al (1995) described the impaired ability of patients with amygdala damage to 
recognise expressions of fear from photographs in the Ekman and Friesen (1976) 
series. They dismissed the idea that the poor performance of the patients was simply a 
reflection of the fearful exemplars being the most difficult to recognise since the 
expression of anger gave their controls the most difficulty. However, the performance 
of normal participants in the free naming task described in Chapter 2 demonstrated 
that the most difficulty was experienced with expressions of fear and disgust. In 
addition, Japanese participants were significantly impaired relative to their Western 
counterparts in interpreting these facial signals. This finding suggests that there may 
be something about these particular affect signals which is difficult to decode even in 
normals. 
Sprengelmeyer at al (1996) suggest that along with evidence from studies of patients 
with amygdala damage who experience difficulties in the identification of fear, there is 
evidence to suggest that different emotions may be compromised by different types of 
brain damage. The impairment for the HD group with the expression of fear, although 
not as severe as that measured for disgust could be a result of the tissue damage 
sustained to the amygdala in these patients. Sprengelmeyer et al (1996) and Young et 
al (1995) consider the possibility that certain basic emotions may have dedicated 
neural circuitry. This is an attractive proposition and one for which fear and disgust 
would be obvious candidates. The facial expression of disgust with the tongue 
brought forward within the mouth represents the action of expelling food and 
wrinkling the nose reduces airflow through the nasal passages as a response to a bad 
smell. In addition, an individual who can detect and display fear would have an 
obvious advantage over an individual who could not. Sprengelmeyer et al (1996) note 
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that HD sufferers seem to have poor personal hygiene which would suggest that an 
inability to experience disgust could be a strong possibility. 
In locating the exact neural substrate for the expression of disgust, Sprengelmeyer et 
al (1996) suggested that this role may be attributed to the basal ganglia. Jacobs, 
Shuren, Bowers, and Heilman (1995b) found that patients with Parkinson's disease 
who suffer damage to the basal ganglia, were found to show difficulties in matching 
emotional facial expressions and also in the imagery of facial emotions. Jacobs et a1 
(1995b) suggest that in order to generate an image or to activate a percept of an 
emotional expression, we need to make the emotional face in order to receive 
proprioceptive feedback. They suggest that these facial movements need only be 
minute. This suggestion would help to explain the lack of emotional imagery in 
Parkinson's sufferers since they are unable to make effective emotional faces. 
However, making a definitive statement regarding the basal ganglia as the neural 
substrate for disgust is not possible yet since Dewick, Hanley, Davies, Playfer and 
Turnbull (1991) found no impairment with the recognition of facial expreSSIOns 
amongst sufferers with Parkinson's disease. 
Recently, Gray, Young, Barker, Curtis and Gibson (1997), have reported a highly 
selective deficit in the recognition of disgust in people who carry the gene for HD. 
This is a very revealing finding since this deficit was shown in people who were 
clinically pre-symptomatic, with no general cognitive deterioration. In addition, this 
deficit was evident in the absence of other face processing difficulties that occur in the 
later stages of the disease. Gray et al (1997) suggest that this finding provides 
powerful evidence for a role of the basal ganglia in the emotion of disgust. In 
addition, Gray et al (1997) suggests that this finding, in conjunction with the findings 
of impaired recognition of fear in amygdala damaged patients (Adolphs et aI, 1994; 
Calder et al 1996a) represents a double dissociation between the recognition of two of 
our facial expressions. As such, Gray et al (1997) propose that the expression 
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analysis module in models such as the Bruce and Young (1986) model of face 
processing, should be adapted to describe a more specific set of modules, each one 
dedicated to one basic emotion, or a cluster of emotions. In the light of these specific 
deficits affecting visual and auditory inputs (Sprengelmeyer et aI, 1996; Scott et aI, 
1997), an emotion recognition system would need to be multi-modal. Alternatively, 
Gray et al (1997) suggest that these deficits are caused by damage to more central 
aspects involved in the ability to experience particular emotions under appropriate 
circumstances. 
Recently, Phillips, Young, Senior, Brammer, Andrews, Calder, Bullmore, Perrett, 
Rowland, Williams, Gray, & David (1997) used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (tMRI) to examine cerebral activation in response to the perception of 
expressions of disgust. Normal participants were shown computer transformed faces 
representing different intensities of a disgust expression. Participants were asked to 
make a judgement as to the sex of each face so as not to make the nature of the 
investigation explicit. Phillips et aI, (1997) reported that both strong and mild 
expressions of disgust activated the anterior insula cortex, and that strong disgust also 
activated structures linked to the limbic cortico-striatal-thalamic circuit. Phillips et al 
(1997) comment that the anterior insula is involved in responses to bad tastes, thus 
suggesting that our response to the perception of this expression from others and that 
of taste may have a similiar neural substrate. As such the perception of this expression 
is likely to be closely associated with the actual experience of this emotion. 
General Discussion 
In this chapter, the neurological basis of social communication was discussed with 
reference to disorders such as autism, delusional syndromes, Huntington's disease 
and Urbach-Wiethe disease. Many of these disorders have varied aetiologies, but the 
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amygdala emerged as a brain structure which when damaged, was at least partly 
responsible for some of the face processing impairments described. The Bruce and 
Young (1986) model of face processing represents expression analysis as a single 
operation suggesting that all emotions are analysed by a common perceptual 
mechanism. However, the evidence described in this chapter would suggest that each 
of our emotions may possess their own discrete processing mechanisms since the 
recognition of one emotion can be lost without cost to any other. This pattern was 
observed for SE and DR who were found to show specific impairments in the ability 
to recognise expressions of fear in a simple forced choice task (Calder et aI, 1996a). 
In Huntington's disease, patients were found to be impaired in their recognition of all 
expressions although performance for the expression of disgust was severely 
impaired (Sprengelmeyer et aI, 1996). Importantly though, Gray et al (1997) reported 
that carriers of the HD gene were also impaired in the recognition of disgust, and this 
impairment occurred in the absence of any difficulty with other facial expressions or 
other face processing tasks. This finding by Gray et al (1997) in conjunction with 
findings from amygdala damaged patients who can show a differentially severe 
impairment in the recognition of fear (Calder et aI, 1996a) provides evidence for a 
double dissociation between two of our basic emotions, and supports the suggestion 
that we may possess dedicated neural circuitry for some of our basic emotions. Calder 
et al (l996a) have described this as the "separate substrates" hypothesis. This 
hypothesis would support a fractionated mechanism for expression analysis with at 
least some of the basic emotions represented by discrete circuitry. In terms of 
evolution it is possible to imagine how such circuitry could have developed with 
advantages for individuals who could display and perceive in particular, the 
expressions of fear, anger and disgust. 
Evidence for the separate substrates hypothesis would be supported if it could be 
established that we perceive emotions categorically, a theory for which there IS 
substantial evidence (Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Calder, Young, Perrett, Etc off, & 
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Rowland, 1996b). If we do indeed have dedicated neural circuitry for individual 
expressions we might expect to see a range of patients with discrete difficulties for 
any of our repertoire of facial expressions, particularly those which are linked to more 
basic emotions, but this does not seem to be the case (so far). The second 
interpretation suggested by Calder et al (1996a) was the "perceptual difficulty 
hypothesis". This supports the idea of a common perceptual mechanism for all 
expressions with some expressions being more vulnerable to impairment than others. 
In particular, expressions of fear and disgust may simply be less perceptually distinct 
than the expression of happiness for example. This hypothesis is supported with 
evidence from the studies reported in this thesis from Chapter 2, and also from many 
other cross cultural studies which have consistently demonstrated that negative 
expressions, particularly fear and disgust, are the most difficult to interpret. In 
addition, the control participants in Sprengelmeyer et aI's (1996) found fear the most 
difficult expression to label in a forced choice task. 
Considering Gray et aI's (1997) finding that people who carry the gene for lID are 
also impaired in their ability to recognise the emotion of disgust, it would perhaps be 
interesting to test the relatives of sufferers of Urbach-Wiethe disease who carry the 
gene responsible for this condition and determine if they too experience difficulties in 
recognising the expression of fear. 
Research into the amygdala usmg PET technology has revealed areas of the 
amygdaloid complex which are specific for particular functions. For example, Cahill, 
Haier, Fallon, Alkire, Tang, Keator, Wu and McGaugh (1996), used PET to monitor 
glucose metabolism in the amygdaloid complex while normal participants viewed 
video clips, the contents of which were either emotionally arousing or neutral. After a 
period of three weeks, participants were recalled and their memory for the clips 
assessed in a free recall test. Participants were found to recall more information from 
the emotional clips compared to the clips containing neutral material. In addition, 
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glucose metabolism in the right amygdaloid complex while viewing the emotional 
clips was highly correlated with the overall number of emotional clips recalled. 
Glucose metabolism in the amygdaloid complex was not correlated with the recall of 
the number of neutral clips recalled. From this research, it would seem that long-term 
memory for emotionally arousing events involves the right amygdala. Morris et al 
(1996) found that the presentation of fearful faces to normal participants caused 
increased rCBF in the region of the left amygdala and left periamygdaloid cortex, with 
no activation of the right amygdala. This finding was also confirmed by Phillips et al 
(1997) using fMRI. These findings illustrate the varied role of the amygdaloid 
complex in processing emotional material. 
The importance of the amygdala in negative emotion and particularly fear has been 
described with findings from a variety of approaches including PET, memory and 
conditioning experiments. In the next chapter, the performance of two patients with 
bilateral amygdala damage who were described in this chapter, SE and DR, were 
tested in their ability to interpret emotion from images in the Jenkins affect set. SE 
also took part in a lAFC expression detection task which was described in Chapter 3, 
and his ability to detect eye gaze direction was also measured using tasks designed in 
Chapter 4. It was predicted that both SE and DR would exhibit an impaired ability in 
their interpretation of expressions of fear and that SE may also have difficulty m 
discriminating gaze direction. 
Importantly however, we will distinguish the perception of expressions from their 
interpretation, and examine whether expressions which are typically impaired in 




In Chapter 5, elements of the neurological basis of social communication were 
described with examples from patients with brain injury and those with congenital 
conditions. Damage to the amygdala was one of the brain pathologies which was seen 
to result in problems with processing emotional expression from the face and from 
auditory signals. Two patients, SE and DR, who were introduced in Chapter 5 are 
described in more detail in this chapter. Both patients have been found to be impaired 
in tasks of expression perception following bilateral amygdala damage (Calder et aI, 
1996a). This chapter predominantly describes the performance of SE who took part in 
a series of tasks, designed and described in earlier chapters, which serve to 
investigate his sensitivity, and understanding of signals of facial affect and his 
sensitivity to gaze direction detection. DR performed only two of the expression tasks 
using the Jenkins expression set. The data reported here for DR was collected by 
Andy Calder from the MRC Applied Psychology Unit in Cambridge. 
The aim of the investigations reported in this chapter was not primarily to demonstrate 
that patients with amygdala damage have difficulties with certain aspects of 
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expression processing as this has been impressively demonstrated in much of the 
recent literature describing patients with damage to this important brain area. Instead, 
the investigations in this chapter highlight the difficulties facing researchers in 
choosing an appropriate task for investigating sensitivity to facial expressions since 
the choice of paradigm appears to significantly influence the measured performance. 
The next section describes the pathology and clinical history of patients SE and DR, 
both with bilateral amygdala damage. In subsequent sections, SE's performance in a 
range of tasks designed to assess his sensitivity to signals of facial affect and gaze 
direction, and DR's performance in two facial expression tasks using the Jenkins 
image set are described. 
Case Summary SE 
Clinical History and Neurological Investigations 
The pathology of SE' s condition has been described extensively in published journal 
articles. This description has been adapted from McCarthy, Evans and Hodges 
(1996). 
In 1986 SE, a 66 year old ex-railwayman was diagllosed with viral encephalitis due to 
herpes simplex. His initial symptoms included disorientation, nausea, headache, 
pyrexia and confusion. He spent a three week period in hospital after which time his 
orientation had improved but he showed signs of a memory impairment. Five years 
after his initial illness SE was being investigated by a research group who discovered 
that he was suffering from topographic amnesia (an inability to find his way around 
previously familiar surroundings, and in learning to navigate in new surroundings) 
and was also showing a mild prosopagnosia. His ability to recognise his family and 
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friends remained intact but his ability to recognise less familiar people like 1V 
personalities and politicians was impaired. SE was found to have a severe bilateral 
anosmia, and displayed a very distorted sense of taste. 
A CT scan taken when SE was first admitted to hospital showed damage to the right 
temporal lobe. More recently an MRI scan was performed which revealed extensive 
damage to the right temporal pole, amygdala (all nuclei), uncus, hippocampus, 
parahippocampul gyrus, and inferior and middle temporal gyri to the level of the 
insula with compensatory dilation of the temporal hom of the right lateral ventricle. 
The left cerebral hemisphere was normal with the exception of small regions of 
damage to the uncus and the amygdala. Diencephalic and frontal lobe structures were 
normal. 
Neuropsychological Investigations 
SE's measured visual acuity was normal, 6/6 bilaterally. He made no errors on the 
Ishihara colour chart and was found to have full fields and fully reactive pupils. 
McCarthy et al (1996) reported that in a bedside cognitive evaluation SE was 
completely alert and oriented and obtained a perfect score on the mini mental state 
examination. The naming of objects and repetition tasks was faultless and he was able 
to retain information and recall it accurately after a filled delay. SE showed no 
evidence of visuospatial or other basic perceptual deficits. 
McCarthy et al (1996) tested SE on the standard battery of neuropsychological tests. 
He showed well preserved intellectual abilities with his measured IQ (W AIS-R full 
scale IQ = 100) being no different from his predicted premorbid IQ as obtained on the 
National Adult Reading Test. His perceptual, language and executive functioning was 
reported to be satisfactory. His performance was also reported as satisfactory on a 
verbal memory test, but impaired on visual memory showing difficulties in the 
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delayed recall of visual infonnation. McCarthy et al (1996) also reported that at the 
time of testing, SE showed impaired perfonnance on picture naming and word-picture 
matching tasks with his scores falling just outside the nonnal range which they 
reported as suggesting a mild semantic disorder. 
Case Summary DR 
A full case description for DR can be found in Young et al. (1995). The relevant 
elements of her neurological history are reported below. 
Clinical History and Neurological Investigations 
DR, now aged 53 years, first suffered from epilepsy during her second pregnancy at 
the age of 28 years. Two weeks after the onset of epilepsy, DR began suffering from 
complex partial seizures which occurred two or three times each day. Since then DR 
has continued to experience three types of seizure: tonic clonic seizures which occur 
approximately monthly; absences which occur several times every day; and complex 
partial attacks which last for a couple of minutes which occur almost daily, these 
attacks are followed by a period of confusion and automatic behaviour. Over the 
years, has been treated with a number of anti-convulsants which have failed to control 
her seizures. 
A series of electroencephalogram investigations in the 1970' s established the locus of 
the seizures as the left anterior temporal lobe plus some autonomous discharge in the 
right temporal lobe. Between 1978 and 1981 DR underwent a number of stereotaxic 
procedures which targeted the left amygdala initially and then the left and right 
amygdala. In total, DR had four cryoprobe lesions and one electrocoagulation lesion 
on the left side, and two cryoprobe lesions on the right side. After this procedure, a 
CT scan revealed a haematoma in the region of the right caudate nucleus. 
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Despite this extensive surgery, DR still experiences six or seven attacks per day in 
which she becomes absent and makes fidgeting movements. These seizures can leave 
her feeling confused and dis inhibited although she usually regains normal orientation 
quite quickly. 
MRI scans performed in 1991 and 1992 showed extensive lesions of the left medial 
amygdala with destruction of much of the basal nuclei although the lateral nucleus 
was largely spared. The rostro-caudal region of the amygdala up to the anterior horn 
of the left hippocampus was also damaged. Associated damage extended dorsally 
beyond the amygdala to effect part of the anterior commisure, lateral putamen and 
external capsule. In the right hemisphere, the MRI scan revealed a small posteriorly 
placed lesion at the caudal limit of the amygdala and a further lesion in the right 
anterior amygdaloid region. 
DR experiences some word finding difficulties but is reported to engage readily in 
conversations. She is not impeded by this mild aphasia as she uses effective 
circumlocutions. She experiences occasional lapses of everyday memory which often 
involve the faces of people she knows, particularly if they appear in an unusual 
context. 
Neuropsychological Investigations 
DR's predicted premorbid IQ is 111 as measured using the revised version of the 
National Adult Reading Test. Her latest assessment with the W AIS-R gave a full scale 
IQ of 87. DR's basic visual functions are unimpaired with full visual fields to 
confrontation testing and normal spatial contrast sensitivity. DR was unimpaired in 
recognising that famous faces were familiar, but was impaired at naming them, 
however she could provide their occupations. DR was also able to reject unfamiliar 
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faces. As for emotions, DR is able to provide examples of occasions that she has felt 
happiness or sadness and is able to describe circumstances in which other people 
would feel happy, sad, angry, afraid etc. 
Summary 
Both SE and DR have extensive amygdala damage which is more severe in the right 
amygdala for SE, and in the left for DR. In face related tasks, SE was poor at 
providing the names or occupations of familiar faces, consistent with his mild 
pro sop agnosia, whereas, DR was unimpaired in the recognition of familiar faces but 
had difficulties with name retrieval. For both SE and DR basic visual functions were 
found to be unimpaired. Therefore any problems in face processing could not be 
simply attributed to poor vision. 
Interpretation of Facial Expression 
In this next section, SE and DR's performance in the forced choice and free naming 
expression tasks described in Chapter 2 are compared with data from a group of 
control participants. SE's sensitivity is investigated further using additional paradigms 
to measure his performance in facial affect tasks. 
Control Participants 
Six participants contributed to the control data in the following investigations of affect 
sensitivity. All were male, aged between fifty and sixty-four years of age, with a 
mean age of 58.3 years, SD = 4.89. All control participants were security or portering 
staff at Stirling University who were paid for their time. 
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Free Naming Expression Allocation Task 
This task was performed using the Jenkins image set. SE and DR were shown each 
of the sixty expression exemplars consecutively (10 of each of the six expressions, 
happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise) in a random order. SE and DR 
were asked to label each of the cards with a single emotional label which they 
considered best described the expression depicted. They were not restricted to any set 
of words, nor given examples of possible answers. The viewing time was not 
restricted and the participants voiced their answers to the experimenter who recorded 
their responses. 
Results 
A correct score was given if either the exact word or a synonym of the word was used 
to label the expression. The overall scores for SE and DR are shown in Table 6. 1 
along with scores from control participants. 
SE appeared to be more severely impaired in this task than DR, however, despite the 
very low scores for the expression of fear, the patients' performance in this task was 
not significantly different to that of the control group. However, SE's score of zero 
out of ten is likely to represent a floor effect and suggests that this particular task was 
not sufficiently sensitive to reveal any possible abnormality. 
DR actually out-performed controls in her ability to label the expression of fear. In 
fact, DR's performance was not found to be significantly different to the control 
group for any of the expressions. In this task, SE was only found to be significantly 
impaired in his ability to label expressions of disgust. 
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Asterisked scores are significantly impaired in comparison to the performance of 
controls: **z> 3.10, p < 0.001. 
Expression SE DR Controls 
Mean SD 
Happiness 10/10 10/10 9.83 0.37 
Sadness 6/10 9/10 6.5 1.61 
Anger 9/10 8/10 4.17 1.57 
Disgust 3/10** 7/10 7.67 1.25 
Fear 0/10 5/10 2.83 1.46 
Surprise 10/10 9/10 7.3 1.25 
Table 6.1: Interpretation of emotion infacesfrom the lenkinsfacial affect set in afree 
naming task by SE and DR, with mean scores and standard deviations for six control 
participants. 
Synonyms 
The labels provided for each card by SE and DR were scored as correct if the word 
they allocated was synonymous with the target label. The synonyms used by SE are 
shown in Table 6.2. In most cases he would use one of these labels several times for 
the same expression. For example, he used the label 'smile' to describe two of the 
'happy' stimuli. If SE used a label with an ambiguous interpretation, he was asked to 
clarify his answer. For example, he consistently defined "shock" as "a look of 
surprise". Consequently all responses of "shock" for fear stimuli were scored as 
incorrect and not synonymous with the target. 
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SE Happy Sad Disgust Surprise 
Synonym Smile Sullen Horror Shock 
Laugh Misery 
Table 6.2: Synonyms used by SE m his judgement of stimuli m the Jenkins 
expression set. 
DR was tested by Andy Calder, the synonyms used by DR to label the expression 
stimuli are shown in Table 6.3. Some of the responses, for example "fed-up" and 
"shocked" were thought to be slightly ambiguous since she used these same labels in 
more than one emotion category. When asked to clarify her responses, DR defined 
"fed-up" as "disgust and possibly anger", consequently the response of 'fed-up' was 
scored correct for disgust and incorrect for anger and sadness. DR also defined her 
label of "shocked" defining it as "surprise, could really only be that". 
DR Happy Sad Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
Synonym Pleased Miserable Annoyed Fed-up Frightened Shocked 
Jolly Nasty Scared 
Table 6.3: Synonyms used by DR in her judgement of the Jenkins expression set in a 
free choice expression allocation task. 
The range of synonyms used by control participants is illustrated in Table 6.4. The 
contents of this table demonstrate the variety of ways in which people perceive the 
same facial expression exemplars. As Russell (1994) observed, there does not appear 
to be a dichotomous relationship between emotion labels and facial expressions. 
Despite the fact that all participants were requested to use one word, an emotional 
label, many of the controls used words of exclamation which could not be described 
as emotions, but rather responses to situations, e.g. ugh! and phew! for the 
expressions of disgust. 
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SYNONYMS 
Happiness Sadness Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
pleased depressed annoyance revulsion shocked shock 
joyful unhappy aggressIve phew! frightened astonished 
enjoyment glum threatening stinky scared amazed 
contented sorrow gruesome startled aghast 





Table 6.4: Synonyms used by six control participants in the free naming expression 
allocation task using images from the Jenkins expression set. 
Errors 
SE made no errors in his labelling of the expressions of happiness and surprise. The 
most common error for SE was in his interpretation of fearful expressions which he 
frequently labelled as 'surprise' (see Table 6.5). (Numbers in parenthesis represent 
the frequency with which each particular response was made). 
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Sad Anger Disgust Fear 
Disbelief (1) Suspicious/ Doubting (1) Surprise (2) Anger (1) 
Thoughtful (1) Doubt (1) Shock/Surprise (9) 
Smug (1) 
Doubt (1) 
Table 6.5: Errors made by SE in the free naming expression allocation task using 
images from the Jenkins expression set. Numbers in parenthesis represent frequency 
of response. 
As in SE's case, the errors made by DR were primarily for negative affect signals 
which were labelled with other negative emotion categories. This suggests that despite 
the low scores recorded for some of the emotion categories, both SE and DR are able 
to distinguish between positive and negative affect. Table 6.6 presents the errors 
made by DR in this free naming task. 
DR Sad Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
Fed-up (1) Frightened (1) Annoyed (3) Shocked (2) Frightened (1) 
Errors Fed-up (1) Surprise (2) 
Annoyed (1) 
Table 6.6: Errors made by DR in the free naming expression allocation task using 
images from the Jenkins expression set. Numbers in parenthesis represent frequency 
of response. 
Errors made by the control participants are listed in the Appendix. If any of the 
control participants responded with an ambiguous label, for example, 'shock' was 




Neither patient nor controls experienced difficulties in labelling images of facial affect 
portraying 'happy' expressions. SE experienced greatest difficulty with negative 
affect stimuli, and in particular expressions of fear and disgust. However, only his 
labelling of the disgust stimuli was significantly different to that of the control group. 
DR's performance was comparable to the controls for each of the expressions in the 
Jenkins image set. 
In the patient data, fear was frequently labelled as surprise or shock, but surprise was 
not confused with fear, with the exception of one occasion where DR used 
'frightened' to label one of the surprise exemplars. The same pattern of responses 
was made by the control participants. Fear was labelled as surprise on a total of ten 
occasions, but fear was only used once to describe a surprise exemplar. It would 
seem that for patients and controls alike, labelling the expression of surprise poses 
little or no problem. However, in this task, where the stimuli are viewed one at a time 
without previewing, fear is frequently confused with surprise. These results suggest 
the possibility of a labelling bias, such that for some reason there is a reluctance to use 
the label of fear. The possibility of a labelling bias is investigated in later tasks. 
Firstly, SE and DR's performance in a forced choice task using the Jenkins image set 
is reported. 
6-Alternative Forced Choice Expression Labelling Task I 
In this task, SE and DR were presented with the 60 expression exemplars comprising 
the Jenkins image set and were requested to allocate each exemplar with an expression 
from a given list. This list contained the six target expressions of happiness, sadness, 
anger, disgust, fear and surprise and was available for reference throughout the task. 
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For each presentation of a stimulus card, SE and DR were requested to choose one 
emotion label from the list that best described the facial expression being portrayed. 
SE performed this task on two separate occasions separated by a period of 5 months. 
Results 
Control participants performed very well in this task but were poor at labelling 
expressions of fear. Mean scores and standard deviations for the control group are 
reported in Table 6.7 along with the scores from SE and DR. SE's first attempt at this 
task demonstrated that he was significantly impaired in labelling the negative 
expressions of disgust, anger, sadness and fear compared to the control group. In his 
second attempt, nearly half a year later, he was found to only be impaired in labelling 
expressions of disgust. DR was impaired at labelling expressions of anger and 
disgust but her ability to label fearful expressions was not significantly different to the 
control group. 
These results do not reflect SE's and DR's performance in an equivalent task using 
images from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) set which revealed that both patients were 
only significantly impaired in their ability to label expressions of fear (Calder et aI, 
1996a). 
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Asterisked scores are significantly impaired in comparison to the performance of 
controls: *z> 2.33, p < 0.01; **z> 3.10, p < 0.001. 
SE (trial 1) SE (trial 2) DR Controls 
Expression Mean SD 
Happiness 10/10 10/10 10/10 10 0 
Sadness 8/10** 9/10 10/10 9.67 0.47 
Anger 8/10** 10/10 7/10** 9.8 0.37 
Disgust 8/10** 6/10** 7/10** 9.8 0.37 
Fear 1/10* 3/10 4/10 5 1.41 
Surprise 10/10 9/10 10/10 9.5 0.5 
Table 6.7: Interpretation of emotion in faces from the Jenkins facial affect set in a 
6AFC task by SE and DR, with mean interpretation rates and standard deviations for 
six control participants. 
Errors 
SE's performance in this task was significantly different to that of the controls for all 
of the negative expressions. The errors made by SE in his first attempt are shown in 
Tables 6.8. (Numbers in parenthesis represent the frequency of the response). 
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SE Sad Anger Disgust Fear 
Errors Disgust (2) Disgust (2) Sad (1) Surprise (7) 
Anger (1) Disgust (1) 
Anger (1) 
Table 6.8: Errors made by SE in Trial] of the 6-altemative constrained choice task 
using the Jenkinsfadal affect image set. 
SE made no errors in the interpretation of the expressions of happiness and surprise. 
However, his low score for the fearful stimuli was largely due to his mistaking the 
physiognomy of this expression with that of surprise. It is also interesting to note that 
SE labelled two exemplars of sadness and two exemplars of anger as expressions of 
disgust, and chose labels of sadness and anger to describe two of the disgust 
exemplars. This perhaps supports the idea of a more generalised problem reflecting a 
level of confusability between these negative emotions. 
When SE performed this 6AFC task for a second time, his performance was only 
found to be significantly different to that of the control group for the expression of 
disgust, which on this occasion he confused with sad and fearful exemplars (Table 
6.9). Once again, his performance was perfect for expressions of happiness and he 
only made one error in labelling expressions representing surprise. Despite the large 
number of errors in labelling expressions of fear, SE was not significantly different 
from the control group. 
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SE Sadness Disgust Fear Surprise 
Errors disgust (1) sadness (2) surprise (4) fear (1) 
fear (2) sadness (2) 
anger (1) 
Table 6.9: Errors made by SE in Trial 2 of the 6-alternative constrained choice task 
using the Jenkins facial affect image set. 
DR's performance was significantly different to that of controls for the expressions of 
anger and disgust which she confused with each other and with surprise. Once again, 
despite the large number of errors made in labelling expressions of fear, her 
performance was not significantly different to that of controls. Errors made by DR are 
shown in Table 6.10. Numbers in parenthesis represent the frequency of the 
response. 
DR Anger Disgust Fear 
Errors Surprise (2) Anger (2) Disgust (1) 
Disgust (1) Surprise (1) Surprise (5) 
Table 6.10: Errors made by DR in a 6-alternativeforced choice task using the Jenkins 
affect image set. 
The errors made by the control group are shown in Table 6.11. The type of 
confusions made by the patients are very similar to those made by the control 
participants. In particular, both groups consistently attribute fearful stimuli with a 
surprise label, but make relatively few mistakes when labelling expressions of 
surpnse. 
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Controls Sadness Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
anger (1) disgust (1) fear (1) surprise (23) fear (3) 
Errors disgust (1) disgust (6) 
happy (1) 
Table 6.11: Errors made by six control participants in a 6AFC task using the Jenkins 
affect image set. 
Discussion 
When SE and DR were able to choose their own labels to describe the expressions 
they were presented with, DR's performance was not found to be significantly 
different to that of the control group, and SE was only impaired in his interpretation 
of exemplars of disgust. In contrast, when a forced choice paradigm was used, DR 
was found to be impaired in her interpretation of expressions of anger and disgust, 
expressions which she interpreted with an accuracy no different to the control group 
in the free naming task. In addition, SE's first attempt at this task revealed that he was 
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significantly different to the control group in his ability to interpret expressions of 
sadness, anger, disgust and fear, whereas his performance in the free naming task 
revealed only a problem with disgust. When SE performed this task for a second 
time, his performance for the expressions of sadness, fear and anger were no longer 
significantly different to that of the controls but his difficulty with disgust remained, a 
pattern which would seem to reflect his abilities in the free naming task more 
accurately than his first attempt at the forced choice task. SE's apparent improvement 
in the forced choice task from the first to the second attempt could reflect a general 
problem with the repeated testing of patients in certain tasks. SE is a very keen 
participant and rehearses his responses, it is possible that he has learnt some 
alternative strategies for performing these tasks of expression perception. In future 
work with SE it will be important to time his responses to each stimuli since learnt 
strategies often take longer to execute than spontaneous decisions. 
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The patient and control data in both the free and forced choice tasks revealed 
difficulties in the interpretation of fearful expressions. The next two experiments were 
designed to determine if the nature of free and forced choice paradigms was actually 
precluding participants' true ability to interpret expressions of fearful stimuli. 
6-Alternative Forced Choice Expression Labelling Task II 
This task was designed to investigate the possibility of a labelling bias which may 
have been responsible for the poor performance for both patient and controls in the 
first constrained choice task. The apparent inability to label expressions of 'fear' may 
have arisen as a result of some sort of reluctance to use this label and not as a result of 
a genuine inability to identify it. 
In this task, SE was shown six cards on each trial representing one of each of the six 
expressions. On each trial he was given an expression label and was requested to 
choose one card from the six which best illustrated that particular emotion. 
The sixty expressions were divided into ten sets with one of each of the SIX 
expressions in each set. Each set was shown to SE on six occasions such that during 
the course of the task SE was requested to identify all of the expressions within each 
set. The sets were shown to SE sequentially with a different target expression in each 
trial. For example, from set 1 he was asked to identify the 'happy' face, from set 2 to 
identify the 'sad' face, set 3 identify the 'angry' face and so on until set 10 cycling 
through the 6 expressions. When set 1 was shown for a second time, SE was asked 
to identify the 'sad' face and so on. 
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Results 
When able to view examples of each of the six expressions at once, SE's scores, and 
those of controls, increased dramatically, and SE's performance did not differ 
significantly from the controls for any of the expressions (see Table 6.12). His 
performance for the expression of fear increased from scores of 1 and 3 in the first 
constrained choice task to 8 in this task. 
Expression SE Controls 
Mean SD 
Happiness 10/10 9.5 0.5 
Sadness 9/10 10 0 
Anger 10/10 9.5 0.5 
Disgust 10/10 9.83 0.37 
Fear 8/10 7 1.0 
Surprise 10/10 9.5 0.76 
Table 6.12: Interpretation of emotion in faces from the Jenkins facial affect set in a 
6AFC task by SE, with mean interpretation rates and standard deviations for six age-
matched control participants. 
Errors 
SE made a total of three errors in this task which are reported in Table 6.13. 
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SE Sadness Fear 
Errors disgust (1) surprise (1) 
disgust (1) 
Table 6.13: Errors made by SE in Constrained Choice Task (II). Numbers In 
parenthesis represent the frequency of responses. 
The errors made by the control participants were similar to those made by SE for the 
expression of fear. Even when a comparison was available between expressions of 
fear and surprise, some fear exemplars were still labelled as surprise. 
Controls Happiness Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
Errors surprise (2) disgust (2) fear (1) surprise (13) fear (2) 
disgust (3) 
sadness (3) 
Table 6.14: Total errors made by six control participants in Constrained Choice Task 
(II). Numbers in parenthesis represent the frequency of responses. 
Discussion 
The marked improvement in SE's performance could simply be that in this task, SE 
was able to view examples of each of the expression exemplars, and by a process of 
elimination determine which face was portraying fear. As the performance of the 
control participants was also found to increase in this task, it is possible that the task 
was too easy and that all participants were performing at ceiling which could mask 
any true disadvantage for this expression. However, this is unlikely since the control 
participants scored seven out of ten which was below SE's score. An alternative 
explanation could be that SE is perfectly able to interpret the physiognomy of a fearful 
face when able to compare it directly with the slightly different physiognomy that 
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constitutes a surprised expression. This idea is consistent with Russell's (1991) 
finding that expressions of contempt used by Matsumoto and Ekman (1988) were 
judged as disgust if presented in isolation, but if a disgust and contempt exemplar 
were presented simultaneously, participants would successfully distinguish between 
the two expressions. 
Expression Matching Task 
The same 10 sets of expressions were used in this task as in the previous forced 
choice task (II), with an additional 60 faces from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) 
series. (The actors used from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) set were MF, NR, WF, 
SW, EM, PE, JJ, MO, C and PF). Each set contained six images, one of each of the 
six expressions from the Jenkins expression set, which were arranged in a circle in 
front of SE, a seventh card, taken from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series was 
placed in the centre of the circle. The task for SE was to match the central expression 
with one from the surround. Each consecutive trial used expression exemplars from a 
different set. SE performed a total of 60 trials matching each of the 6 expressions on 
10 separate occasions. 
Results 
Asterisked scores are significantly impaired in comparison to the performance of 
controls: **z> 3.10, p < 0.001. 
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Expression SE Controls 
Mean SD 
Happiness 10/10 10 0 
Sadness 6/10** 9.7 0.75 
Anger 8/10 8 1.91 
Disgust 5/10** 9 1.15 
Fear 8/10 5.2 2.6 
Surprise 6/10 7.8 1.34 
Table 6.13: Matching images of facial affect from the Jenkins set by SE, with mean 
scores and standard deviations for six control participants. 
SE was found to be significantly impaired in his ability to match expressions of 
sadness and disgust, but out-performed controls in his ability to match fearful 
expressions. His ability to match happy facial expressions was perfect, but his 
performance in matching expressions of surprise, although not significantly different 
to that achieved by controls, was greatly reduced compared to his own performance 
for this expression in previous tasks. 
Errors 
The errors made by SE in this task are illustrated in Table 6.14. As in other 
expression tasks, SE often confuses expressions of sadness, anger and disgust with 
one another, and also confuses fear with surprise. 
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SE Sadness Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
Errors disgust (4) disgust (2) sadness (3) surprise (2) fear (4) 
anger (1) 
fear (1) 
Table 6.14: Errors made by SE in matching images of facial affect from the Jenkins 
image set with single exemplars from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series. Numbers 
in parenthesis represent frequency of responses. 
Control participants also exhibit the same confusions with fear and surprise and 
frequently confuse expressions of anger, sadness and disgust, as shown in Table 
6.15. 
Controls Sadness Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
Errors anger (1) disgust (5) anger (3) surprise (24) Fear (8) 
disgust (1) sadness (4) sadness (2) disgust (3) 
happiness (1) fear (1) 
fear (1) 
Table 6.15: Errors made by controls in matching images of facial affect from the 
Jenkins image set with single exemplars from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series. 
Numbers in parenthesis represent frequency of responses. 
Discussion 
SE was impaired in his ability to match expressions of sadness and disgust with 
exemplars of the same expressions posed by other actors. The errors made by SE and 
the control participants reflected very similar confusions, which have been evident in 
all of the tasks described so far. 
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In these tasks, SE has been required to interpret the images of facial affect that he has 
been presented with. Some of these tasks have apparently revealed impairments and 
others may have concealed them - or suggested the absence of an impaired ability. 
The results of these experiments demonstrate the difficulties facing researchers in 
choosing appropriate tasks for assessing a patient's ability, and also in interpreting the 
responses. In the next experiment, SE's ability to discriminate expression exemplars 
from neutral exemplars is investigated using the 1AFC task which was described in 
Chapter 3. This psychophysical task has the advantage that it does not require the 
participants to interpret the affect signals that are presented, instead they must detect 
the presentation of the affect signals embedded amongst neutral distractors. 
Detection of Facial Expressions: I-AFe Expression 
Detection Task 
SE was asked to participate in this experiment as a poor performance in this task 
would suggest an inability to perceive the signal value of expressive faces compared 
to neutral faces. If SE' s apparent difficulties in labelling expression are caused by an 
inability to interpret facial expressions, then he should be able to perform this task 
with ease since it only requires the discrimination of an expression (any expression) 
from neutral and does not require any semantic knowledge regarding individual affect 
signals. 
Design 
The design of this task was described in Chapter 3. SE performed this task at an 
equivalent viewing distance of 10m. As described in Chapter 3, there were 120 
randomised trials consisting of the 60 expression faces (signals), and 60 neutral faces 
(non-signals) from the Jenkins affect image set. Each stimulus was presented for 3 
screen cycles after which a blank screen appeared. The task for SE was to determine 
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on each trial if the stimulus was a signal or a non-signal. SE voiced his response to 
the experimenter who responded using a key press which triggered the onset of the 
next trial. SE performed this task on two separate occasions separated by a period of 
five months. 
Results 
Figure 6.2 Illustrates SE's performance calculated from the hit rates on each occasion 
compared to a group of undergraduate students who performed the task. (Age 
matched controls were not asked to participate in this task as SE's overall 
performance matched that of the young adult group so closely). 
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Figure 6.2: SE's performance in a lAFC expression detection task compared on two 
separate occasions and with the mean performance of six undergraduate students. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
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SE's performance in this task is comparable to the performance of a group of young 
adults for expressions of happiness, sadness, disgust and surprise. On SE's first 
attempt at this task, his performance for the expression of fear fell within the range of 
scores obtained by the undergraduates, but outside of it on his second attempt. His 
ability to discriminate expressions of anger from neutral on both occasions also fell 
outside the range of performance measured for the undergraduate group. However, 
only his performance in discriminating anger from neutral on the second attempt was 
found to be significantly different to the undergraduate group (z > 2.33, p < 0.01). 
Discussion 
In general, SE's performance was comparable to a group of young adults, only 
differing in his ability to discriminate angry faces from neutral ones in one of the 
trials. For this reason, age match controls were not used in this study. It would have 
been interesting, but not very surprising if SE had been compared with an age-
matched control group and found to out-perform them considering his experience at 
psychological testing compared to theirs. The important finding of this study is that 
comparing him with a group of young adults demonstrates that he is clearly not 
impaired in this task. 
This study demonstrated that SE's difficulty with facial expressions is unlikely to be 
due to an inability to perceive the difference between the signalling values of an 
expression compared to a neutral face. His impaired performance in some of the tasks 
reported earlier, are more likely to be caused by an inability to transform facial 
physiognomy into a meaningful, affective signal. A more demanding, and perhaps 
revealing task would have compared SE's ability to discriminate between 
expressions, rather than between an expression and neutral. For example, in the tasks 
described earlier in this chapter, SE often confused expressions of sadness, anger and 
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disgust as well as expreSSIOns of fear and surpnse. A task which required a 
discrimination between these expressions may have also revealed some perceptual 
problems. 
Generating Exemplars of Facial Affect 
SE consented to be filmed producing exemplars of the six facial affects of interest in 
this series of investigations. Examples of his expressions can be seen in Figure 6.3. 
Although SE was slightly nervous about being filmed, he generated these facial 
expressions very rapidly, producing all six affects within one minute, as can be seen 
from the time code at the base of each image. He found most difficulty with the 
expreSSIOn of 'disgust' which he took a few moments to think about before 
generating a convincing expression. All other expressions were performed 
instantaneously on hearing the instructions from the experimenter. 
The effectiveness of each of these signals was significantly more apparent from the 
moving sequence than from these static images. 
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Figure 6.3: SE posing examples of facial expressions. From left to right: happiness, 
sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise. 
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Questionnaire to Evoke Emotional Responses 
SE was given a questionnaire which was designed to assess his ability to attribute an 
appropriate emotional response to an emotional situation. SE was asked a total of 
twenty -five questions, each of the form, "how would you feel if. .... ?". The questions 
were intended to arouse feelings of happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and 
surprise. There were 4 questions intended to evoke feelings of sadness, anger and 
disgust, 5 for evoking fear, 6 for surprise and 2 for happiness. Table 6.15 shows a 
copy of the questionnaire and SE's responses. SE was also asked to rate the intensity 
of his responses using a seven-point scale, one representing low intensity and seven 
high intensity. Some of the questions were slightly ambiguous in their intended 
effect. The main aim of this task was to determine if SE was capable of generating 
appropriate responses to the questions. 
Results 
How would you feel if ......... SE's Rating 
response 
1 .... someone stole your bicycle? Angry 7 
2 .... you bumped into friends from home when you were Very pleased 1 
holidaying in a far away place? 
3 .... you opened your fridge and all the contents had gone Very Angry 7 
mouldy? 
4 .... your open top car broke down in a safari park full of Scared 7 
roaming lions and tigers? 
5 .... someone was deliberately rude to you? Angry 7 
6 .... your pet died? Sad 5 
7 .... you won a large sum of money on the lottery? Very pleased 5 
8 .... you got your foot caught in a railway line and could Scared 7 
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see a train approaching? 
9 
.... you heard that a child of one of your friends was very Sad 7 
ill? 
10 .... you made plans to meet up with friends you haven't Pleased 4/5 
seen for awhile? 
11 
.... a chemical factory was deliberately polluting a river? Very angry 7 
12 .... you were sitting in a room with a very unpleasant Very uncom- 7 
smell in it? fortable 
13 .... you won a competition you thought you had done Very 7 
badly in? surprised 
14 .... you were on a sinking ship that was far out to sea? Frightened 5 
15 .... a friend that had been very ill made a complete Very pleased 7 
recovery? 
16 .... your favourite football team lost an important match? Very sad 5 
17 .... you saw a shark swimming towards you while you Frightened 7 
were swimming in the sea? 
18 .... you saw someone being sick in a public place? Emotionally 5 
upset or 
nauseated 
19 .... someone deliberately gave you false directions to a Lost 7 
place you were looking for? Angry 7 
20 .... you opened the breadbin and found a spanner in it? Surprised 7 
21 .... a member of your family died? Devastated 7 
22 .... your family organised a party for you without your Surprised 7 
knowledge? and pleased 
23 .... you saw someone eating a sheep's eye? Nauseated 7 
24 .... 1 told you, you were going on holiday to Blackpool Very pleased 7 
tomorrow? 
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25 .... you were unexpectedly asked to give a presentation on Surprised! 5 
a subject you knew nothing about? Puzzled 
Table 6.15: Questionnaire answered by SE to investigate his ability to generate an 
appropriate response to an emotionally arousing situation. 
The majority of questions in this questionnaire were fairly extreme scenarios and not 
surprisingly, SE used the upper end of the rating scale in all but eight of the 
questions. Importantly though, he attributed an appropriate emotional response to 
each of the questions. His rating of question 14 with a 5 was perhaps somewhat low 
but this could simply reflect inexperience with rating scales. SE did not choose to 
label any of the events with a 'disgust' label but did use 'nauseous' on two occasions. 
Question three was designed to evoke a feeling of disgust but SE responded with 
'very angry'. 
Discussion 
The use of a questionnaire as a tool for examining emotional responses is actually 
quite a blunt instrument since it is unlikely that responses made in questionnaires are 
directly related to actual emotional experience. It is possible that in any of the given 
situations posed in Table 6.15, SE would not actually experience the emotions he 
attributed to the scene. His responses could have been made as a result of knowing 
which emotion would be the appropriate response to the situation, either from 
recollections of past experiences or from simply being cognisant of the appropriate 
emotion. 
In the next experiment, SE was asked to recall occasions in which he had experienced 
specific emotions. His confusions between certain expressions evidenced in earlier 
tasks could be a reflection of a poor understanding of the emotional labels used. 
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Memory for Emotional Incidences 
SE was asked to recall occasions when he had felt the emotions of happiness, 
sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise. Once again, the task was designed to 
determine if SE had an accurate/appropriate representation of the six emotions in his 
memory for personal events. SE was asked to provide examples and also to rate them 
using the seven-point scale used in the questionnaire. 
Results 
SE provided the responses presented in Table 6.16 fluently and with ease. 
Emotion Incident Rating 
Happiness Meeting Barbara Dixon 7 
Sadness Seeing an elderly person in despair and then dying 7 
Anger (i) John Major 7 
(ii) Tony Blair for "turning his back on socialism" 7 
Disgust Barbara Dixon playing the part of a prostitute in a TV drama 7 
Fear Waking up in hospital after taking an overdose 7 
Surprise Winning a singing competition in Butlins 7 
Table 6.16: Examples of occasions which have caused SE to feel happiness, sadness, 
anger, disgust, fearful and surprised. 
All of SE's responses were considered to be appropriate (perhaps with the exception 




Some areas of the amygdala receive fear related information and others issue fear 
related motor responses. The amygdala receives fear information from three sources: 
the sensory areas of the thalamus; the sensory areas of the cortex; and the 
hippocampus. Information from the latter source is involved in the memory of fear 
information such that a previously encountered stimulus which evoked a fear 
response can elicit the same emotions again simply by recollection of that stimulus. 
("Sends shivers down my spine just thinking about it"). SE has extensive damage to 
his hippocampus, so although he may be conscious of the appropriate responses to 
the situations given in the questionnaire, he may not actually elicit a fear response 
which could be measured using GSR, or by monitoring the heart rate. 
Gaze Direction Sensitivity 
Neurophysiological studies have revealed that cells which are sensitive for facial 
expressions are found in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Hasselmo et aI, 1989), 
a brain region which has also been shown to have cells sensitive to gaze direction, 
(Perrett et aI, 1985). In addition, Campbell et al (1990) found that STS ablation in 
non-human primates and temporal lobe lesions in humans resulted in impaired gaze 
direction detection. 
Young et al (1995) tested DR's ability to discriminate between a directed (target) and 
an averted gaze (distractor). They found that DR was unimpaired if the gaze direction 
of the distractor face deviated by 200 , but was impaired when the angle was decreased 
to 100 and 50. The performance of patients with Huntington's disease, who also have 
damage to the amygdaloid complex, was found to be borderline although performance 
was well above chance (Sprengelmeyer et aI, 1996). 
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SE was tested in a range of gaze direction detection tasks to investigate his sensitivity 
to this social signal. With the extensive temporal lobe damage SE has incurred, it was 
expected that he would experience difficulties with this task 
Control Participants 
Data from control participants was collected in this investigation as SE' s performance 
was found to be impaired (at least in one condition) compared to the group of healthy 
participants whose data was reported in Chapter 4. Age matched controls were not 
recruited for the 1AFC psychophysical experiment described in Chapter 3 as SE's 
performance was not found to differ from a group of young adults. Therefore, SE's 
performance in the following gaze tasks is compared with data collected from three 
control participants, two female and one male aged between 60 and 66 years with a 
mean age of 63.3 years, SD = 2.49. 
Procedure 
SE performed the six gaze tasks which were described in detail in Chapter 3: 
(1) Upright Face Upright Eyes 
(2) Inverted Face Inverted Eyes 
(3) Upright face Inverted Eyes 
(4) Inverted Face Upright Eyes 
(5) Absent Face Upright Eyes 
(6) Absent Face Inverted Eyes 
This procedure differs from that used by other research groups (e.g. Perrett et a1 
(1988); Campbell et al (1990)) in that it requires a discrimination of gaze which is 
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averted to the left or to the right rather than a distinction of whether the person is 
looking towards or away from you. In addition, this task explores the contribution of 
the facial surround in the patients ability to discriminate gaze direction. 
SE performed conditions one to four on one occasion and conditions five and six on 
another visit approximately 4 months later. All conditions were as those described in 
Chapter 4 with the exception that the range of gaze eccentricities was increased to 10° 
in conditions one to four. SE viewed the screen at a distance of 1m and responded 
using a keypress to signify the direction of the gaze. SE took short breaks between 
each condition to prevent himself from tiring. 
Results and Discussion 
Although reaction times are not reported here, SE found no difficulty in making rapid 
decisions to the stimuli in each of the six conditions. Table 6.17 presents threshold 
performance for SE in each of the six conditions and compares it to mean thresholds 
and standard deviations from the control group. (See Chapter 4 for a complete 
account of the design and analysis of this experiment). Data from each of the 
conditions was submitted to a probit analysis which determined the best fitting 
cumulative Gaussian. Psychometric functions were plotted for SE's performance in 
each task and are illustrated in Figure 6.4. The data appears very noisy due to the 
large number of cue values. From the psychometric functions, thresholds values, 
which are presented in Table 6.17, were calculated in each of the six conditions. The 
mean threshold and standard deviations in each condition were calculated from the 
control data and are also reported in Table 6.17. 
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Asterisked scores are significantly impaired in comparison to the performance of 
controls. **z > 3.10, p < 0.001. 
Condition SE (threshold 0) Controls (threshold 0) 
Mean SD 
face upright -eyes 2.34 1.98 0.34 
upright 
face absent -eyes 3.06 3.03 0.79 
upright 
face inverted-eyes 3.85 2.39 1.07 
upright 
face inverted-eyes 4.39 3.86 0.68 
inverted 
face absent-eyes 8.25** 4.10 1.03 
inverted 
face upright -eyes 2.82 3.02 0.85 
inverted 
Table 6.17: Threshold peiformance in 6 gaze direction detection tasks by SE with 
mean thresholds and standard deviations for three control participants. 
SE experienced most difficulty with the 'face absent-eyes inverted' condition which 
the control participants also experienced the most difficulty with. However, SE's 
performance in this condition was substantially and significantly worse than the 
controls. SE's performance in all the other conditions was not significantly impaired 
compared to the control group. SE's highest thresholds (i.e. lowest sensitivity) were 
recorded for the inverted conditions of 'face inverted-eyes inverted' and 'face absent-
eyes inverted', surprisingly though, his performance in the 'face upright-eyes 
inverted' condition exceeded that in two of the other conditions in which the eyes 
were presented in an upright orientation. Figure 6.7 illustrates performances of SE 
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Figure 6.7: Threshold measures of performance in a gaze direction detection task by 
SE and three control participants. 
Both SE and controls demonstrated greatest sensitivity to gaze direction when the face 
was in the correct configuration, i.e. the 'upright face-upright eyes' condition, a 
finding which suggests that SE's ability to discriminate gaze direction has remained 
intact. 
General Discussion 
In this chapter a range of tasks were employed which attempted to examme the 
perfonnance of two amygdala damaged patients in their ability to process affect 
stimuli. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the primary aim of this 
research was not to produce more evidence for a role of the amygdala in the appraisal 
of fearful stimuli, but rather to implement some of the tasks designed in this thesis 
and to investigate their application in a clinical setting. Of secondary interest was the 
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ability of these patients to perform these tasks compared to a group of control 
participants. 
Using the Jenkins affect image set, the paradigm which revealed the most significant 
differences between the performance of the patients and the performance of the 
control group was the six alternative constrained choice task (I). This paradigm is the 
one most commonly used in clinical investigations of affect processing. In this task 
SE was found to be impaired in his ability to label expressions of fear, disgust, anger 
and sadness, and DR was significantly impaired with expressions of anger and 
disgust, but not fear. Interestingly, on SE's second attempt at this task, five months 
later, he was now only found to be impaired in his ability to label expressions of 
disgust. SE has been a very conscientious contributor to several research programmes 
across the country. It is possible that due to extensive testing, SE has been able to 
develop numerous strategies which may now mask the presence of any real 
impairment. When Calder and his colleagues (1996) tested SE and DR in a 6AFC task 
using stimuli from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series, both patients were found to 
only be impaired in their ability to label expressions of fear. 
However, SE's potential ability to develop coping strategies does not account for the 
discrepancies in his performance in each of the different tasks. In the free naming 
task, which both SE and DR performed before the forced choice tasks, SE was found 
to only differ significantly from the control group in his ability to label the expression 
of disgust, and DR's performance was no different to controls for any of the 
expressions. When the nature of the forced choice task was changed so that on each 
trial SE was able to view examples of all six of the expressions, his performance 
accuracy increased dramatically and was no different to controls. There are a number 
of possible explanations for this finding: the poor results obtained in constrained 
choice task (I) could have been the result of a labelling bias, such that, for some 
reason SE did not make full use of the target labels presented to him. In constrained 
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choice task (II), SE was forced to choose stimuli for every emotional label. Secondly, 
SE may have only been successful in the constrained choice task (II) as he was able to 
use a process of elimination to identify the fearful exemplars. If as Calder et al 
(1996a) suggested SE is only impaired in his ability to interpret expressions of fear, 
SE has only to correctly identify five of the images and attribute the expression he 
does not recognise with the label of fear. Such a strategy would obviously take longer 
than if an expression was spontaneously recognised, consequently, in future SE 
should be timed when participating in these tasks. In other tasks, the majority of the 
fearful exemplars were labelled as surprise, but surprise was only rarely labelled as 
fear. SE's success in this task could simply be due to his ability to accurately label 
surprise exemplars and then by default accurately label the fearful faces. 
In the matching task, SE was impaired in his ability to match expression of disgust 
making confusions with expressions of sadness, anger and fear. 
Calder et al (1996a) reported that both SE and DR were impaired in their ability to 
label expressions of fear in a forced choice task, a finding which has been replicated 
in this study for SE, but not for DR. However, when other paradigms were used to 
investigate expression processing, SE was not found to be impaired in his ability to 
label expressions of fear, but instead demonstrated a consistently poor performance in 
his ability to label expressions of disgust. From this data alone, one would be 
reluctant to report that damage to the amygdala resulted in an impaired ability to 
interpret fearful facial expressions, but instead may suggest that these results more 
closely resemble performance by patients with Huntington's disease. In addition, 
disgust was the only expression which caused difficulties for SE when he was asked 
to pose examples of each of the six basic emotions. 
SE's ability to recall occasions which have been emotionally arousing, and to provide 
appropriate responses in the emotion questionnaire was apparently normal. Although 
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his responses to the questions which were designed to evoke feelings of disgust may 
warrant further investigation. However, the problem with questionnaires like the one 
given to SE is that they do not actually tap into emotional experience. Since SE does 
not have a general amnesia, he is able to recall personal events which have caused 
particular emotions, and appears to be able to respond appropriately to emotionally 
arousing questions. Whether or not SE would actually experience these same 
emotions now is an empirical question. 
O'Carroll et al (1997) tested SE's performance in an emotional memory task adopting 
the paradigm used by Cahill et al (1994) which was described in Chapter 5. This task 
involves a narrative accompanied by a slide show which describes three phases of a 
story. The story has a neutral beginning and end, but a highly emotional middle 
phase. Normal control participants exhibit enhanced recognition memory for this 
portion of the story in a forced choice test. SE failed to show this peak for the 
emotionally arousing part of the story and instead exhibited superior recall for the 
final neutral phase. O'Carroll et al (1997) suggest that this replication of Cahill's 
(1994) findings provide further support for the role of the amygdala in long term 
emotionally influenced memory. However, DR did exhibit the normative peak for the 
emotional middle phase of the story. O'Carroll et al (1997) suggest that DR's 
performance could be attributed to a hyperemotional effect which she may have 
experienced as a result of her epilepsy and subsequent surgical procedures. 
Alternatively, O'Carroll and his colleagues proposed that laterality effects could 
account for this finding. SE has more extensive damage to his right amygdala, DR to 
her left. Recent research by Cahill et al (1996) found that the glucose metabolic rate 
of the right amygdala measured while normal participants viewed the emotional film 
clips was highly correlated with the number of emotive clips recalled, and was not 
significantly correlated with the number of neutral films recalled. As such Cahill et a1 
(1996) suggested that the amygdala is selectively involved in the long-term memory 
of emotionally arousing events. 
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SE's performance in the gaze tasks was comparable to the control group for all of the 
conditions with the exception of the 'face absent-eyes inverted' condition in which he 
was found to be significantly impaired. However, when the face and eyes were 
presented together in an upright orientation, SE was found to be highly accurate in 
determining the direction of the gaze demonstrating that his ability to perform this 
aspect of face processing has remained intact. 
Only three participants contributed to the control data for the gaze tasks described in 
this chapter compared to six contributors when these tasks were originally described 
in Chapter 4. However, if the data from both groups are compared, it is apparent that 
the same general trend in performance is measured across all conditions. In the three 
conditions which presented the eyes in an upright orientation, performance was 
comparable between the two groups. However, the older control participants were 
found to be considerably more sensitive to gaze direction than the younger group 
reported in Chapter 4 when the eyes were presented in an inverted configuration. 
However, SE's performance in the 'face absent-eyes inverted' condition was still 
worse than these participants. It is possible to speculate that the significance of the 
facial surround may decrease with age. Children have been shown to be relatively 
insensitive to the inversion effect seen with adults for the recognition of familiar faces 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986), which suggests an increased reliance on configural 
information and the development of a rigid schema for faces. Perhaps this rigid 
schema becomes more plastic into old age, which could explain the superior 
performance of SE's control group with manipulations of the facial surround. A 
further difference between the control group and the participants of Chapter 4 is that 
the controls, and SE, took part in each of the six conditions. The participants of 
Chapter 4 only contributed data to one condition. The use of a between groups versus 
a within groups design could also have effected the data, since participants may have 
adopted a certain strategy in one condition which could then be used in another, 
alternatively participants could have employed a different strategy in each condition. 
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Of course, from only three participants it IS impossible to draw any definite 
conclusions, however, the possibility of a decreased reliance on configural 
information with age does provide an interesting hypothesis for future consideration. 
Summary 
This chapter revealed the difficulties of choosing an appropriate task for the 
assessment of a patients ability to interpret facial expressions. The first four tasks 
reported in this chapter, free naming, constrained choice (I), constrained choice (II), 
and the matching task, all generated different results. With the exception of SE's first 
attempt in the constrained choice task (I), neither patient were found to differ 
significantly from controls in their interpretation of the expression of fear. DR was 
unimpaired in labelling facial expressions of emotion in a free naming task, but was 
impaired in her ability to label anger and disgust in the constrained choice task (I). SE 
was also found to be consistently poor at labelling expressions of disgust. SE also 
struggled to pose this expression himself but managed after a short delay. The varied 
results of the expression labelling tasks emphasise the need to interpret data collected 
in this way with care. 
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Review, Future Work and Conclusions 
Overview 
The research reported in this thesis employed a variety of paradigms to investigate our 
ability to detect and interpret social signals from the face, both in health and disease. In 
this chapter, the findings of this research are reviewed and suggestions for further 
related areas of study are suggested. Some preliminary results are also reported from an 
investigation designed to explore the role of dynamic information in the recognition of 
our facial expressions. 
Review 
In Chapter 2, the conventional methods of expression recognition, forced choice and 
free naming, were described and the problems in the interpretation of data obtained 
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using these paradigms discussed and illustrated by comparing performance between the 
tasks, and between participants from Western and Japanese cultures. 
The expression exemplars which comprised the image set used in this thesis were 
chosen from a collection of images which were labelled with an accuracy of 100% by 
ten participants in a forced choice task. Forced choice paradigms generally serve to 
inflate the apparent measure of accuracy by limiting participants to a list of labels, none 
of which they may feel are appropriate descriptions of the emotion they perceive. This 
was clearly shown to be the case when the same image set was used in the free naming 
task. Labelling accuracy fell for each of the expressions but was particularly reduced for 
the expressions of fear, disgust and sadness with scores falling to 75%, 84% and 86% 
respectively. These results illustrate the way in which participants use a 'best guess' 
strategy to label some of the expressions in a forced choice task. 
In the free naming task, many participants chose not to use a word which described an 
emotion (despite their instructions) but instead used phrases or exclamations which 
were effectively describing a response to an emotional situation, rather than the emotion 
itself. For example, some participants used words such as "phew!" to describe a 
disgusted expression. Such a response was scored as correct despite it not appearing in 
the Oxford dictionary of Antonyms and Synonyms under disgust. This evidently makes 
the experimenters personal judgement of accuracy open to interpretation. Further 
difficulties of interpretation and translation were described in the analysis and use of 
these tasks when performed by Japanese participants. Two independent judges 
translated the data and although agreement was high between the two (97%), there were 
some important differences including confusions between the translations of disgust, 
anger and sadness. 
In the forced choice and free naming tasks, the Japanese participants found difficulties 
in labelling expressions of fear, disgust and anger. Mean scores in the forced choice 
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task for these expressions were 36%, 75% and 57% respectively, and 28%, 40% and 
62 % in the free naming task. Performance for the expressions of fear and anger were 
similar in both tasks, however, participants interpretation of the expression of disgust 
decreased dramatically from the forced choice task to the free naming task. As described 
in Chapter 2, the relatively low score measured in the forced choice task could have 
arisen due to an ambiguous choice of kanji to define this word. Alternatively, 
participants may have simply been unable to interpret the physiognomy of this 
expression and therefore allocated the label of disgust to a selection of faces which they 
felt unable to define using any of the other labels. This suggestion would be supported 
by the large decrease in accuracy when no labels were provided in the free naming task. 
The Japanese participants did not differ significantly from their Western counterparts in 
interpreting the expressions of happiness, sadness and surprise which demonstrates that 
the tasks were understood. In general, the pattern of performance measured for the 
Japanese participants was very similar to that of the Western group. Westerners reliably 
interpreted expressions of happiness and surprise and found the greatest difficulty with 
fearful and disgusted expressions. This pattern of performance was observed in the 
Japanese group only with a much reduced accuracy for the negative expressions. From 
the results reported in Chapter 2, it appears that in a free naming expression allocation 
task, all participants find the greatest difficulty with the expressions of fear and disgust. 
For the Japanese, this difficulty is more profound and suggests that cultural differences 
may have an influence on the amount of exposure to negative expressions, and also that 
these negative expressions are simply the most difficult to interpret, especially from 
different race faces. 
After the difficulties experienced with interpretation and translation in the forced choice 
and free naming tasks, the use of a psychophysical technique to measure socially 
relevant signals was an appealing solution since problems with translation or 
interpretation could be overcome by the precise design of the task. 
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In Chapter 3 two psychophysical tasks were designed to measure the detectability of 
affect signals from the face. Measuring our sensitivity to facial expressions in this way 
only required the participants to discriminate between an expression (any expression) 
and a neutral face. As such, the participants were not required to interpret the 
expressions, making the task of interpreting the data considerably more straight 
forward. Participants were presented with the stimuli at a range of viewing distances 
which were equivalent to viewing a real face at distances of 10, 20, 30, 40 and SOm. 
Hager and Ekman (1979) had suggested that some expressions may be detectable at 
distance in excess of 200m and reported that male 'angry' faces were capable of 
transmitting an effective signal over further distances than female angry faces. Neither 
of these observations were confirmed in this thesis. Experiment 2, described in Chapter 
3 used a two alternative forced choice paradigm in which participants were required to 
locate the presentation of an expression exemplar in one of two intervals on each trial. 
Experiment 3 used a signal detection paradigm which required the participant to 
determine the category (expression or neutral) of the stimulus on each presentation. The 
same pattern of performance was measured in each task although accuracy was 
generally higher using the 2AFC paradigm. However, both tasks revealed that 
participants were most sensitive to the expressions of happiness and surprise which 
were found to be reliably detected at an equivalent viewing distance of 4Om. In contrast, 
the expression of sadness was poorly detected over all viewing distances with 
performance fluctuating around chance in both tasks. This would be predicted for an 
expression which is an external representation of an internal state which we do not need 
to transmit over great distances. Sadness is an emotion for which there would be no 
obvious survival benefit for an organism to detect or transmit over large distances. 
Therefore, our facial features have adopted a subtle configuration for this emotion. All 
of the other expressions tested are intended to be overt signals to other people, either in 
greeting, as in surprise and happiness, warning as in disgust, fear or anger, or threat as 
in anger. As such it would be expected that these expressions should be able to transmit 
their intended signal more effectively. 
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Expressions of fear, anger and disgust, which participants found difficult to interpret in 
the forced and free naming tasks of Chapter 2, were not found to be difficult to detect. 
Thus, the expressions which cause confusion in labelling paradigms, do not do so as a 
consequence of the strength of the signal they are able to transmit. However, the 
psychophysical tasks described in this thesis were not able to address the confusabilities 
of these negative expressions. Had these tasks required a discrimination between 
expressions, for example, instead of responding 'neutral' or 'expression' if the task had 
required the discrimination 'fear' or 'not fear', or 'disgust' or 'not disgust' this may 
have proved a more revealing task. If these expressions are perceptually distinct, then 
one would not expect confusions between them and other expressions. However, it 
might be predicted that fear would be reliably distinguished from expressions of 
happiness and sadness but may potentially be confused with surprise, anger or disgust 
as was seen in the tasks which required interpretation. 
The tasks described in Chapter 3 make only a small step into the understanding of the 
perception of our facial expressions. Our ability to detect facial expressions is not 
simply the result of basic visual functions which can be neatly defined as the result of 
operations such as acuity and contrast sensitivity. Instead, our detection of facial 
expressions involves higher order mechanisms which treat these signals not simply as 
complex patterns, but as faces, as socially relevant stimuli which require a higher level 
of processing. The use of a specialised system tuned to the perception of faces as a 
specific stimulus class was illustrated when performance in the 2AFC task was found to 
decrease when the faces were presented in an inverted configuration. If the expression 
stimuli had been processed purely as complex patterns of light and dark regions, 
inversion would have had no effect since image properties are only trivially effected by 
this transformation. However, inversion is known to have detrimental effects on 
aspects of face processing, therefore the poor performance measured in this condition 
was indicative of the interruption of a process linked with the processing of faces as a 
specific stimulus class. However, this experiment was unable to establish if the faces 
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were being processed as emotional signals or simply unusual facial configurations with 
no reference to affect whatsoever. 
The power of these social signals in their upright configuration was demonstrated when 
the images were reduced to I-bit per pixel format. In the 6AFC task labelling accuracy 
remained remarkable high suggesting no loss of signal from the reduced grey-scale. In 
the 2AFC psychophysical task, performance decreased with increasing distance and 
was worse than the performance at equivalent viewing distances in full grey-level task 
although a similar trend was observed. Happiness and surprise remained the best 
detected with increases in viewing distance, and sadness was detected with an accuracy 
no better than chance. In this task, participants ability to detect the expression of disgust 
showed a rapid decrease between 10 and 20m. This expression was also found to be 
the most difficult to label in the 6AFC task with a mean performance accuracy of 73%. 
Fear was found to be the next most difficult to label producing a score of 80%, anger 
followed at 82% with all other expressions being labelled with an accuracy in excess of 
95%. 
In these psychophysical investigations, vlewmg distance was used as a means of 
increasing the difficulty of the detection task and investigating our sensitivity to signals 
of facial affect. Hager and Ekman's (1979) conclusion that the face is a long distance 
transmitter of affective information was confirmed, although not to the extent that some 
of our facial expressions would be detectable at 220m. 
In Chapter 4, sensitivity to gaze direction was measured using two psychophysical 
techniques. The first used a live set-up of gazer and observer, and the second 
transferred the image of the same gazer to the screen. Comparison between the two 
conditions was slightly ambiguous due to the changes in face size and viewing distance, 
however, performance in each task revealed that sensitivity was at least as good as 
Snellen acuity and demonstrated that the task transferred well to the screen. 
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Manipulations of the facial surround revealed that the ability to detect gaze direction did 
not rely solely on processes such as acuity to make a geometric analysis of the relative 
amounts of visible iris and sclera. Performance in the 'face absent-eyes upright' 
condition was found to be significantly inferior to that measured in the 'face upright-
eyes upright' condition. The presence of the facial surround provided a necessary 
framework for the analysis of gaze direction. In addition performance in the 'face 
inverted-eyes upright' condition revealed a trend towards a beneficial effect of the facial 
surround even when presented in an incongruous orientation to the eyes, however, this 
did not reach statistical significance. Inverting the eyes had a very detrimental effect on 
participants ability to discriminate gaze direction regardless of the context in which the 
eyes were presented. In an upright orientation, the face is analysed configurally, as a 
whole, when the face is inverted, individual facial features are analysed at a local level. 
The disruption of configural processing interferes with the task of gaze direction 
detection which illustrates the role of higher order functions in what may have been 
considered to be a simple perceptual task. 
Methodologies for Assessing Expression Perception in Patients 
A summary of the performances of SE and DR which significantly differed from 
controls is reported in Table 7.1. This data demonstrates how the measured 
performance varied depending on the nature of the task employed, which illustrates the 
limitations of the traditional techniques for assessing expression recognition. In DR's 
case, performance in the free naming task was no different to the control group for any 
of the expressions, and SE was only found to be impaired in his interpretation of the 
expression of disgust in this task. When a forced choice paradigm was used, SE 
performed particularly badly and was found to be significantly impaired labelling 
expressions of sadness, anger, disgust and fear. However, when this trial was repeated 
five months later, SE's performance only differed significantly from controls for the 
expression of disgust. Despite DR's good performance in the free naming task, when 
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tested using a forced choice paradigm she was found to be impaired in her labelling of 
expressions of disgust and anger. The decrease in accuracy measured in the forced 
choice task compared to the free naming task suggested that the patients may have been 
exhibiting a labelling bias. To investigate this possibility, SE performed two further 
tasks, the 6AFC task (II), in which he made no significant errors, and a matching task 
which caused difficulties with the expressions of sadness and disgust. In summary, 
unlike published studies with these patients, no differentially severe impairment in 
labelling accuracy for fear was found. DR did not differ significantly from controls in 
her perception of fear in either of the tasks she performed, and SE was only 
significantly impaired in this task on his first attempt at the 6AFC task (I). 
Sadness Anger Disgust Fear 
Free Naming SE 
6AFC (I) SE SE,DR SE,DR SE 
6AFC (II) 
Matching SE SE 
Table 7.1: Performance which differed significantly from controls in each of four tasks 
of expression perception. (DR only participated in the free naming task and the 6AFC 
task (/)). 
However, both SE and DR did produce very low accuracy scores in their ability to label 
expressions of fear, but in the majority of cases, these scores did not differ significantly 
from the control group as this was the expression that caused the most difficulty for the 
controls. In fact, DR outperformed the controls in the free naming task, and SE 
outperformed them in the matching task. Why should the control participants have 
performed so badly with this expression? In a forced choice task with these images, 
young adults labelled each of the emotions with an accuracy of 100%, and 75% in a 
free naming task, so the low scores from the control participants are not a reflection of 
the quality of the image set. The control participants were only 50% correct in the 
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forced choice task (1), and 28.3% correct in the free naming task. Wolfgang and Cohen 
(1988) reported that overall recognition scores for expressions from a standardised set , 
varied with the level of education achieved by the participant. Those participants with a 
university education had an overall score of 81 %, those with a high school education, 
66%, and those with only a primary school education scored only 43%. In addition, 
Alvarez and Fuentes (1994) found that participants from a low socioeconomic group 
were significantly impaired in their ability to label facial expressions compared to a 
group of university students. In the study reported in Chapter 6, SE and DR were 
compared with control participants who had received no formal education after school 
leaving age, and were thought to match both patients well on IQ although no formal 
measures were taken. The low score measured for the controls for this expression is 
similar to that measured for the Japanese participants who scored 36% in the forced 
choice task and 28% when the free naming paradigm was used. However, low IQ 
certainly cannot account for the poor performance measured for the Japanese 
participants. It could explain the poor performance of the control participants in this 
study, however, the control participants described by Calder et al (1996a) in their 
investigations with SE and DR, who were matched for IQ, did not experience the same 
difficulties described for the controls used in this study. The controls in Calder et al's 
(1996a) study found the expression of anger the most difficult to label which they 
propose provides evidence to suggest that perceptual difficulty alone could not account 
for the poor performance of the patients. However, the controls used in Sprengelmeyer 
et ai's (1996) study did find fear the most difficult to label, and this was certainly the 
case in this study. If the expressions of fear and disgust are simply the most difficult to 
interpret, it could be imagined that a system specifically tuned to their perception would 
require expertise with these signals which the Japanese participants may simply not 
have. It appears as though the expressions, fear and disgust, which cause normal 
participants the most difficulty in tasks of interpretation, are also the ones which cause 
brain injured patients the most difficulty. These patients often have very generalised 
face processing impairments which are not confined to an inability to label one facial 
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expression. It would seem reasonable that expressions which cause normal participants 
the most difficulty, as shown by the performance of the Western and Japanese 
participants in Chapter 2, are the ones which are most severely affected when general 
face processing abilities have been impaired. 
To what extent is the perception and interpretation of affect signals correlated with the 
experience of emotion? In terms of our evolution, the development of specific neural 
substrates for basic emotions is most obviously applied to experiencing them. 
However, the research which has indicated specific neural substrates for some of our 
basic emotions has been concerned with the recognition of these affect signals. A link 
between the mechanisms involved in the recognition of emotions, and those required 
for experiencing them would be highly advantageous since it would enable us to learn 
about potentially dangerous situations without actually having to experience them 
ourselves (Brothers, 1989). 
The observation that patients with Huntington's disease appear to be impaired in their 
recognition of disgust both from visual and auditory cues, and that they appear not to be 
concerned with their own personal hygiene (Sprengelmeyer et aI, 1996), would suggest 
that perhaps all aspects of expression processing from perception and interpretation to 
experience are linked by a more central mechanism. In addition, the recent report by 
Phillips et al (1997), described cerebral activation in the anterior insula when normal 
participants were shown faces portraying disgust. This area is also associated with 
responses to bad tastes indicating that the neural response to the perception of this 
expression is also associated with the appraisal of distasteful stimuli. 
The recent evidence for specific neural substrates for two of our basic emotions, fear 
and disgust (Phillips et aI, 1997; Morris et al, 1996) has provided the most compelling 
evidence that the perception of these expressions from the faces of others, even in tasks 
which did not require the images to be overtly recognised, is linked with the experience 
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of the emotion itself. As such, performance in tasks of detection, like those described in 
Chapter 3, are likely to be associated with a more central mechanism for analysing our 
facial affect signals. In addition, the finding that people with Mobius syndrome who are 
unable to express emotions facially, also report difficulties in experiencing them (Cole, 
1997). In order to understand the emotional content of an experience they must 
intellectualise their mood, "this is a happy event, therefore I must be happy". 
The research reported m this thesis has practical, methodological and theoretical 
implications which are described in the next section which briefly describes some 
preliminary research projects and possible research for the future. 
Detection of Facial Expressions 
The psychophysical tasks described in Chapter 3 provided a useful tool for establishing 
our sensitivity to signals of facial affect, and as a means of assessing the performance 
of a patient with face processing impairments. However, for some patients, the rapid 
stimulus presentation, or use of a computer may not be appropriate. A more portable 
and accessible version of this experiment was devised by transferring the task to paper. 
A Gaussian filter was applied to each of the images in the Jenkins affect set creating 
new images which were blurred to various degrees. In the psychophysical experiments 
described in Chapter 3, the difficulty of the tasks was controlled by varying the viewing 
distance. A Gaussian filter has the effect of blurring the images and is equivalent to 
increasing the viewing distance. The task remained a 2AFC with two images printed 
side by side on paper. One of the images consisted of the expression, and the other a 
neutral face of the same expressor. The location of the expression was randomised 
between trials and the task for the participant was to locate the presence of the target, 
either on the left or the right of the page. SE has performed this task and his 
performance was found to be equivalent to a group of young adults as was seen in the 
lAFC psychophysical task reported in Chapter 6. In addition, the same pattern of 
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results emerged from this task as from the computer based tasks with expressions of 
happiness and surprise remaining well detected with increased amounts of blurring, and 
sadness being poorly detected even with low levels of blur. 
In the next section another methodological approach to explore participants 
interpretation of facial expressions is described. Most research in this area uses static 
images of facial expressions for the reasons described in Chapter 2. But what effect 
would a dynamic input have on tasks of expression recognition? One way to investigate 
this is to make the expressions harder to see and then look for an improvement in 
recognition from a moving sequence. This approach has been adopted in a current 
project which is being carried out in collaboration with Professor Vicki Bruce at Stirling 
University, and Dr. Sakiko Yoshikawa at the Advanced Telecommunications Research 
Institute in Japan. Some background to this project and some preliminary results are 
reported in the next section. 
The Role of Motion in Facial Expression Recognition 
In this preliminary investigation, the disruptive effects of negation on face processing 
were used as a tool to explore the contribution of dynamic information to facial 
expression recognition. It is a well reported phenomenon that negating grey level 
images makes the task of person identification difficult (Galper, 1970; Bruce & 
Langton, 1994; Kemp, Pike, White & Musselman, 1996; Johnston, Hill and Carman, 
1992). Images in photographic negative retain the same spatial arrangement of the 
features but all the grey levels are reversed. It is therefore quite surprising to discover 
quite how disruptive this image transformation is to face recognition. Two possibilities 
for this effect have been proposed, the first considers the idea of shape from shading, 
whereby negation produces an impossible pattern of shading which interrupts the 
retrieval of 3D information from the face and hence the ability to access information 
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regarding identity (Kemp et aI, 1996). The second possibility concerns the disruption of 
the apparent pigmentation of these facial images which alone could account for the poor 
recognition (Bruce & Langton 1994). 
Galper (1970) was the first to study the effects of negation on face recognition. He used 
a recognition memory task and suggested that the difficulty experienced by participants 
with the negated stimuli was the result of the participants being unable to 'read' the 
expression of the individual. This explanation is highly unlikely in the light of the 
wealth of evidence that has been reported in this thesis and elsewhere for the separate 
processing of expression and identity. The effects of negation have been likened to 
those of inversion, both perhaps arise due to the difficulty in encoding configural 
information from the transformed images. Hayes, Morrone and Burr (1986) 
demonstrated that it was the low spatial frequency components in an image that were 
sensitive to negation. Line drawings, which contain only high frequency information 
are difficult to recognise in positive and unaffected by negation. 
Interest in the effects of negation have increased over the last ten years and its disruptive 
effect on person identification have been used as a tool to investigate other aspects of 
face processing. In this investigation, negation was used to investigate the role of 
motion in facial expression recognition. It has been found that recognition of familiar or 
famous faces from negative is increased if the sequences are moving. This study 
attempted to establish whether this benefit was also seen for facial expressions, and if 
so, if it arose as a result of the effects of motion itself, or simply the presentation of 
more static information. 
Participants were shown video-clips of actors posmg expresslOns of happiness, 
sadness, anger and surprise in positive and negative formats which could be either 
moving or static. The dynamic displays showed the actor's features moving from a 
neutral pose to the apex of the expression. The static displays showed a single frame 
218 
representing the apex of the expression for an equivalent duration as the dynamic 
sequence. Participants were given a list of expressions which contained the four target 
expressions and two distractors and were asked to choose the most appropriate 
expression label on each trial. 
Motion was found to have a beneficial effect for expression identification in both the 
positive and negative conditions. Performance was greatest in the positive moving 
condition and least in the negative static condition. However, the question still remains 
as to whether the advantage was actually due to dynamic information itself, or simply 
the presentation of more information. Ongoing research compares participants 
performance in the negative moving condition, presenting the stimuli at the normal 
frame rate of 30 frames per second (FPS) and at the much reduced speed of 4FPS. 
Slowing the presentation rate maintains the informative properties but interferes with the 
natural dynamics. Therefore, if the measured advantage is a result of the relative 
amounts of information contained within a moving sequence compared to a static one, 
performance at the two speeds should be the same. If however, the benefit of seeing a 
moving sequence comes from a special property of the actual dynamics, performance 
would be hindered when the presentation rate is slowed. 
Recently, evidence has emerged which would support the idea of a mechanism tuned to 
the perception of biologically relevant motion which would contribute to the recognition 
of our facial affect signals. Humphreys, Donnelly and Riddoch (1993) described a 
patient, HJA, who was severely impaired in his ability to recognise identity and was 
poor at discriminating facial expressions and gender from static images of faces. 
However, if the images were animated using a point light display, he was able to make 
accurate judgements. A second patient, GK, who was not significantly impaired in his 
ability to recognise identity, was found to be poor at recognising facial expressions 
from both static and moving faces. Humphreys et al (1993) suggest that the 
impairments demonstrated by these patients indicates that expressions are encoded 
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separately from static and dynamic images. Humphreys et al (1993) cite the work of 
Perrett and his colleagues (1990a; 1990b) who have reported the presence of cells in the 
STS of the macaque which exhibit sensitivity to biologically significant movement 
patterns. In addition, prosopagnosic patients have been shown to compensate for their 
inability to recognise familiar people from their faces, and instead can achieve 
recognition from the person's gait. Humphreys et al (1993) proposed that the 
neurophysiological findings provide evidence for two types of model. The first would 
predict the existence of separate channels for processing dynamic and static facial 
expressions, with a pooling of information at a later stage of processing, perhaps 
providing social significance to the signals. The second model would predict a central 
mechanism which would receive inputs from static and dynamic form channels and 
simply categorise the type of affect signal. 
In the context of this research, we might expect that if we do possess a motion system 
which is specifically tuned to biologically relevant stimuli, such as facial expressions, 
that this system would be disrupted by interfering with the natural time course in which 
we typically see these displays take. We might expect that when the facial expressions 
are slowed to a presentation rate of 4FPS, recognition would be no greater than that 
which would be measured in the static condition. 
Future research in this project will also investigate the ability of Western participants to 
recognise the facial expressions posed by the Japanese actors under the same conditions 
of form and presentation. Western participants may be as poor at recognising facial 
affect from Japanese faces as the Japanese participants were found to be in interpreting 
these signals from Western faces in the tasks described in Chapter 2. As such, it may be 
the case that Western participants will be less affected by the negation of these images, 
but may gain more from the animation of the sequences. 
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In Chapter 6, Figure 6.3, patient SE was illustrated posing expressions of happiness, 
sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise. The static images printed in this thesis were 
taken from the apex of the display but they are not able to capture the exposition of 
these affect signals as they are seen in motion, consequently, they may not appear to be 
convincing portrayals of the expressions being examined. 
A theoretical application of the research reported in this thesis comes from the finding 
that our sensitivity to eye gaze direction is influenced by configural processing. 
Performance was found to be significantly impaired when the eyes were presented in 
isolation compared to within the context of an upright face. As the presence of the facial 
surround was found to have a significant advantage in discriminating gaze direction, it 
may be supposed that the expression portrayed on the surrounding face would also 
have an effect on the measured sensitivity. In the next section, some of the literature 
which would support this suggestion for a future project is briefly described. 
Gaze Direction Sensitivity from Emotionally Expressive 
Faces 
The gaze direction sensitivities reported in Chapter 4 were all measured from an actor 
posing a neutral facial expression (if a facial surround was present). Despite the 
evidence from neuropsychological and neurophysiological research for a double 
dissociation between facial expressions and eye gaze, perhaps at some level of 
processing, the two channels of information are pooled to generate socially relevant 
information. 
Dimberg and Ohman (1983) demonstrated that responses conditioned to angry faces 
directed towards a participant were resistant to extinction, conversely, responses 
conditioned to angry faces directed away from a participant extinguished immediately. 
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Furthermore, the orientation of the faces during acquisition was not important, only 
during the extinction phase were the faces required to be directed toward the participant 
to maintain persistent responses. Hansen and Hansen (1988) presented participants 
with arrays of expressive faces and found that participants were more efficient and 
faster at locating angry faces in happy crowds than happy faces in angry crowds. 
Similarly, the same pattern was found if the happy faces were replaced with neutral 
faces. They also found that participants were quicker to determine the presence or 
absence of an angry face in a happy crowd than they were to decide the presence or 
absence of a happy face in an angry crowd. This asymmetry was also found to increase 
as the size of the crowd increased. Hansen and Hansen (1988) concluded that faces 
could be pre-attentively processed for signals of potential threat. Von Gronau and 
Anston (1995) reported the existence of a search asymmetry for the detection of a 
straight ahead gaze. Eye-like stimuli with a directed gaze were detected more quickly 
and with fewer errors when embedded in an array of averted gaze dis tractors , than 
averted gaze stimuli were detected in an array of directed gaze distractors. They did not 
find the same effect for geometric eye-like stimuli which would suggest that the 
detectability of the realistic eye-like stimuli was not simply an artifact of the directed 
gaze stimuli also conforming to a symmetrical pattern. This research, in conjunction 
with Hansen and Hansen's (1988) finding of pre-attentive processing of signals of 
potential threat, would suggest that it may be the case that performance in a gaze 
direction discrimination task would be most sensitive if the eyes were embedded within 
faces that signalled potential threat. So, for example, participants may be better able to 
discriminate gaze direction from a face which was portraying a directed expression such 
as anger or fear, in which case, the ability to decide if this emotion was directed at self 
would have obvious survival benefits for an organism. Conversely, sensitivity to gaze 
direction from a sad face may not be very impressive since sadness is not a signal 
which we usually direct at other people and would not cause the same arousal as a 
potentially threatening signal. The same penalty for mistaking the direction of gaze of a 
sad person would not befall the individual who mistook the gaze of an angry person. 
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Consequently, it could be imagined that participants would make more errors if the gaze 
was embedded in a threatening face as they may be more willing to assume that the gaze 
was directed towards them, since the penalty for mistaking a directed gaze could prove 
costly. 
Conclusions 
The question posed at the beginning of this thesis asked, 'how sensitive are we to the 
socially relevant signals that we are confronted with in our non-verbal communications 
with other people, and how can we measure these sensitivities?' I hope that by now the 
reader is convinced that we are highly sensitive to these signals, with evidence that our 
facial expressions can transmit an affective signal over great distances and that our 
ability to detect gaze direction is at least as good as Snellen acuity. In addition, the 
detection of both of these social signals was found to depend on face specific 
mechanisms and not simply low level visual processes such as contrast sensitivity and 
acuity. The second part of the question is slightly more difficult to answer. The amount 
of variation in SE's performance in the first four tasks described in Chapter 6, and in 
DR's performance in the free naming and 6AFC task (I) illustrates the difficulty in 
interpreting data collected using these paradigms. Are genuine impairments being 
revealed? Are some paradigms concealing genuine difficulties? Are others indicating the 
presence of an impairment simply as an artifact of experimental design? Are alternative 
strategies for coping with impairments easier to implement in some tasks compared to 
others? None of these questions can be easily addressed, although all are possible 
scenarios. The appeal of the psychophysical tasks described in Chapter 3 is that they do 
not require participants to interpret what they see, but simply make a discrimination 
between a signal and a non-signal. The suggestion of an equivalent task requiring a 
discrimination between 'fear' and 'not fear' for example, could provide a useful 
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Table 1: The contents of this table represent the expressions posed by each of the 
twenty-one actors whose images comprise the Jenkins affect set. 
Actor Happy Sad I Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
AB ~ "-I, "-I 
BC "-I "-I "-I, "-I 
CG "-I "-I "-I 
FC "-I "-I, 
PM "-I "V, ~ "-I "-I 
FY "V ~ 
" 
"V 
HB "-I "V, 
HL "-I "V "V "V "V 
KB "-I "-I "V, "V 




MM ~ "-I 
Iv1R "V 
MY "-I "V "V "-I 
PR "-I 
RF "-I 
SC "-I "V "V 
" SD "-I .. "-I 
SJ "-I "-I 




Western and Japanese participants in a Free Naming Expression Allocation Task 
SOURCE: grand mean 
population expression N MEAN SD SE 
120 7.7500 2.6703 0.2438 
SOURCE: population 
pop exp N MEAN SD SE 
J 60 6.5833 3.1852 0.4112 
w 60 8.9167 1.2114 0.1564 
SOURCE: exp 
pop exp N MEAN SD SE 
happy 20 9.8500 0.4894 0.1094 
sad 20 8.1500 1.5313 0.3424 
anger 20 7.8500 1. 9541 0.4369 
disgust 20 6.2000 3.4580 0.7732 
fear 20 5.2000 3.0018 0.6712 
surprlse 20 9.2500 0.8507 0.1902 
SOURCE: pop exp 
pop exp N MEAN SD SE 
Japanese h 10 9.7000 0.6749 0.2134 
J s 10 7.7000 1.8886 0.5972 
j a 10 6.2000 1. 2293 0.3887 
J d 10 4.0000 3.5901 1.1353 
j f 10 2.9000 2.3781 0.7520 
J su 10 9.0000 1. 0541 0.3333 
Westerners h 10 10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
w s 10 8.6000 0.9661 0.3055 
w a 10 9.5000 0.7071 0.2236 
w d 10 8.4000 1.2649 0.4000 
w f 10 7.5000 1.2693 0.4014 
w su 10 9.5000 0.5270 0.1667 
FACTOR: subject population expression score 
LEVELS: 20 2 6 120 
TYPE RANDOM BETWEEN WITHIN DATA 
SOURCE SS df MS F P 
============================================================ 
pop 163.3333 1 163.3333 32.606 0.000 *** 
s/p 90.1667 18 5.0093 
exp 314.7000 5 62.9400 31. 325 0.000 *** 
es/p 180.8333 90 2.0093 
pe 99.4667 5 19.8933 9.901 0.000 *** 
es/p 180.8333 90 2.0093 
248 
Chapter 3: Experiment 2:Sensitivity to expressive 
signals from the upright face 
SOURCE: grand mean 
distance exp N MEAN SD SE 
180 7.2278 2.0628 0.1538 
SOURCE: distance 
dist exp N MEAN SD SE 
d1 36 9.1389 1. 2225 0.2037 
d2 36 8.1389 1.6415 0.2736 
d3 36 7.6667 1.7071 0.2845 
d4 36 5.9167 1.6626 0.2771 
d5 36 5.2778 1.1859 0.1976 
SOURCE: expression 
dist exp N MEAN SD SE 
happy 30 8.1667 1.9667 0.3591 
sad 30 6.2000 1. 2429 0.2269 
anger 30 7.2333 1.8696 0.3413 
disgust 30 7.0000 2.4495 0.4472 
fear 30 7.1333 2.2397 0.4089 
surprise 30 7.6333 2.0254 0.3698 
SOURCE: distance expression 
dist exp N MEAN SD SE 
d1 h 6 9.5000 0.8367 0.3416 
d1 s 6 7.0000 1. 0954 0.4472 
d1 a 6 9.1667 0.7528 0.3073 
d1 d 6 9.6667 0.5164 0.2108 
d1 f 6 9.5000 0.8367 0.3416 
d1 su 6 10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d2 h 6 9.5000 0.8367 0.3416 
d2 s 6 5.6667 1.3663 0.5578 
d2 a 6 7.8333 1.4720 0.6009 
d2 d 6 8.6667 1.3663 0.5578 
d2 f 6 8.5000 1. 2247 0.5000 
d2 su 6 8.6667 0.5164 0.2108 
d3 h 6 9.1667 0.9832 0.4014 
d3 s 6 6.3333 1. 2111 0.4944 
d3 a 6 8.0000 1.2649 0.5164 
d3 d 6 7.5000 1.7607 0.7188 
d3 f 6 7.1667 2.1370 0.8724 
d3 su 6 7.8333 1.8348 0.7491 
d4 h 6 6.6667 2.0656 0.8433 
d4 s 6 6.6667 0.8165 0.3333 
d4 a 6 5.5000 1. 3784 0.5627 
d4 d 6 4.8333 1. 4720 0.6009 
d4 f 6 5.1667 2.1370 0.8724 
d4 su 6 6.6667 1. 2111 0.4944 
d5 h 6 6.0000 1. 4142 0.5774 
d5 s 6 5.3333 1. 2111 0.4944 
d5 a 6 5.6667 1.3663 0.5578 
d5 d 6 4.3333 1.0328 0.4216 
d5 f 6 5.3333 0.5164 0.2108 



















dist 367.0778 4 91.7694 54.106 0.000 *** 
ds/ 33.9222 20 1.6961 
exp 64.8944 5 12.9789 7.407 0.000 *** 
es/ 43.8056 25 1. 7522 
de 80.8556 20 4.0428 2.481 0.002 ** 
des/ 162.9444 100 1. 6294 
250 
Chapter 3: Male and Female Expressions of Anger 
SOURCE: grand mean 
dist sex N MEAN SD SE 
60 1. 4667 1.1856 0.1531 
SOURCE: distance 
dist sex N MEAN SD SE 
d1 12 0.4167 0.6686 0.1930 
d2 12 1. 0833 0.7930 0.2289 
d3 12 1.2500 0.8660 0.2500 
d4 12 2.3333 1.1547 0.3333 
d5 12 2.2500 1. 2154 0.3509 
SOURCE: sex 
dist sex N MEAN SD SE 
female 30 1. 5667 1. 2229 0.2233 
male 30 1.3667 1.1592 0.2116 
SOURCE: distance sex 
dist sex N MEAN SD SE 
d1 f 6 0.6667 0.8165 0.3333 
d1 m 6 0.1667 0.4082 0.1667 
d2 f 6 1.1667 0.7528 0.3073 
d2 m 6 1.0000 0.8944 0.3651 
d3 f 6 1.3333 0.8165 0.3333 
d3 m 6 1.1667 0.9832 0.4014 
d4 f 6 2.1667 1.3292 0.5426 
d4 m 6 2.5000 1. 0488 0.4282 
d5 f 6 2.5000 1. 5166 0.6191 
d5 m 6 2.0000 0.8944 0.3651 
FACTOR: subject distance sex score 
LEVELS: 6 5 2 60 
TYPE RANDOM WITHIN WITHIN DATA 
SOURCE SS df MS F P 
=============================================================== 
dist 31.9333 4 7.9833 9.466 0.000 *** 
ds/ 16.8667 20 0.8433 
sex 0.6000 1 0.6000 0.429 0.542 
ss/ 7.0000 5 1. 4000 
ds 1. 4000 4 0.3500 0.333 0.852 
dss/ 21. 0000 20 1. 0500 
251 
Chapter 3: Experiment 3: lAFC task to study sensitivity 
to expressive signals from the face. 
SOURCE: grand mean 
distance expression N MEAN SD SE 
180 6.4000 2.2363 0.1667 
SOURCE: distance 
dist expr N MEAN SD SE 
dl 36 8.2500 1.9030 0.3172 
d2 36 6.6389 2.4278 0.4046 
d3 36 6.1667 2.0633 0.3439 
d4 36 5.6944 1.7699 0.2950 
d5 36 5.2500 1. 7788 0.2965 
SOURCE: expression 
dist expr N MEAN SD SE 
Happy 30 7.6333 2.1573 0.3939 
Sad 30 4.6000 1. 9582 0.3575 
Anger 30 6.3333 2.0398 0.3724 
Disgust 30 6.3000 2.1995 0.4016 
Fear 30 6.3333 1.9535 0.3567 
Surprise 30 7.2000 1.9896 0.3633 
SOURCE: distance expression 
dist expr N MEAN SD SE 
dl H 6 9.6667 0.5164 0.2108 
dl S 6 5.6667 2.4221 0.9888 
dl A 6 8.3333 0.8165 0.3333 
dl D 6 8.3333 1.5055 0.6146 
dl F 6 8.1667 1.7224 0.7032 
dl Su 6 9.3333 1. 2111 0.4944 
d2 H 6 8.6667 1. 2111 0.4944 
d2 S 6 3.6667 2.3381 0.9545 
d2 A 6 7.0000 1. 7889 0.7303 
d2 D 6 6.6667 2.0656 0.8433 
d2 F 6 6.3333 2.4221 0.9888 
d2 Su 6 7.5000 2.0736 0.8466 
d3 H 6 7.3333 2.3381 0.9545 
d3 S 6 4.0000 2.0000 0.8165 
d3 A 6 7.0000 1. 2649 0.5164 
d3 D 6 6.3333 2.4221 0.9888 
d3 F 6 6.1667 1.1690 0.4773 
d3 Su 6 6.1667 1.8348 0.7491 
d4 H 6 7.5000 0.8367 0.3416 
d4 S 6 4.5000 0.8367 0.3416 
d4 A 6 4.6667 1. 7512 0.7149 
d4 D 6 5.1667 1.4720 0.6009 
d4 F 6 6.1667 2.1370 0.8724 
d4 Su 6 6.1667 1. 7224 0.7032 
d5 H 6 5.0000 2.0976 0.8563 
d5 S 6 5.1667 1.7224 0.7032 
d5 A 6 4.6667 1. 7512 0.7149 
d5 D 6 5.0000 2.1909 0.8944 
d5 F 6 4.8333 0.7528 0.3073 























dist 192.7556 4 48.1889 14.262 0.000 *** 
ds/ 67.5778 20 3.3789 
expr 162.6000 5 32.5200 15.838 0.000 *** 
es/ 51. 3333 25 2.0533 
de 78.5111 20 3.9256 1. 536 0.086 
des/ 255.5556 100 2.5556 
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Chapter 3: Experiment 2 and 3 compared (2AFC & 
Signal Detection) 
SOURCE: grand mean 
dist exp task N MEAN SD SE 
360 6.8167 2.1850 0.1152 
SOURCE: distance 
dist exp task N MEAN SD SE 
d1 72 8.6944 1. 6499 0.1944 
d2 72 7.3889 2.1919 0.2583 
d3 72 6.9167 2.0262 0.2388 
d4 72 5.8194 1.6978 0.2001 
d5 72 5.2639 1. 5011 0.1769 
SOURCE: expression 
dist exp task N MEAN SD SE 
happy 60 7.9000 2.0642 0.2665 
sad 60 5.4000 1.8152 0.2343 
anger 60 6.7833 1.9923 0.2572 
disgust 60 6.6667 2.3192 0.2994 
fear 60 6.7333 2.1223 0.2740 
surprise 60 7.4167 2.0025 0.2585 
SOURCE: distance expression 
dist exp task N MEAN SD SE 
d1 h 12 9.5833 0.6686 0.1930 
d1 s 12 6.3333 1.9228 0.5551 
d1 a 12 8.7500 0.8660 0.2500 
d1 d 12 9.0000 1.2792 0.3693 
d1 f 12 8.8333 1. 4668 0.4234 
d1 su 12 9.6667 0.8876 0.2562 
d2 h 12 9.0833 1.0836 0.3128 
d2 s 12 4.6667 2.1034 0.6072 
d2 a 12 7.4167 1.6214 0.4680 
d2 d 12 7.6667 1.9695 0.5685 
d2 f 12 7.4167 2.1515 0.6211 
d2 su 12 8.0833 1. 5643 0.4516 
d3 h 12 8.2500 1.9598 0.5658 
d3 s 12 5.1667 1.9924 0.5752 
d3 a 12 7.5000 1.3143 0.3794 
d3 d 12 6.9167 2.1088 0.6088 
d3 f 12 6.6667 1. 7233 0.4975 
d3 su 12 7.0000 1. 9540 0.5641 
d4 h 12 7.0833 1.5643 0.4516 
d4 s 12 5.5833 1. 3790 0.3981 
d4 a 12 5.0833 1. 5643 0.4516 
d4 d 12 5.0833 1.3790 0.3981 
d4 f 12 5.6667 2.1034 0.6072 
d4 su 12 6.4167 1. 4434 0.4167 
d5 h 12 5.5000 1. 7838 0.5149 
d5 s 12 5.2500 1.4222 0.4106 
d5 a 12 5.1667 1.5859 0.4578 
d5 d 12 4.6667 1.6697 0.4820 
d5 f 12 5.0833 0.6686 0.1930 
d5 su 12 5.9167 1. 6214 0.4680 
254 
SOURCE: task 
dist exp task 
e2 (Expt.2) 
e3 (Expt.3) 
SOURCE: distance task 
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SOURCE: distance expression task 
dist exp task N MEAN 
d1 h e2 6 9.5000 




















































































































































































































d2 su e3 6 7.5000 2.0736 0.8466 
d3 h e2 6 9.1667 0.9832 0.4014 
d3 h e3 6 7.3333 2.3381 0.9545 
d3 s e2 6 6.3333 1. 2111 0.4944 
d3 s e3 6 4.0000 2.0000 0.8165 
d3 a e2 6 8.0000 1. 2649 0.5164 
d3 a e3 6 7.0000 1.2649 0.5164 
d3 d e2 6 7.5000 1.7607 0.7188 
d3 d e3 6 6.3333 2.4221 0.9888 
d3 f e2 6 7.1667 2.1370 0.8724 
d3 f e3 6 6.1667 1.1690 0.4773 
d3 su e2 6 7.8333 1.8348 0.7491 
d3 su e3 6 6.1667 1. 8348 0.7491 
d4 h e2 6 6.6667 2.0656 0.8433 
d4 h e3 6 7.5000 0.8367 0.3416 
d4 s e2 6 6.6667 0.8165 0.3333 
d4 s e3 6 4.5000 0.8367 0.3416 
d4 a e2 6 5.5000 1. 3784 0.5627 
d4 a e3 6 4.6667 1. 7512 0.7149 
d4 d e2 6 4.8333 1.4720 0.6009 
d4 d e3 6 5.3333 1.3663 0.5578 
d4 f e2 6 5.1667 2.1370 0.8724 
d4 f e3 6 6.1667 2.1370 0.8724 
d4 su e2 6 6.6667 1. 2111 0.4944 
d4 su e3 6 6.1667 1.7224 0.7032 
d5 h e2 6 6.0000 1. 4142 0.5774 
d5 h e3 6 5.0000 2.0976 0.8563 
d5 s e2 6 5.3333 1. 2111 0.4944 
d5 s e3 6 5.1667 1. 7224 0.7032 
d5 a e2 6 5.6667 1.3663 0.5578 
d5 a e3 6 4.6667 1.7512 0.7149 
d5 d e2 6 4.3333 1.0328 0.4216 
d5 d e3 6 5.0000 2.1909 0.8944 
d5 f e2 6 5.3333 0.5164 0.2108 
d5 f e3 6 4.8333 0.7528 0.3073 
d5 su e2 6 5.0000 1.0954 0.4472 
d5 su e3 6 6.8333 1. 6021 0.6540 
256 
FACTOR: subs distance expression task score 
LEVELS: 12 5 6 2 360 
TYPE RANDOM WITHIN WITHIN BETWEEN DATA 
SOURCE SS df MS F P 
=============================================================== 
dist 523.3722 4 130.8431 51.401 0.000 *** 
ds/t 101.8222 40 2.5456 
exp 214.2667 5 42.8533 22.536 0.000 *** 
es/t 95.0778 50 1.9016 
de 115.9278 20 5.7964 2.771 0.000 *** 
des/t 418.3111 200 2.0916 
task 60.8444 1 60.8444 6.511 0.029 * 
sit 93.4556 10 9.3456 
dt 35.0722 4 8.7681 3.444 0.016 * 
ds/t 101.8222 40 2.5456 
et 13.0556 5 2.6111 1. 373 0.250 
es/t 95.0778 50 1.9016 
det 42.6944 20 2.1347 1. 021 0.440 
des/t 418.3111 200 2.0916 
257 
Chapter 3: Experiment 4: Facial expression detection 
from 1-bit per pixel images 
SOURCE: grand mean 
distance expression N MEAN SD SE 
108 6.6944 1.9114 0.1839 
SOURCE: distance 
dist expr N MEAN SD SE 
d1 36 8.1111 1. 6523 0.2754 
d2 36 6.3889 1. 7448 0.2908 
d3 36 5.5833 1.4015 0.2336 
SOURCE: expression 
dist expr N MEAN SD SE 
H 18 7.6667 1.9097 0.4501 
S 18 5.3889 1. 4608 0.3443 
A 18 6.4444 1. 7896 0.4218 
D 18 6.4444 2.2550 0.5315 
F 18 6.9444 1.6260 0.3832 
Su 18 7.2778 1.7083 0.4027 
SOURCE: distance expression 
dist expr N MEAN SD SE 
d1 H 6 9.5000 0.5477 0.2236 
d1 S 6 5.5000 1. 3784 0.5627 
d1 A 6 7.6667 1.0328 0.4216 
d1 D 6 8.8333 1.1690 0.4773 
d1 F 6 8.5000 0.5477 0.2236 
d1 Su 6 8.6667 1. 5055 0.6146 
d2 H 6 8.0000 0.6325 0.2582 
d2 S 6 4.8333 1.1690 0.4773 
d2 A 6 6.3333 1.9664 0.8028 
d2 D 6 5.0000 1. 7889 0.7303 
d2 F 6 6.8333 1.1690 0.4773 
d2 Su 6 7.3333 1. 2111 0.4944 
d3 H 6 5.5000 1. 3784 0.5627 
d3 S 6 5.8333 1. 8348 0.7491 
d3 A 6 5.3333 1.6330 0.6667 
d3 D 6 5.5000 1. 5166 0.6191 
d3 F 6 5.5000 1.3784 0.5627 
d3 Su 6 5.8333 1.1690 0.4773 
FACTOR: subj dist expr correct 
LEVELS: 6 3 6 108 
TYPE RANDOM WITHIN WITHIN DATA 
SOURCE SS df MS F P 
=============================================================== 
dist 120.0556 2 60.0278 39.291 0.000 *** 
ds! 15.2778 10 1.5278 
expr 57.1944 5 11.4389 5.647 0.001 ** 
es! 50.6389 25 2.0256 
de 51. 8333 10 5.1833 3.008 0.005 ** 
des! 86.1667 50 1. 7233 
258 
Chapter 3: Experiment 2 and 4 compared (Full grey-
level and I-bit per pixel) 
SOURCE: grand mean 
distance expression task N MEAN SD SE 
216 7.5046 1.9553 0.1330 
SOURCE: distance 
dista expre task N MEAN SD SE 
d1 72 8.6250 1.5331 0.1807 
d2 72 7.2639 1.8988 0.2238 
d3 72 6.6250 1.8722 0.2206 
SOURCE: expression 
dista expre task N MEAN SD SE 
h 36 8.5278 1. 6985 0.2831 
s 36 5.8611 1.4373 0.2396 
a 36 7.3889 1. 8091 0.3015 
d 36 7.5278 2.1972 0.3662 
f 36 7.6667 1. 8048 0.3008 
su 36 8.0556 1.7229 0.2871 
SOURCE: distance expression 
dista expre task N MEAN SD SE 
d1 h 12 9.5000 0.6742 0.1946 
d1 s 12 6.2500 1.4222 0.4106 
d1 a 12 8.4167 1.1645 0.3362 
d1 d 12 9.2500 0.9653 0.2787 
d1 f 12 9.0000 0.8528 0.2462 
d1 su 12 9.3333 1.2309 0.3553 
d2 h 12 8.7500 1.0553 0.3046 
d2 s 12 5.2500 1.2881 0.3718 
d2 a 12 7.0833 1.8320 0.5288 
d2 d 12 6.8333 2.4433 0.7053 
d2 f 12 7.6667 1.4355 0.4144 
d2 su 12 8.0000 1.1282 0.3257 
d3 h 12 7.3333 2.2293 0.6435 
d3 s 12 6.0833 1.5050 0.4345 
d3 a 12 6.6667 1.9695 0.5685 
d3 d 12 6.5000 1.8829 0.5436 
d3 f 12 6.3333 1.9228 0.5551 
d3 su 12 6.8333 1. 8007 0.5198 
SOURCE: task e2 (Expt. 2) , e4 (Expt.4) 
dista expre task N MEAN SD SE 
e2 108 8.3148 1.6443 0.1582 
e4 108 6.6944 1. 9114 0.1839 
SOURCE: distance task 
dista expre task N MEAN SD SE 
d1 e2 36 9.1389 1.2225 0.2037 
d1 e4 36 8.1111 1. 6523 0.2754 
d2 e2 36 8.1389 1.6415 0.2736 
d2 e4 36 6.3889 1.7448 0.2908 
d3 e2 36 7.6667 1. 7071 0.2845 
d3 e4 36 5.5833 1.4015 0.2336 
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SOURCE: expression task 
dista expre task N 















































SOURCE: distance expression task 
dista expre task N MEAN 
d1 h e2 6 9.5000 
d1 h e4 6 9.5000 











































































































































































































































































FACTOR: subs distance expression task score 
LEVELS: 12 3 6 2 216 
TYPE RANDOM WITHIN WITHIN BETWEEN DATA 
SOURCE SS df MS F P 
=============================================================== 
dist 150.2593 2 75.1296 38.382 0.000 *** 
ds/t 39.1481 20 1.9574 
exp 147.3009 5 29.4602 17.557 0.000 *** 
es/t 83.8981 50 1.6780 
de 40.0185 10 4.0019 2.523 0.009 ** 
des/t 158.6296 100 1.5863 
task 141.7824 1 141.7824 97.843 0.000 *** 
sit 14.4907 10 1. 4491 
dt 10.4815 2 5.2407 2.677 0.093 
ds/t 39.1481 20 1.9574 
et 7.8565 5 1. 5713 0.936 0.466 
es/t 83.8981 50 1.6780 
det 28.1296 10 2.8130 1. 773 0.075 
des/t 158.6296 100 1.5863 
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Chapter 3: Experiment 5: Sensitivity to expressive 
signals from the inverted face. 
SOURCE: grand mean 
distance expression N MEAN SD SE 
180 5.7889 1.6945 0.1263 
SOURCE: distance 
dist expr N MEAN SD SE 
d1 36 7.5833 1.3390 0.2232 
d2 36 6.0833 1.6626 0.2771 
d3 36 5.0000 1. 4343 0.2390 
d4 36 5.0278 1.2980 0.2163 
d5 36 5.2500 1.2042 0.2007 
SOURCE: expression 
dist expr N MEAN SD SE 
h 30 6.3000 2.1520 0.3929 
s 30 5.5333 1.3060 0.2384 
a 30 5.5667 1. 5906 0.2904 
d 30 5.5333 1.5698 0.2866 
f 30 6.0000 1.4856 0.2712 
su 30 5.8000 1. 9191 0.3504 
SOURCE: distance expression 
dist expr N MEAN SD SE 
d1 h 6 8.6667 1.0328 0.4216 
d1 s 6 6.6667 1.0328 0.4216 
d1 a 6 7.5000 1.3784 0.5627 
d1 d 6 7.3333 1. 5055 0.6146 
d1 f 6 6.8333 0.4082 0.1667 
d1 su 6 8.5000 1.3784 0.5627 
d2 h 6 7.1667 2.2286 0.9098 
d2 s 6 5.3333 1. 2111 0.4944 
d2 a 6 6.5000 1.2247 0.5000 
d2 d 6 4.6667 1. 6330 0.6667 
d2 f 6 6.6667 1. 5055 0.6146 
d2 su 6 6.1667 1.1690 0.4773 
d3 h 6 5.3333 1.9664 0.8028 
d3 s 6 5.3333 1.5055 0.6146 
d3 a 6 4.5000 1.0488 0.4282 
d3 d 6 5.0000 1. 0954 0.4472 
d3 f 6 5.1667 1.7224 0.7032 
d3 su 6 4.6667 1.5055 0.6146 
d4 h 6 4.8333 1.4720 0.6009 
d4 s 6 5.8333 0.9832 0.4014 
d4 a 6 4.5000 1. 0488 0.4282 
d4 d 6 5.1667 1.4720 0.6009 
d4 f 6 5.3333 1. 5055 0.6146 
d4 su 6 4.5000 1. 2247 0.5000 
d5 h 6 5.5000 1.6432 0.6708 
d5 s 6 4.5000 1. 0488 0.4282 
d5 a 6 4.8333 0.4082 0.1667 
d5 d 6 5.5000 0.8367 0.3416 
d5 f 6 6.0000 1.5492 0.6325 























dist 172.7556 4 43.1889 30.510 0.000 *** 
ds/ 28.3111 20 1.4156 
expr 14.5778 5 2.9156 1.093 0.389 
es/ 66.6889 25 2.6676 
de 52.3111 20 2.6156 1.508 0.095 
des/ 173.4222 100 1.7342 
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Chapter 3: Experiment 2 and 5 compared (Upright & 
Inverted) 
SOURCE: grand mean 
dist exp task N MEAN SD SE 
360 6.5111 2.0166 0.1063 
SOURCE: distance 
dist exp task N MEAN SD SE 
d1 72 8.3611 1. 4946 0.1761 
d2 72 7.1111 1.9396 0.2286 
d3 72 6.3333 2.0624 0.2431 
d4 72 5.4861 1.5473 0.1824 
d5 72 5.2639 1.1867 0.1399 
SOURCE: expression 
dist exp task N MEAN SD SE 
H 60 7.2500 2.2370 0.2888 
S 60 5.8667 1.3080 0.1689 
A 60 6.4000 1. 9151 0.2472 
D 60 6.3167 2.1589 0.2787 
F 60 6.5167 1.9872 0.2565 
Su 60 6.7167 2.1636 0.2793 
SOURCE: distance expreSSlon 
dist exp task N MEAN SD SE 
d1 H 12 9.0833 0.9962 0.2876 
d1 S 12 6.8333 1. 0299 0.2973 
d1 A 12 8.3333 1.3707 0.3957 
d1 D 12 8.5833 1. 6765 0.4840 
d1 F 12 8.0833 1. 4434 0.4167 
d1 Su 12 9.2500 1. 2154 0.3509 
d2 H 12 8.3333 2.0151 0.5817 
d2 S 12 5.5000 1. 2432 0.3589 
d2 A 12 7.1667 1. 4668 0.4234 
d2 D 12 6.6667 2.5346 0.7317 
d2 F 12 7.5833 1.6214 0.4680 
d2 Su 12 7.4167 1.5643 0.4516 
d3 H 12 7.2500 2.4909 0.7191 
d3 S 12 5.8333 1.4035 0.4051 
d3 A 12 6.2500 2.1373 0.6170 
d3 D 12 6.2500 1. 9129 0.5522 
d3 F 12 6.1667 2.1249 0.6134 
d3 Su 12 6.2500 2.3012 0.6643 
d4 H 12 5.8333 1.9462 0.5618 
d4 S 12 6.2500 0.9653 0.2787 
d4 A 12 5.0000 1. 2792 0.3693 
d4 D 12 5.1667 1.2673 0.3658 
d4 F 12 5.0833 1.8809 0.5430 
d4 Su 12 5.5833 1. 6214 0.4680 
d5 H 12 5.7500 1.4848 0.4286 
d5 S 12 4.9167 1.1645 0.3362 
d5 A 12 5.2500 1. 0553 0.3046 
d5 D 12 4.9167 1.0836 0.3128 
d5 F 12 5.6667 1.1547 0.3333 
d5 Su 12 5.0833 1.0836 0.3128 
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SOURCE: task 
dist exp task 
e2 
e5 





































SOURCE: expression task 




























































SOURCE: distance expression task 
dist exp task N MEAN 






















































































































































































































d2 Su eS 6 6.1667 1.1690 0.4773 
d3 H e2 6 9.1667 0.9832 0.4014 
d3 H eS 6 5.3333 1. 9664 0.8028 
d3 S e2 6 6.3333 1. 2111 0.4944 
d3 S eS 6 5.3333 1. 5055 0.6146 
d3 A e2 6 8.0000 1. 2649 0.5164 
d3 A eS 6 4.5000 1.0488 0.4282 
d3 D e2 6 7.5000 1.7607 0.7188 
d3 D eS 6 5.0000 1. 0954 0.4472 
d3 F e2 6 7.1667 2.1370 0.8724 
d3 F eS 6 5.1667 1.7224 0.7032 
d3 Su e2 6 7.8333 1.8348 0.7491 
d3 Su eS 6 4.6667 1. 5055 0.6146 
d4 H e2 6 6.8333 1. 9408 0.7923 
d4 H eS 6 4.8333 1.4720 0.6009 
d4 S e2 6 6.6667 0.8165 0.3333 
d4 S eS 6 5.8333 0.9832 0.4014 
d4 A e2 6 5.5000 1. 3784 0.5627 
d4 A e5 6 4.5000 1. 0488 0.4282 
d4 D e2 6 5.1667 1.1690 0.4773 
d4 D e5 6 5.1667 1.4720 0.6009 
d4 F e2 6 4.8333 2.3166 0.9458 
d4 F eS 6 5.3333 1. 5055 0.6146 
d4 Su e2 6 6.6667 1. 2111 0.4944 
d4 Su e5 6 4.5000 1.2247 0.5000 
dS H e2 6 6.0000 1.4142 0.5774 
dS H e5 6 5.5000 1.6432 0.6708 
dS S e2 6 5.3333 1. 2111 0.4944 
dS S eS 6 4.5000 1. 0488 0.4282 
d5 A e2 6 5.6667 1.3663 0.5578 
dS A e5 6 4.8333 0.4082 0.1667 
d5 D e2 6 4.3333 1. 0328 0.4216 
d5 D e5 6 5.5000 0.8367 0.3416 
d5 F e2 6 5.3333 0.5164 0.2108 
d5 F eS 6 6.0000 1.5492 0.6325 
d5 Su e2 6 5.0000 1. 0954 0.4472 
dS Su eS 6 5.1667 1.1690 0.4773 
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FACTOR: subjects distance expression task score 
LEVELS: 12 5 6 2 360 
TYPE RANDOM WITHIN WITHIN BETWEEN DATA 
SOURCE SS df MS F P 
=============================================================== 
dist 462.2611 4 115.5653 75.328 0.000 *** 
ds/t 61. 3667 40 1.5342 
exp 63.2222 5 12.6444 5.715 0.000 *** 
es/t 110.6222 50 2.2124 
de 73.6389 20 3.6819 2.202 0.003 ** 
des/t 334.4333 200 1.6722 
task 187.7778 1 187.7778 138.298 0.000 *** 
sit 13.5778 10 1.3578 
dt 74.9722 4 18.7431 12.217 0.000 *** 
ds/t 61.3667 40 1.5342 
et 17.9556 5 3.5911 1. 623 0.171 
es/t 110.6222 50 2.2124 
det 60.1278 20 3.0064 1.798 0.023 * 
des/t 334.4333 200 1. 6722 
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Chapter 4: Experiment 2: Contribution of the facial 
surround in gaze discrimination tasks (I) 
SOURCE: grand mean 
orlen conte N MEAN SD SE 
40 3.6732 1. 5299 0.2419 
SOURCE: orient 
orien conte N MEAN SD SE 
upr 20 3.1859 1.5771 0.3526 
inv 20 4.1605 1. 3481 0.3014 
SOURCE: context 
orien conte N MEAN SD SE 
abs 20 3.7693 1.4077 0.3148 
pres 20 3.5771 1. 6743 0.3744 
SOURCE: orient context 
orien conte N MEAN SD SE 
upr abs 10 3.2024 1.0458 0.3307 
upr pres 10 3.1693 2.0387 0.6447 
inv abs 10 4.3361 1. 5414 0.4874 
inv pres 10 3.9848 1.1799 0.3731 
FACTOR: subs orient context data 
LEVELS: 40 2 2 40 
TYPE RANDOM BETWEEN BETWEEN DATA 
SOURCE SS df MS F P 
=============================================================== 
orient 9.4985 1 9.4985 4.213 0.047 * 
sloc 81.1626 36 2.2545 
context 0.3695 1 0.3695 0.164 0.688 
sloc 81.1626 36 2.2545 
oc 0.2531 1 0.2531 0.112 0.740 
sloc 81.1626 36 2.2545 
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Chapter 4: Experiment 3: Contribution of the facial 
surround in gaze discrimination tasks (II) 
SOURCE: grand mean 
face eyes N MEAN SD SE 
36 0.2719 0.1705 0.0284 
SOURCE: face 
face eyes N MEAN SD SE 
Face Up (FU) 12 0.3367 0.2280 0.0658 
Face Down (FD) 12 0.2667 0.1696 0.0490 
Face Absent (FA) 12 0.2125 0.0571 0.0165 
SOURCE: eyes 
face eyes N MEAN SD SE 
Eyes Up (EU) 18 0.3483 0.2014 0.0475 
Eyes Down (ED) 18 0.1956 0.0830 0.0196 
SOURCE: face eyes 
face eyes N MEAN SD SE 
FU EU 6 0.4783 0.2384 0.0973 
FU ED 6 0.1950 0.0965 0.0394 
FD EU 6 0.3583 0.1915 0.0782 
FD ED 6 0.1750 0.0804 0.0328 
FA EU 6 0.2083 0.0223 0.0091 
FA ED 6 0.2167 0.0814 0.0332 
FACTOR: subs face eyes score 
LEVELS: 36 3 2 36 
TYPE RANDOM BETWEEN BETWEEN DATA 
SOURCE SS df MS F P 
=============================================================== 
face 0.0930 2 0.0465 2.397 0.108 
slfe 0.5821 30 0.0194 
0.2101 1 0.2101 10.827 0.003 ** eyes 
slfe 0.5821 30 0.0194 
fe 0.1318 2 0.0659 3.397 0.047 * 
slfe 0.5821 30 0.0194 
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Chapter 6 
Errors made by six control participants in a free naming expression allocation task. 
Numbers in parenthesis represent the frequency of the response, where no 
parenthesis are present the word was used only once. 
Controls Happiness Sadness Anger Disgust Fear Surprise 
Satisfied bored (5) determination (8) aghast (3) surprise (10) joy (3) 
smug (4) spiteful (3) puzzled (3) disbelief (4) disbelief (3) 
perplexed (2) frustration (2) pain (3) bewilderment (3) unaware (2) 
contemplative hate (2) sad (2) determined (3) guilty 
sulking perplexed (2) scared guilty (3) contented 
acceptance concentration unsure puzzled (3) delight 
reflective bamboozled grimace amazed (2) gnmace 
disappointed disgust uncertain repugnant (2) fear 
anger aghast revulsion (2) pleasure 
Errors penSIve idiot blameless bewilderment 
failed! pam anxiety startled 
thoughtful adamant cagey 
placid serious astonished 
fear shock 
so what?! disdain 
grimace worried 
distrust agog 
nasty! astounded 
wide-eyed 
stupid 
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